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“People at Law:  Subordinate Southerners, Popular Governance, and Local Legal 
Culture in Antebellum Mississippi and Louisiana” uses manuscript civil and criminal 
court records, church disciplinary hearings, newspaper accounts of trials, and the personal 
papers of judges and lawyers to investigate the relationship between subordinated people 
and the law in the Natchez District of Mississippi and Louisiana from 1820 to 1860.  This 
project asks if local courts provided white women and free and enslaved blacks with a 
platform to improve their lives.  Although denied many legal rights and excluded from 
formal political arenas, white women and African Americans positioned themselves as 
astute litigators.  They frequently went to court to redress wrongs done to them and to 
make public demands on those in positions of authority.  Knowledge of the southern legal 
system, coupled with the ability to harness their own community networks, gave them a 
degree of power:  the power to improve their immediate situations and, on occasion, the 
power to bend others to their will.  
Part of the reason for the success of the challenges subordinates mounted in court 
against their husbands, masters, and social betters was the limited nature of the 
challenges themselves.  Rather than attempting to confront the planter class directly and 
dismantle the larger social system, they appealed to notions of justice and fairness that 
they insisted all southerners shared.  When white women and African Americans (male 
and female) used local courts to constrain the power of their superiors, they in effect 
confirmed their subordination by making patriarchal marriage and the institution of 
slavery work according to the highest southern ideal.  But in the process, courts 
disciplined adulterous husbands and brutal masters.  Setting limits on the unrestrained 
behavior of husbands or slaveholders helped uphold the legitimacy of hierarchical 
marriage and slavery, to be sure.  Still, it also allowed wives (white and black), free 
people of color, and slaves to turn their subordination into a legal strategy.  While they 
did not overthrow the system of power that subordinated them, white women, free blacks, 
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The process of researching and writing a dissertation is often a lonely—and 
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encouragement that I have received along the way.   
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completed my dissertation research with the aid of an Andrew W. Mellon dissertation 
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Club Foundation, the Department of History at the University of Maryland, and the 
Dolphe Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas at Austin.  I am 
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received from the American Bar Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the 
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me when I needed help figuring out—at bottom—what was significant about my project, 
gave me the space to find my own voice, and helped me realize what I am capable of.  
Working with him reminds me why I want to be a historian and write the kinds of books 
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people want to read.  If I can be half the scholar, teacher, and mentor he is, I will be doing 
well indeed.  Robyn Muncy’s door was always open, and she believed in me from the 
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cheerleader and a fine critical reader.  Leslie Rowland took me under her wing as if I 
were her own advisee, and I have greatly benefited from her vast knowledge of southern 
history.  Dylan Penningroth has been a fellow traveler in the unwieldy world of local 
courts and a source of wisdom when I have most needed it.  Michael Ross has offered me 
insight into the field of legal history, a field new to me.  The support of my committee 
has made this a better dissertation and me a better scholar.   
 The friendships I developed as a graduate student at the University of Maryland 
and a fellow at the American Bar Foundation have helped sustain me throughout this 
process.  Amy Rutenburg, Christina Larocco, and I have shared a brain for a number of 
years—something that began when we studied for and agonized over our comprehensive 
exams.  You know, ladies, if this whole Ph.D. thing does not work out (or if we 
experience yet another general rebellion against productivity), we always have our young 
adult historical fiction to fall back on—inspired by our dissertations, of course.  The 
American Bar Foundation offered me a home and a community in Chicago.  Robert 
Nelson, Laura Beth Nielson, Joanna Grisinger, Rashmee Singh, Meredith Roundtree, and 
the members of the Whine and Cheese writing group have helped me grow as a legal 
scholar and a historian.  I could not have asked for a better mentor than Dylan 
Penningroth, and I particularly appreciate his sage advice, probing questions, and 
friendship.  I owe special thanks (and a thousand martinis) to Jill Weinberg.  She read 
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every word of this dissertation—more than once—and her insightful critiques have made 
it better.   
 I could not have done this without the support of my friends and family.  I am 
especially grateful for the sharp wit, ceaseless encouragement, and generosity of spirit of 
Sarah Johnson, Abigail Johnson, Gabrielle Adams, Jennifer Liden, and Felicity Turner.  I 
owe y’all a glass of wine and so much more.  Juanita Robinson gave me a place to come 
home to each night after hours of research in a damp basement in Natchez, Mississippi.  
Juanita also treated me as family, fed me many a southern meal, and taught me a great 
deal about Natchez.  The Person family—Jim, Lee, Currie, and Wells—exposed me to a 
whole new world and included me as one of their own from the moment I walked through 
their door.  In many ways, Jimmie and Jane Person made this project possible.  Jane’s 
connections to nearly everyone in the greater Natchez area opened every door 
imaginable.  Jane and Jimmie gave me a place to visit on the weekends, fed me martinis 
and oyster stew, and welcomed me and loved me as if I were their own grandchild.  My 
sisters—Anna Welch, Leslie Person, Sarah Welch, and Jamie Connolly—have constantly 
helped me remember what is most important.  Now that this is finished, I promise (!) to 
talk about something else.  Well, I will try my best anyway.  My parents, Mike and Mary 
Welch and Kate Fitzpatrick, neither doubted me nor judged my choices, even when they 
did not quite get what I was doing with my life or otherwise.  Thank you for believing in 
me—always.  Ari Bryen talked me through many a conceptual problem and opened up 
his life and heart to me.  My life is richer with Ari in it.        
 I dedicate this dissertation to Jimmie Person.  Jimmie’s family settled in Port 
Gibson, Mississippi, in the early part of the nineteenth century, and Jimmie himself has 
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lived there his entire life.  I learned a great deal about the importance of family and place 
from Jimmie, lessons he taught me over laughs, cocktails, meals, and Mississippi State 
football games.  He also taught me more about southern history than anyone else—
through our animated conversations, treks through old graveyards and battlefields, and 
frequent excursions down the muddy back roads of Claiborne County.  Jimmie took this 
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In September 1822, Fanny, a free woman of color and former slave, appeared 
before the district court in Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana.  She was suing Francois 
Gueho, an “evil-minded and disgraceful” white man, for slanderous verbal attacks on her 
reputation.  Gueho, Fanny claimed, had “wickedly, willfully and maliciously slandered” 
her and “endangered her freedom by insisting that she is a slave.” Gueho’s “acts of 
violence, threats and menaces” had endangered her position in the community, Fanny 
told the court, and caused others to question her free status.  Gueho, she pleaded, 
“intended to reduce her to slavery.”  He was a powerful and influential man, the 
“president of the Parish of Pointe Coupee.”  Without the court’s intervention and 
protection, he could “greatly injure her.”  She herself had behaved respectably and had 
“faithfully served” her former master.  She asked the court to formally “adjudge” her a 
free woman and award her $5,000 in damages, plus “general relief.”
1
  Fanny’s lawsuit 
raises important questions about the relationship between subordinated people and local 
courts in the slave South.  It indicates her readiness to use the courts to address her 
grievances, reveals her familiarity with the legal process, and confirms the soundness of 
her expectation that the court might rule in her favor.  As a woman of color and a former 
slave, however, her lawsuit against a white man challenges the race and gender 
inequalities that historians of the antebellum South have found embedded in the southern 
legal system.    
                                                 
1
 The outcome of Fanny’s lawsuit is not known.  Fanny v. Gueho, Records of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, #539, Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana, 1822.   
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 “People at Law: Subordinate Southerners, Popular Governance, and Local Legal 
Culture in Antebellum Mississippi and Louisiana” investigates the relationship between 
subordinated people and the law in the Natchez District of Mississippi and Louisiana 
from 1820 to 1860.  It asks if local courts—although themselves an arm of the planter 
class—provided white women and free and enslaved African Americans with a resource 
to improve their lives.  With its enormous plantations, large population of slaves, and the 
richest planters in the American South, the Natchez District seems an unexpected place 
for a legal culture that recognized the claims of marginalized people.  Nevertheless, 
although denied many legal rights and excluded from formal political arenas, white 
women and African Americans positioned themselves as astute litigators.  They 
frequently went to court to redress wrongs done to them and to make public demands on 
those in positions of authority.  Knowledge of the southern legal system, I argue, coupled 
with the ability to harness their own community networks, gave them a degree of power:  
the power to improve their own situations and the power to bend others to their will.   
In exchange for individual legal success, however, white women and free and 
enslaved African Americans reinforced their subordinate position within the southern 
social order.  Part of the reason for the success of the challenges subordinates mounted in 
court against their husbands, masters, and social betters was the limited nature of the 
challenges themselves.  Rather than attempting to confront the planter class directly and 
dismantle the larger social system that oppressed them, they appealed to notions of justice 
and fairness that they insisted all southerners shared.  When white women and African 
Americans used the local courts to constrain the power of their superiors, they in effect 
confirmed their subordination by making patriarchal marriage and the institution of 
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slavery work according to the highest southern ideal.  But in the process, courts also 
disciplined adulterous husbands and brutal masters.  These men had violated their 
prescribed roles by wantonly abusing their wives or carelessly governing their slaves and 
thus were penalized.  Setting limits on the unrestrained behavior of husbands or 
slaveholders quite certainly helped uphold the legitimacy of hierarchical marriage and 
slavery.  Still, I argue, it also allowed wives (white and African American), free people of 
color, and slaves to turn their subordination into a usable legal principle, transforming the 
slaveholders’ terrain into their own turf.   In so doing, they improved their situations.  
While they did not overthrow the system of power that subordinated them, white women, 
free blacks, and slaves used the courts to help define what their subordination would look 
like.  Their actions in court helped influence the rules that dictated their lives.   
 
By the eve of the Civil War, the institution of slavery defined the Natchez 
District.
2
  With the opening of new territory in the southern interior, the enormous 
movement of slaves from the seaboard states to the Deep South, the invention of the 
cotton gin, revolutions in cotton and sugar, as well as other factors, slavery became 
deeply entrenched in the Natchez District.  In the antebellum period, the cotton counties 
of Mississippi and the cotton and sugar parishes of Louisiana were emphatically slave 
societies:  societies in which slavery was central to the region’s economy and a powerful 
slaveholding minority held the reins of political power.  In this region, the authority of 
the slaveholding elite was seemingly unlimited, and a coherent planter ideology and 
culture unified slaveholders.  Slaveholders’ interests dominated politics.  The South’s 
                                                 
2
 The Natchez District consisted of the Mississippi River counties and parishes of southwest 
Mississippi and southeast Louisiana.   
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richest planters resided in Natchez, Mississippi, and its environs, and many owned 
plantations in both states.  By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the District’s 
slaveholders were some of the largest importers of slaves in the booming domestic slave 
trade.  The Surget family of Mississippi, to name one example, owned more than 5,000 
slaves.  Natchez was home to “Forks-of-the-Road,” the busiest slave market outside of 
New Orleans.  As in much of the South, slavery touched nearly every aspect of life in the 
Natchez District, from the rule of law to the position of women in society.   
Throughout the South, slavery affected power relations within households.  
Households—planter and yeoman alike—represented the most important social unit in 
the slave South, and they organized the majority of the population (free women and 
children, servants, and slaves) in relationships of dependency to the propertied male head.  
As historian Stephanie McCurry demonstrates, by law and custom, adult freemen, as 
heads of households, were constituted masters.  As masters, they enjoyed exclusive 
authority over their household.  The construction of households as independent and 
impenetrable primarily reflected planters’ interests in the security of slave property, but 
planters could not establish the requisite legal and customary authority of the master 
without making more general claims.  Rooted in property rights and an ideology of fierce 
independence, McCurry argues, these claims extended to the households of all free and 
propertied men. When jurists ruled on the rights of property, for example, they made no 
distinction between planter and yeoman.  The proslavery ideology developed by planters 
reminded white southerners of every class that slavery could not be distinguished from 
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other relations of power and repeatedly conjoined all domestic relationships of 
domination and subordination, particularly marriage.
3
   
The authority of men as household heads was also reflected in southern statutes 
and appellate law.  The southern legal system supported the authority of men over all 
other dependents, and the state recognized and supported the male head as the sole 
representative of the family in all economic, legal, and political matters.  Generally, only 
white men had the power to act at law, and only they could cast ballots.  Once married, 
wives surrendered their legal personality.  Single white women could function on a legal 
par with white men with regard to property rights; they did not, however, enjoy any of the 
political rights associated with property ownership.
4
  Slaves and free people of color 
fared even worse.  Southern statutes stipulated that anyone born of a slave mother was the 
property of the mother’s owner.  Slaves had no civil or political rights.  Both prejudice 
and policy led white southerners to subordinate free blacks legally as well, and 
lawmakers did their best to make sure free people of color enjoyed few rights.  Many 
states equated free blacks with slaves in an effort to diminish their status as free persons.
5
   
As subordinates, white women and free and enslaved African Americans, seemed, 
then, to be outside the political and legal system.  From the perspectives of household 
governance and formal law, subordinated people had little power and standing in 
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 Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the 




 Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1986); and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1982).  
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southern society, and the law represented a site closed to them.  Thus, the success of 
white women and African Americans’ in using the local courts to improve their lives was 
all the more surprising, especially in the heart of a slave society.   
The law did not uniformly reinforce the power of household heads.  Wives and 
slaves registered their voices in the public sphere, using the courts to contest the authority 
of husbands and masters and expand their place in southern society.  Their actions in 
court demonstrated that the power of household heads was far from absolute.  The focus 
on the household as an independent and autonomous space tends to denote a world apart 
from law or politics, positing the public actions of domestic dependents as extralegal and 
apolitical.  I demonstrate, however, that the household was a political space, and wives 
and slaves were legal and political actors.  Subordinated people, including domestic 
dependents, insisted that their voices be heard, demanded access to the legal system to 
seek redress for wrongs done to them, and turned their private disputes into public 
matters.   
By investigating how married women, free blacks, and slaves used public, legal 
venues to enlarge their positions in antebellum southern society, this dissertation 
contributes to recent scholarship in women’s and gender history and in African American 
history that argues for an expanded view of the politics and disrupts old dichotomies of 
“public” and “private” by positing a dynamic connection between private households and 
the public, political order.  Indeed, as scholars of the household such as Laura F. 
Edwards, Stephanie McCurry, and Peter W. Bardaglio point out, the values that dictated 
white men’s political choices originated in the household—in the relations of authority, 
dependency, and subordination that engaged them most directly.  Relationships of power 
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within southern households between masters and their dependents were every bit as 
political as those between household heads.
6
 
In addition, my dissertation contributes to a developing literature examining law 
on the ground that suggests that ordinary people influenced the legal and political 
processes that occurred within their communities.  Viewed from the perspective of 
appellate decisions and statutes, the southern legal system has long been understood as 
exclusionary and hierarchical, situating marginalized people as outsiders to the courts.  
Married women and free and enslaved blacks were acted upon by legal institutions.  
Those in subordinate positions were objects of the law, not agents of it.  At the appellate 
level, jurists could not—and would not—open Pandora’s Box by legally recognizing a 
slave’s personality or a married woman’s ability to challenge her husband without 
confronting slavery or patriarchal marriage—institutions central to antebellum southern 
society.  At the state level, the law was decidedly hierarchical, separate from the local 
community in which the case originated, and separate from the facts in the case.   
An emphasis on the law as an instrument of cultural hegemony constitutes one of 
the most influential interpretations of the law’s function in the slave South.  The classic 
account of southern law’s hegemonic role is Eugene Genovese’s Roll, Jordon, Roll.  
According to Genovese, the law “constituted a principal vehicle for the hegemony of the 
ruling class.”
7
  Slaveholders used the law to maintain their position of power, and it 
                                                 
6
 On this point, see McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds, viii.  See also Peter W. Bardaglio, 
Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century South (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995); and Laura F. Edwards, “Law, Domestic Violence, and the 
Limits of Patriarchal Authority in the Antebellum South,” in Gender and the Southern Body Politic, ed. 
Nancy Bercaw (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2000), 63-86.  
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 Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordon, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Random House, 




enabled them to disguise the extent to which their power rested on force and violence.
8
 
Genovese’s conception of law as a tool of the elite renders those in positions of 
subordination as largely irrelevant.  Moreover, he presumes that the power of the planter 
elite was firmly in place.   
Local court records present a different picture.   As recent scholarship on law and 
governance in the nineteenth century contends, two conceptions of the state coexisted in 
the antebellum South—one in which the law was an “abstraction” and the other in which 
“the rule of law was realized through concrete relations within the community.”
9
  While 
historians of the South have turned to appellate decisions as definitive expressions of the 
law, these decisions represented only one element of the legal order.  Investigating local 
legal practice makes the law look less unified.
10
  As historians such as Laura Edwards, 
Ariela J. Gross, Dylan C. Penningroth, and Walter Johnson have shown, locally 
constructed law was susceptible to the agency, opinion, and participation of the wives, 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 25-49. Genovese’s argument about hegemony and the law has inspired a voluminous 
literature.  Even scholars who do not agree with Genovese’s position on the “hegemonic function of the 
law” nonetheless continue to discuss southern law in instrumental terms:  southern legislators and jurists 
developed legal doctrines to protect the interests of slaveowners.  Pointing to appellate opinions and 
statutes, scholars demonstrate that southern lawmakers and jurists used law to impose a proslavery ideology 
and to protect the power of masters and household heads.  Others examine the way judges chose rules 
instrumentally in order to maximize the interests of the ruling class and promoted slaveowners’ economic 
interests.  See, for example, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the American 
Legal Process (New York, 1978); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., and Barbara K. Kopytoff, “Property First, 
Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave’s Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law,” Ohio State Law 
Journal 50 (June 1989): 511-40; and James L. Hunt, “Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law and 




 Laura F. Edwards, “Enslaved Women and the Law: Paradoxes of Subordination in the Post-
Revolutionary Carolinas,” Slavery and Abolition 26 (Aug. 2005): 307.  Elsewhere, Edwards also argues 
that statutes and appellate opinions emphasized individual rights in their most abstract form and obscured 
“key elements of what was, in fact, a highly localized system that rooted legal culture directly and 
concretely in daily life.” See Edwards, “Status without Rights: African Americans and the Tangled History 








children, and slaves that it attempted to control.
11
  The very nature of local law-making 
processes necessitated the participation of all community members—white and black, 
slave and free, male and female.  Laura Edwards emphasizes the power available to 
subordinated people because they were part of a larger community where a whole range 
of “private” injuries became “public” wrongs.  Because jurists wanted to keep “the 
peace” in local communities, and because local authorities emphasized social order over 
individual rights, Edwards found that local courts allowed white women, African 
Americans, and the poor a presence in the law.  “The peace,” in her words, “was an equal 
opportunity enforcer, enclosing everyone in its patriarchal embrace and raising its 
collective interests over those of any given individual.”
12
 
Indeed, if we turn our attention to law on the ground—to the level of trial 
courts—the relationships of domination and subordination in southern society look 
different than they do in state law.  The local legal record in the Natchez District is full of 
white women and free and enslaved African Americans wielding law on their own 
behalf—sometimes successfully, sometimes not.  They had an important presence in the 
local courts and a number of opportunities to learn something about the law and the 
operation of the local courts.  They sued their husbands, masters, and social betters far 
more often than we would expect, and they often won.    
                                                 
11
 On law on the ground in the slave South, see Laura F. Edwards, The People and Their Peace: 
Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Ariela J. Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the 
Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dylan C. Penningroth, 
The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Walter Johnson, “Inconsistency, 
Contradiction, and Complete Confusion: The Everyday Life of the Law of Slavery,” Law & Social Inquiry 
22, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 405-33.  See also Jessica K. Lowes’s review essay of Edwards’s The People and 
Their Peace.  Lowe, “A Separate Peace?  The Politics of Localized Law in the Post-Revolutionary Era,” 
Law & Social Inquiry 36, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 788-817. 
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 Edwards, “Status without Rights,” 383.  See also Edwards, The People and Their Peace. 
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This dissertation demonstrates that in the local courts, litigants and witnesses were 
not anonymous members of categorical groups, as they were in statutes and appellate 
law.  Instead, they were individuals.
13
  At the local level, the legal process was 
inseparable from community relations.  Community norms as well as formal rules of 
evidence and legal language influenced disputes.  In the small, face-to-face communities 
that made up much of the Old South, public and private life overlapped.  Despite 
southern society’s rigid hierarchies, personal and direct knowledge of one’s neighbors 
enabled community members to gauge the individual measure of a man or woman, white 
or black.  For subordinated people, this sometimes meant the opportunity to be judged as 
human beings and widened their access to and influence on the local courts.   
This neither implies, however, that community relations on the ground in the Old 
South were harmonious and less hierarchical.  Far from it.   Nor does it suggest that white 
women, free people of color, and slaves were subordinated in the same way.  They were 
not.  Indeed, in the words of Peter Bardaglio, “the auction block left far less room for 
negotiation and contestation than the altar.”
14
  Community members regularly performed 
and reproduced the acute inequalities that defined the slave South.  Their relationships 
were fraught with tensions.  Subordinated people’s engagement with the law was often 
brutal and exacting.  Yet, even the most powerful and wealthiest members of a 
community sometimes faced community judgment and punishment if they failed to fulfill 
their prescribed roles within the southern social order.  Community members protected 
those who conformed to certain standards of behavior.  They also punished those who did 
                                                 
13
 On this point, see also Edwards, The People and Their Peace, 65-6. 
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not.  In ways that scholars have only begun to understand, marginalized people could thus 
influence the legal and political culture in their communities despite their exclusion from 
formal law and politics. 
 
Law was pervasive in the everyday life of the Old South.  As a result of the 
localized nature of antebellum government, the courts operated in close proximity to 
southerners of all stripes.  Southern towns, especially those in rural areas like the Natchez 
District, formed around the courthouse—the social, commercial, political, and usually 
geographical center of the county.  Most nineteenth-century southerners looked to their 
counties (parishes in Louisiana) as the constituent unit of government.
15
  A uniform, 
systematic, and rationalized body of state law was still embryonic, and state governments 
granted local jurisdictions extensive authority.
 
 Most southern legal business was 
conducted in the lower courts:  in magistrates’ homes or offices, before the board of 
police or police juries, and in county, parish, probate, chancery, orphans, circuit, and 
district courts.  These courts, with their broad range of duties, dealt with a medley of 
local affairs and had wide-ranging powers over nearly every aspect of life.  They oversaw 
roads, bridges, and ferries.  They probated wills, appointed executors, punished gamblers, 
drunks, and fornicators, sanctioned shopkeepers for opening their doors on the Sabbath, 
and enforced the payment of debts.  They returned runaway slaves, provided for orphans 
and the poor, indicted murderers, divorced adulterous spouses, and manumitted slaves.
16
  
                                                 
15
 The county did exist in Louisiana, but by 1820 it was little more than an electoral district.  See 
Robert D. Calhoun, “The Origin and Early Development of County-Parish Government in Louisiana,” 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly 18 (Jan. 1935):  124, 136-37.    
 
16
 On the county as the central unit of government in the Old South and the importance of local 
courts, see Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge: 
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As both observers and participants, white women and African Americans had 
frequent and direct contact with local legal processes, giving them many opportunities to 
develop an understanding of the law.  Court week represented one of the antebellum 
South’s most important social institutions.  While many people attended monthly county 
courts or witnessed hearings and inquests, circuit and district courts attracted residents 
from every corner of the county.  These courts met for one to two weeks twice a year, 
drawing judges, lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and prospective jurors to town.  Court week 
also attracted vendors, entertainers, and spectators.  The courthouse steps served as a 
center of both business and pleasure:  auctioneers sold slaves, grogshops hawked liquor, 
peddlers marketed goods, entertainers danced and sang, farmers and planters conducted 
private business, and friends and neighbors gossiped.  Political parties and temperance or 
Bible societies frequently scheduled their annual meetings during court week.  
Agricultural societies held their annual fairs.  Newspapers discussed court cases, 
announced decisions, and reported legal gossip.  Local business improved when court 
was in session.  William Johnson—a barber, businessman, and leader of the free black 
community in Natchez—noted in his diary that business was especially brisk during the 
November 1850 court session because a “Greate many Persons are in town.”
17
  Even 
those not directly involved in hearings or summoned for trials frequently turned up at 
court to bring testimony, offer information, or simply to observe.
 
 Court week 
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transformed sleepy, rural communities into bustling, noisy towns and drew diverse 
crowds from dispersed sections of the county—crowds that included white women, free 
people of color, and slaves.
18
 
Not all legal business was conducted in the courthouse.  Often magistrates heard 
complaints, conducted inquests, and held trials in taverns, fields, country stores, and other 
places that could accommodate large crowds.  As Laura Edwards points out, “these 
locations pushed law physically into the community and into the lives of the people 
there.”
19
  Indeed, courts met where community members of all types commonly gathered.  
As a result, a wide range of southerners understood the legal process intimately and 
expected it to serve their interests.   
 
By focusing on Mississippi and Louisiana, this dissertation investigates both 
common-law and civil-law regimes.  Mississippi followed the Anglo-American common-
law system—law developed by judges through court decisions and handed down through 
reported cases that established precedent.
20
  As a result of its civil-law history stemming 
from the French and Spanish colonial periods, Louisianans conceived of legal issues 
differently than their common-law counterparts elsewhere in the United States.  They 
adhered to a written code of law rather than a legal system based upon case decisions 
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made by judges.  When Louisiana entered the federal union, many Spanish and French 
residents resisted American authorities’ attempts to replace the civil law with common 
law.  This resistance influenced the shape and substance of Louisiana law and resulted in 
the Louisiana Civil Code.  The 1812 state constitution (as well as subsequent 
constitutions) required judges to justify every decision by citing the specific act of the 
legislature or article in the Civil Code upon which it was based.  Louisiana lawmakers 
rejected implied law and principles of equity, important tenets of the Anglo-American 
common-law system.  Louisiana also retained much of its civil-law tradition, such as the 
ability of free people of color to sue whites and married woman to sue their husbands for 
separations of property.  The influx judges and lawyers trained in the common law and 
repeated exposure to common-law concepts, however, gradually transformed the state’s 
legal system.
21
  Despite Louisiana’s civil-law heritage, the disputes between subordinates 
and their superiors in the local courts of Louisiana were remarkably similar to those in 
the common-law regime of Mississippi.   
Trial court cases from local justice of the peace, county, parish, circuit, district, 
and chancery courts represent the bulk of my research materials.  I searched through 
thousands of civil and criminal legal cases from Adams and Claiborne counties in 
Mississippi and Iberville and Pointe Coupee parishes in Louisiana.  These records are 
neither published nor housed in any archive.  Instead, they are in the possession of the 
clerk of the court’s office and have not been preserved, processed, cleaned, or even 
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organized.  They are in unlabeled boxes in basements and in sloppy piles sitting 
unprotected from vermin and weather in wet storage sheds on the outskirts of towns.  
After several months of searching, I identified about 2,000 cases involving white women 
and African Americans.  
The court records vary considerably.  They certainly look different from the 
published reports with which legal scholars and historians are most familiar with.  They 
are moldy, ripped and falling apart, incomplete, all handwritten, and often in French.  
Over the years, they have suffered from war, theft, rot, fire, flood, and general neglect.  
Because local officials with different levels of literacy created the records, they vary in 
handwriting, spelling, detail, and length.  Sometimes only the initial petition survives, 
and in other instances the verdict is missing.  Lawyers, clerks, and other court officials 
mediated the voices of litigants and witnesses.  Many petitions were formulaic—with 
clerks filling in names, dates, charges, and location.  Some officials recorded few details 
about the involved parties and their complaints, while others included much more 
information, occasionally repeating litigants’ complaints verbatim.  It is difficult to 
ascertain what court officials withheld from the record—the common knowledge, the 
gossip, and the hearsay—information widely available to the local court, but obscured 
(frustratingly so) from the twenty-first century researcher.  Yet, despite the fragmentary 
nature of records, the cases I uncovered proved to be a rich source for understanding how 
and why marginalized people went to court to defend themselves and improve their lives.   
Years of poor record keeping and dwindling county and state budgets also 
influenced the sources I chose to engage.  In all of the counties and parishes where I 
conducted research, the justice of the peace or magistrates’ court records were often 
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missing.  I found records from these lowest courts very rarely and only when a case had 
been appealed to the county or parish court.  The ones I did locate were particularly rich, 
and they included a great deal of witness testimony from white women, free blacks, and 
slaves.  Because they operated so closely to the local community, the magistrates’ courts 
tended to be the most accessible sites of legal redress for those without formal rights.  
Indeed, it was in the magistrates’ courts that women would first seek protection from 
their husbands for domestic abuse or free blacks would charge their white neighbors with 
theft or slander.  
In order to supplement my research in magistrates’ court records, I therefore 
turned to church minutes and disciplinary hearings from Baptist, Catholic, Episcopal, and 
Presbyterian churches in the Natchez District.  Church records may seem out of place in a 
dissertation on local courts, but they are an important piece of the puzzle.
22
  Churches and 
their disciplinary hearings functioned in similar ways to the justice of the peace.  They 
too punished transgressors and policed community members. They handled the same 
kinds of offenses, such as public drunkenness, fornication, and conflicts between 
neighbors.  Church records, then, open another window into the local legal culture of the 
Old South. 
While most of the subordinated people I examined left few records, I tried 
whenever possible to reconstruct the broader circumstances of a given case—although 
doing so proved difficult.  Newspaper accounts of trials, diaries, ex-slave narratives, 
justice of the peace manuals, and personal papers provided me with an important social 
and cultural framework for the local court records I analyzed.  I also examined records 
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documenting the history of the Natchez District in the Natchez Trace Collection at the 
University of Texas at Austin, the Hill Memorial Library at Louisiana State University, 
and the Mississippi Department of Archives and History. These materials included 
personal and family papers, county and parish records, newspapers, plantation records, 
maps, and governors’ pardons.  The personal papers of judges and lawyers from the 
Natchez District were particularly helpful.  Many of these collections included testimony, 
letters to and from clients, judgments, warrants, contracts, depositions, and other legal 
documents. 
 
“People at Law” is divided into four chapters.  Chapter 1 examines free and 
enslaved African Americans’ use of reputation as a defensive and offensive legal 
strategy.  A good reputation could protect African Americans from criminal charges and 
restrictive laws, and it sometimes allowed them privileges usually associated with whites.  
Moreover, African Americans’ ability to circulate gossip about each other, their masters 
and other social betters, and their neighbors sometimes damaged the reputations of their 
superiors.  Litigation involving reputation demonstrates the ability of African Americans 
to shape the social order in their communities.  Although excluded from formal politics, 
in the “small politics” of their neighborhoods, the voices of free blacks and slaves 
sometimes held sway.   
Chapter 2 investigates married women’s lawsuits against their husbands and 
argues that wives (both white and black) used the familiar language of subordination as a 
rhetorical strategy in order to attain legal success.  Courts rewarded women who behaved 
as obedient and chaste wives, and they punished violent and adulterous husbands.  By 
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challenging their spouses’ capacity to govern their households properly, married women 
reinforced patriarchal marriage.  At the same time, however, they employed the local 
courts and their own community networks to their advantage and limited their husbands’ 
power over them.   
Chapter 3 examines slaves’ interactions with and knowledge of the southern legal 
system.  When suing for their freedom, in particular, slaves demonstrated a sophisticated 
understanding of the law and an ability to harness community networks on their own 
behalf.  Yet, using the courts as a pathway to freedom by contending that they were 
wrongfully and illegally enslaved meant acknowledging that there were circumstances in 
which they could be justly and legally enslaved.  By going to the law to sue for legal 
freedom, slaves affirmed legal slavery.  Although they did not challenge slavery directly, 
slaves in Mississippi and Louisiana used the local courts to play a role in negotiating 
what their place within a slaveholding society would be.   
Chapter 4 explores free black plaintiffs and demonstrates that many free people of 
color in Mississippi and Louisiana used the local courts to resist the social limitations and 
humiliations imposed upon them.  When initiating lawsuits against whites over debts 
owed them, broken contracts, property disputes, and other disagreements, free blacks had 
to strike a delicate balance between deference and self-assertion.  As long as they worked 
within the boundaries of their subordination and did not challenge their general position 
within the southern hierarchy, they found legal redress for wrongs done to them and debts 
owed them.    
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that in the Old South, the law had 
many makers.  As legal actors wielding law on their own behalf, subordinated people 
19 
 
demonstrated that the power of the planter elite was not absolute.  Mastery took work and 
required negotiation.  With their use of the local courts, wives, free people of color, and 





















































In October 1857, fifteen-year-old Alexina Morrison, a blond-haired, blue-eyed 
slave, sued her master, James White, for her freedom in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.  
White had purchased Morrison the previous January in the slave market in New Orleans, 
although shortly after her sale, she ran away and filed suit against him in the parish court.  
In her petition, Morrison claimed that she was from Arkansas, born free and of white 
parents.  Her whiteness entitled her to freedom.  She was white, she said, because she 
looked that way, acted that way, and kept the company of respectable whites.  Her 
performance of the qualities of white womanhood overcame evidence of her black 
ancestry and helped determine her ambiguous racial identity.  Morrison was a slave, as 
was her mother, and she may have had an African grandfather, but her conduct and 
reputation in her community, not her blood, made her white.  Furthermore, she told the 
court, her whiteness, discernible in her reputation, made her free.   
Morrison used her reputation as white as a part of her legal strategy.  She and her 
lawyers expertly harnessed local knowledge about her appearance, character, and actions 
in order to prove her claims to whiteness.  Her attorneys asked jurors to look at her for 
themselves and listen to the testimony of their neighbors.  Morrison attended white balls, 
witnesses said.  She slept in beds belonging to young white ladies, ate at the tables of 
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highly regarded white people, wore the clothing of a respectable white woman, and 
conducted herself as sexually virtuous.  Because of her purity, delicacy, beauty, and 
vulnerability—qualities white southerners thought inherent in white women and absent in 
black women—those who testified on her behalf believed that she was white.  Indeed, 
when James White went to court to file his answer to her petition, he found himself 
threatened by a blood-thirsty mob aiming to lynch him for keeping a young and 
vulnerable white woman as a slave.  It was her reputation as white that provided her with 
the legal grounds to sue her master for her freedom, a reputation she used to her 
advantage.
1
     
Antebellum southern society was, as scholar David M. Potter describes it, a “folk 
culture” characterized by “personalism,” a dense network of community and person-to-
person relations.
2
  In the small communities that comprised much of the Old South, 
public and private life overlapped.  Members of such communities were on constant 
display so that everyone knew or knew of most everyone else.  Neighbors noticed the 
spendthrifts and those who worked hard to provide for their families.  They observed who 
went to church on Sunday and who gambled and drank to excess.  They distinguished the 
generous from the skinflints.  Despite southern society’s strict hierarchies, personal 
knowledge of one’s neighbors accustomed local communities to assessing the individual 
measure of a man or woman, white or black, and trust it.  In the local courts, litigants and 
witnesses were individuals—not anonymous members of categorical groups, as they were 
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in statutes and appellate law.  For subordinated people like free and enslaved blacks, this 
presented the opportunity to be judged as human beings.  Morrison had cultivated 
personal relationships with influential white men and women who came to her aid in 
court when she called upon them.  Based on their personal knowledge of her appearance, 
character, and actions, her patrons successfully convinced white jurors that she was 
white.  The kind of familiarity that exemplified social relations in the Old South 
undoubtedly intensified loyalties and hatreds.  Judgmental neighbors—with their short 
tempers and long memories—readily reproduced the extreme inequalities that defined the 
slave South.  But, as Morrison found, local communities protected those who conformed 
to certain standards of behavior expected of fellow community members.  And they 
punished those who did not.     
  As cases like Morrison’s suggest, in the face-to-face society of the antebellum 
South, reputation was paramount.  A good reputation represented a person’s most 
valuable possession, as well as his or her most vulnerable commodity.  “The vulnerability 
of a good name,” explains anthropologist Peter J. Wilson, “stems from the fact that it is 
held and conferred by people other than the person who is said to possess it, and that it 
has no tangible substance, it consists entirely of words.”
3
  Reputations required public 
assessment.  An individual’s “common repute” depended on a public evaluation of his or 
her character and actions.
4
  Because reputations rested on the estimation and judgment of 
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others, they were unstable and constantly made and remade.  Ordinary southerners took 
care to nurture their reputations, and legal proceedings served as a crucial forum for 
protecting and defending a good name.  Litigation involving reputations offered abundant 
proof of the biblical adage, “a good name is better than precious ointment.”
5
   
Wielding reputation was at once a legal strategy and a strategy of power.  While 
the authority of the planter elite seemed unlimited, marginalized people could use the 
politics of reputation to protect themselves and advance their positions.  For those with 
limited legal rights and little official standing in the southern social order, leveraging 
reputation represented an important weapon in the “small politics” of their communities. 
While all southerners understood the social and legal power of reputation and deployed it, 
its use was particularly important to those who were most subordinated in southern 
society—free and enslaved African Americans.   
Free and enslaved African Americans participated in the politics of reputation as a 
means to survive in a slaveholders’ regime.  For free blacks cultivating a good name 
served as both offensive and defensive strategies;  a good reputation could protect them 
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from criminal charges and restrictive laws, and it might also allow them legal privileges 
usually associated with whites.  By highlighting their reputations as obedient, deferential, 
and well-behaved members of the community and showing that they remembered their 
place, free people of color shielded themselves from attack.  In addition, by 
demonstrating that they performed their expected roles in southern society, they could 
use their good reputations to sue others in court, protect their property, and improve their 
situations.       
Enslaved men and women also participated in the politics of reputation through 
gossip.  The rumors they circulated sometimes damaged the reputations of their owners 
and brought their owners’ behavior to the attention of local authorities.  Slaves’ gossip 
was a form of governance, and with it they critiqued the power and authority of their 
superiors.  In the politics of reputation where words were the ultimate weapon, slaves’ 
ability to circulate gossip about their owners and other social betters served as a means to 
exercise a measure of power in a society where they had limited access to 
institutionalized sources of authority.  They helped determine what kind of behavior 
constituted a “good” or “bad” slaveowner.  Within communities, members established 
particular social norms and standards of behavior, and they expected all to adhere to 
them.  Failure to do so jeopardized one’s reputation and community standing.  The 
authority of even the most powerful and wealthiest leaders of a community was thus 
contingent on the fulfillment of their allotted roles within the social order.  When they 
failed to do so, they sometimes faced legal action, weakened political and social standing, 
and loss of reputation.   Because all reputations were subject to public judgment and 
review, the words and opinions of all community members contributed to the 
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conversations that determined an individual’s good name.  Even the voices of the most 
marginalized—the enslaved—could help sustain or undermine the reputations of others.  
For masters who failed to demonstrate the qualities and responsibilities associated with 
their position, slave-initiated rumors of domestic disorder could come to the attention of 
the courts and local authorities, and they sometimes faced penalties.   
Free and enslaved African Americans, however, had to be careful with their 
words.  When participating in the politics of reputation, African Americans worked 
within the boundaries of their subordination.  Setting limits on the excessive behavior of 
slaveholders or emphasizing one’s obedient, sober, industrious, and deferential behavior 
ultimately upheld the legitimacy of slavery and the subordinate position of African 
Americans within southern society.   
Nonetheless, the words of free and enslaved African Americans sometimes had 
the power to influence the social order of their communities.  Although denied entry to 
formal political or public life, in the “small politics” of their neighborhoods, the voices of 
free blacks and slaves held sway.  They did not always achieve the results they desired, 
but their actions inside and outside the courtroom helped shape the next round of the 
battle.      
 
As Alexina Morrison’s lawsuit against her owner suggests, the right reputation 
represented a source of legal and social capital in southern society.  Establishing a good 
reputation served as both defensive and offensive strategies for free people of color 
struggling to survive in a slaveholders’ republic.  Free blacks understood the importance 
of reputation in southern society and employed it to defend themselves from the far-
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reaching authority of their superiors.  While some white southerners attempted to limit 
free blacks’ use of the politics of reputation, especially their words as weapons in battles 
involving reputation, free people of color found ways to wield their good name in court to 
protect or enhance their position.  For free blacks, a good name could shield them from 
arbitrary punishments and restrictive laws and allow them privileges usually reserved for 
white southerners.     
In a culture where the power of white men seemed limitless, free blacks needed to 
secure good reputations within their communities to shield themselves from the litany of 
charges that might be lodged against them.  Southern laws circumscribed the lives of 
people of color to such a degree that local authorities could round them up and haul them 
into court for nearly any offense, real or imagined, from vagrancy to traveling out of state 
or even keeping a dog.  They also faced charges for crimes of deference, such as insulting 
a white person or not yielding the road.  Local churches disciplined their free black 
members in much the same way the magistrates’ courts did, holding hearings for blacks 
accused of “crimes” such as slander, fornication, hunting on a Sunday, or “gross immoral 
conduct,” and punishing them when found “guilty.”
6
  In 1853, Jeffrey, a free black 
Mississippian, faced charges for “styling himself as a Baptist minister,” “teaching strange 
doctrine” to the black population of Port Gibson, and “other dishonest conduct.”  After 
his hearing before church officials, the Magnolia Baptist Church “excluded” him from 
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the congregation because of his “bad repute” in the community.
7
  When defending 
themselves against such accusations, free blacks needed to demonstrate that they were 
“good negroes”—obedient, well-behaved, subservient, and respectable.  Little wonder 
that Nero, a free man of color jailed in Natchez, Mississippi, for “riotous behavior,” 
claimed that he had always demonstrated “good behavior” in his community and asked 
the court to subpoena witnesses on his behalf.
8
   
People of color needed powerful white allies willing to affirm in court that they 
were indeed “good negroes” with respectable reputations, especially as they faced 
increasingly restrictive laws.  By the 1830s, as abolitionists’ attacks on slavery intensified 
and slaveholders’ fears of slave rebellion heightened, white southerners increasingly 
perceived free blacks as a threat to the social order.  Across the South, they escalated 
their assaults on free black communities.  These attacks were particularly prevalent in 
Mississippi and Louisiana.  Lawmakers in both states attempted to restrict—and 
reverse—the growth of the free black population and enacted laws to remove them from 
the state.  In 1831, a Mississippi newspaper captured the sentiment of many whites in the 
region.  “If the free coloured people were removed,” the paper argued, “the slaves could 
safely be treated with more indulgence.  Less fear would be entertained, and greater 
latitude of course allowed. . . . In a word, it would make better masters and better 
slaves.”
9
  Indeed, in one revealing petition, twenty-one white men reminded the 
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Mississippi legislature that there were both “vicious and evil disposed” free people of 
color and those “who have spent a life free from reproval, or even the suspicions of 
improper conduct.”  While the “unworthy” should be removed, these men insisted that 
the “good blacks” be protected.  They asked the legislature to allow local communities to 
make the distinction between “loyal and disloyal.”
10
  Requesting special permission to 
remain in the state, free blacks in good standing in their communities offered petitions 
containing the signatures of reputable white men to their county courts and state 
legislatures.  Black men and women who wanted to remain in the state, however, had to 
remember their place.   
In their petitions to remain in the state or seeking relief from suffocating 
restrictions, free people of color were careful to demonstrate that they were well-behaved, 
not prone to rebellion, sober, industrious, and could offer something of worth to the 
larger community.  To document their cases, they presented evidence of support from 
whites in their neighborhoods.  When Ann Caldwell petitioned the Mississippi 
legislature, she gathered the signatures of over one hundred white residents of Natchez 
and the surrounding area to support her request “for a special act allowing her to remain 
in the state.”  She pledged not to become a public charge and even promised to post a 
bond guaranteeing “her good behavior.”  Her community valued her skills as a healer, she 
claimed, and she had gained her freedom by serving as a “faithful” nurse to her former 
mistress.
11
  Similarly, thirty-three white men of Natchez petitioned on behalf of Esther 
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Barland, a free black woman.  They asked lawmakers to allow her to remain in the state 
due to her reputation for “great industry” and claimed that she was “much grieved at the 




Without a good reputation to call upon, free blacks risked losing everything.  A 
good reputation could help them protect their property.  William Hayden, a free black 
barber in Natchez, claimed that the Mississippi act forcing free blacks to leave the state 
would “produce absolute ruin to his prospects.”  He had gained “an honest livelihood for 
himself” through his “sobriety and good conduct,” he insisted, as “those who knew him 
could affirm.”  His reputation for “honesty,” “fidelity,” and “obedience to the laws of the 
state” made him an ideal candidate for remaining in Natchez.  He owned property and ran 
a successful business, he asserted.  But because he was in constant danger “of being 
driven from his home,” he wanted “a special act exempting him . . . from removal from 
the state.”  Moreover, he claimed that he could produce “testimonials of his good 
character and honesty . . . sobriety and good conduct.”  Indeed, Hayden gained the 
assistance of John Minor, a member of one of the most prosperous and respected families 
in Mississippi.  Minor supported Hayden’s petition and claimed to “have knowledge of 
[his] character” and could “testify to his honesty.”  He “recommended” that the 
legislature allow Hayden to remain a resident of the state, a recommendation the 
legislature followed.  Calling upon his reputation as a sober, industrious, and honest 
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businessman served as an effective defensive strategy.  Hayden’s reputation protected 
him from “ruin” and shielded him from restrictive legislation in a social order where the 
nearly unlimited power of white slaveholders could run roughshod over his “prospects.”
13
  
In the small, face-to-face communities of the Old South, the white community judged 
free blacks like William Hayden or Ann Caldwell as individuals, and because they 
remembered their place, they were rewarded.  Others were not so lucky.  
Many of the restrictive laws free blacks faced were locally negotiated and only 
partially enforced.  The lack of systematic enforcement was deliberate.  Not every free 
black traveling to another state or keeping a dog faced criminal charges.  Instead, white 
authorities used the law selectively.  Laws demanding deference or restricting free 
blacks’ movements existed to remind people of color of their place within southern 
society.  The deferential might be exempt, but, if a black person misbehaved in some 
way, whites could call upon the law to punish the transgressor. 
The need to maintain a good reputation forced free blacks to adhere to the 
standards whites set for them.  When white southerners supported the use of reputation 
by free blacks as a protective strategy, it was often on their terms.  Whites sometimes 
backed free blacks’ access to good reputations (along with the benefits that came with a 
good name) if they had behaved according to their position in the southern racial 
hierarchy.  Yet, in other instances whites sought to limit free blacks’ use of reputation—
especially if it threatened white authority.  In the politics of reputation, words were the 
most lethal weapon; because reputations required public assessment, the words of 
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others—gossip, insults, rumors—could undermine or augment a good name.  Free blacks 
often faced criminal charges for insulting and slandering whites because of the dangerous 
potential their words acquired when repeated or spoken publicly.  Whites went to great 
lengths to regulate free blacks’ speech in order to limit the influence of their words.   
The case of John Motton revealed how the politics of reputation could keep even 
the most aggressive black man in line.  In 1838, Baton Rouge authorities arrested Motton, 
a free black man, for heatedly screaming insults at the executioner while witnessing the 
public hanging of two slaves in the town square.  In his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, Motton admitted using “language strongly disapproving of the cruel manner in 
which the executioner did his duty.”  His anger originated from “the excitement of the 
moment, when the feelings of all bystanders were outraged.”  Understanding the gravity 
of the charges against him for breaching the peace and insulting a white man in the 
presence of others, Motton assured the district court judge that he had not used 
“imprudent or disrespectful expressions towards any officers on duty—or towards any 
other white man.”  His quarrel was with the executioner.  A “bad feeling” existed 
between the two men.  Executioners routinely faced insults and had bad reputations in 
their communities because of the infamy of the hangman’s profession.  Executioners, like 
debt collectors and bailiffs, ran a high risk of verbal abuse and even physical assault 
because of the nature of their duties.
14
  The concern, however, was not simply that 
Motton had insulted the hangman.  Rather, he was arrested for “abusing the executioner 
in the presence of slaves.”   
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By insulting a white man in public and potentially damaging his reputation, 
Motton forgot his place.  Motton’s insulting language toward a white man in the presence 
of slaves raised the hackles of the other white bystanders because it betrayed commonly 
acknowledged racial and social hierarchies.  One man who witnessed the incident, 
William Jackson, claimed that Motton “used language rebellious in its tendency, & 
calculated to destroy that line of Distinction which exists between the several classes of 
the community.”  With this statement to the court, Jackson revealed his apprehension 
about the power and reach of Motton’s words.  By publicly challenging a white man and 
calling him a “damned rascal [who] ought to be hung,” Motton encouraged disrespect and 
even insurrection.  Encouraging slave rebellion was punishable by death.  The judge 
denied Motton’s habeas request because of the insubordinate and mutinous example he 
had offered to enslaved bystanders.
15
   
By insulting a white man, Motton also broke the law, and in this instance white 
officials enforced it.  A black person’s insulting or failing to show respect to a white 
person was a crime in Louisiana.  “Free people of color ought never to insult or strike 
white people, nor presume to conceive themselves equal to whites,” the law provided, 
“but on the contrary, they ought to yield to them in every occasion, and never speak or 
answer to them but with respect, under the penalty of imprisonment, according to the 
nature of the offense.”
16
  Elaborate laws that criminalized blacks’ speech and demanded 
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deferential behavior bolstered the racism that accompanied the entrenchment of slavery 
in the antebellum South and the distancing of whites and blacks.  The development of a 
rigid racial ideology and efforts to make “whiteness” synonymous with freedom and 
“blackness” with slavery depended upon the everyday practice of racial difference.  With 
his affidavit, Jackson reminded Motton of his inferior standing within southern society, 
and the court reminded Motton of his place.   
While laws demanding deference reinforced racial boundaries, they also betrayed 
the uneasiness of white lawmakers and their white constituents about African Americans’ 
speech and the place of free blacks within a slave society.  When white southerners 
prosecuted blacks for insulting whites, they revealed their anxiety about the impact and 
scope of African Americans’ words.  By claiming that Motton’s actions were “calculated 
to destroy that line of Distinction which exists between the several classes of the 
community,” Jackson implicitly acknowledged that Motton had the power to upset racial 
hierarchies.  Motton himself may not have achieved the results he desired when he 
petitioned the court for his release from jail, but his actions reminded white southerners 
of the influence and potential danger of his words.   
While free blacks most often used their reputations to defend themselves from 
attack, cultivating a good name also served as an offensive weapon.  Sometimes the 
reputations of free people of color exceeded their social and racial status and allowed 
them certain privileges and opportunities usually associated with whites.  The good 
reputations of some free blacks allowed their voices to carry weight in their communities 
in a number of ways, despite their subordinate status.   
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With the right reputation, even those with little legal or political standing could 
attain enough social credit to bring information to court and be believed.  Free blacks in 
both Mississippi and Louisiana used their good reputations to sue in court for repayment 
of debts owed them, settle disputes over cattle and horses, inheritance, slave warranties, 
and back wages, win damages for assault, and adjudicate a number of other 
disagreements.  While statutes in every southern state except Louisiana barred free blacks 
from testifying against whites, in practice, free blacks (many of them descendants of 
slaves or former slaves) found ways to circumvent these statutory prohibitions.  Many 
engaged their white neighbors as both legal allies and legal foes.
17      
Antoine Lacour’s reputation as a trustworthy cotton planter and good neighbor far 
surpassed the social position typically assigned a free black man in Louisiana and 
assisted him in winning the nine lawsuits in which he was embroiled between 1831 and 
1844—all but one involved litigation against white men.
18
  In 1830, Lacour’s household 
consisted of eighteen slaves, and by 1839 he was reputed to own real and personal 
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property valued at $150,000.
19
  Litigious to the core, he made extensive use of the legal 
system to increase his wealth, protect it, and bequeath it to others.  Like white men of 
similar financial standing, Lacour bought and sold land, slaves, and other property, 
ginned cotton, rented out bondsmen, and, when he went to court, hired white attorneys to 
represent him.  Although illiterate, he spoke both French and English.  In early 1838, 
Lacour may have solidified his position when he hired a white man, Weyman Ingledove, 
to serve as overseer on his cotton plantation.  A slaveowning, free black planter who 
employed a white overseer was a rare occurrence in the antebellum South.  This curious 
arrangement, however, lasted less than a year.  Between 1839 and 1840, Ingledove sued 
Lacour four times, twice for back wages and twice for slandering him as a horse thief.  
He even attempted to have Lacour arrested.  Ingledove’s persistent pursuit of Lacour 
proved a costly mistake, as he lost each case.  Although Lacour could not serve on a jury, 
hold office, vote, or participate in a number of other civic acts reserved for white men, in 
a venue often denied free black men, he repeatedly defeated his white overseer.   
In late summer, 1839, Lacour’s legal troubles with his overseer began when 
Ingledove sued him for back wages.  In his petition to the Iberville parish court, 
Ingledove claimed that Lacour had hired him in April 1838 to serve as a “Labourer and 
overseer” on his plantation for a “term of nine months.”  According to Ingledove, near 
the end of the contract, Lacour evicted Ingledove from his plantation and refused to pay 
him.  Lacour intended to depart Louisiana “without leaving sufficient property to satisfy 
the judgment which he suspect[ed] to obtain against him.”  Witnesses for Ingledove (one 
of whom Lacour had sued successfully in 1831) testified that Lacour planned to sell his 
                                                 
19
 1830 U.S. Census, Iberville, Louisiana, Microfilm Publication M19, Roll 43, National Archives 




property for $150,000 and go to France where “Negros” had “rights” and “were admitted 
as Generals in the Armies.”  Ingledove wanted Lacour “arrested and confined” to ensure 
that he would not flee the state.  In early December, 1839, the parish judge ordered 
Lacour’s arrest but suspended the warrant three days later when Lacour denied the 
charges against him and filed a motion to dissolve the arrest.  Lacour admitted that he 
planned to move to France, but he claimed that he had “plenty of . . . slaves, movables 
and credits” in Louisiana, enough to “satisfy” Ingledove’s “demand.”  In the trial that 
followed, witnesses established the source of the two men’s disagreement.  Some months 
prior, Lacour had lent Ingledove a horse and sent him, in his capacity as overseer, in 
search of runaway slaves.  When Ingledove returned fifteen days later without the horse, 
claiming he had lost it, Lacour had terminated his employment and refused to pay him 
unless he returned the missing horse.  After listening to the witnesses’ testimony, the 
parish court judge ordered Lacour to subtract the value of the horse—some $50—from 
the $200 he still owed Ingledove.  Lacour swiftly appealed, claiming that Ingledove’s 
theft of his horse justified terminating his employment without pay.  Two months later 
the district court in Plaquemine overturned the parish court’s decision and dismissed 
Ingledove’s case entirely.
20
     
The controversy between the two men, however, was not over.  In mid-spring, 
1840, Ingledove sued Lacour twice more, this time for slandering him as a horse thief.  In 
both of his defamation lawsuits, Ingledove professed that he was a man “of 
irreproachable honesty, character, and reputation,” “a good neighbor and good friend,” 
and “harmless and inoffensive” to boot.  Notwithstanding these noble qualities, Lacour 
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had “falsely, maliciously, and slanderously” accused him of dishonesty and of stealing 
and then gambling away his horse.  These accusations “render him contemptible and 
suspicious to the public and . . . deprive him of his honest reputation,” he lamented.  
Lacour also had made threats against Ingledove in “both the English and [F]rench 
languages” and had warned that if he approached his plantation again, he would “shoot 
him & make his negroes throw his dead body in the river.”  The district court dismissed 
the first lawsuit because of lack of evidence, requiring Ingledove to pay court costs and 
nonsuited him (fined him for filing an inadequate case) in the second.
21
 
Lacour’s success hinged on local knowledge and the reputations of both men in 
their community.  In each of the four trials, both Ingledove and Lacour summoned 
witnesses to testify on their behalf.  Community members frequently provided verbal 
accounts of the controversies at hand, descriptions of physical evidence, opinions about 
the circumstances of a given case, and personal judgments about the litigants involved.
22
  
Such witness testimony shaped the outcome of a case. 
In many ways, Ingledove faced an uphill battle when he sued Lacour.  While 
white men had the greatest claim to a good reputation as a result of their superior position 
in the southern hierarchy, formal determinants such as race, gender, age, property 
ownership, class, and religion did not fully define a person’s status in antebellum 
southern society.  At times, behavior could modify the status hierarchy.  Within particular 
communities, individuals had to affirm those attributes associated with their position.  
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White women, children, and free and enslaved African Americans could earn a good 
reputation or even an elevated position in their community by fulfilling their allotted 
roles within the social order.
23
  Lacour, although a black man, had significant influence in 
his community because of his position as a wealthy planter and slaveowner.  Even the 
men who testified on Ingledove’s behalf respecting Lacour’s alleged intentions to move 
to France acknowledged that Lacour was honest, well-regarded, prosperous, and not 
dependent on others for his livelihood.  His financial independence meant that he was not 
subject to the influence of an employer or landlord and free to make decisions for 
himself.  Despite his race, Lacour’s community professed respect for him and his 
capacity as a fair-minded householder.  Because he performed effectively the qualities 
expected of a man of his economic stature—honesty, rationality, reliability, and 
independence—Lacour enjoyed an elevated status.  Not a single witness uttered a word in 
favor of Ingledove’s character and reputation, even those who testified on his behalf.  
Instead, many reported rumors of Ingledove’s frequent gambling as an explanation for 
the alleged horse theft.   
Thieves had particularly ignoble reputations in southern society.  To be called a 
thief implied a lack of trustworthiness.  In a face-to-face culture where a man was known 
by his word, charges of dishonesty could not be left uncontested.  Trust was essential in a 
society where many were illiterate, and lenders often extended credit on nothing more 
than a handshake or the debtor’s oral promise to repay.  A damaged reputation might 
result in the loss of crucial sources of livelihood—trading partners, credit, potential 
business associates, and opportunities for prosperity.  Charges of theft, fraud, frequent 
gambling, and dishonesty could have ruinous consequences and jeopardized a man’s 
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position in his community.
24
  With his social and economic standing on the line, as well 
as his prospects for future employment, Ingledove could not afford to disregard such an 
allegation.  Ignoring an accusation of theft was tantamount to admitting that it was true.  
Worse, however, by calling him a thief, Lacour publicly shamed and dishonored 
Ingledove.  The slaveholding South was a society in which conceptions of honor held a 
central social and cultural place.  White men were particularly sensitive about points of 
honor.   Moreover, honor was tied to public display.  It required an audience as well as 
external assessment and confirmation.
25
  Indeed, honor hinged on reputation and outward 
appearances.
26
  Men of honor projected themselves through the way they appeared and 
what they said.  They were treated honorably when others respected the image they 
portrayed and acknowledged it as true.  The principal concern to men of honor was the 
acceptance of their appearance, not their inner character.  In southern honor culture, 
accusing a man of being dishonest and unprincipled was a serious offense.
27
  Whether or 
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not Ingledove actually stole the horse and was a dishonest man was far less shameful than 
the public perception of him as a thief.
28
 
But to be denounced as a thief by a black man represented a particularly 
humiliating offense to a white man, as Ingledove claimed when Lacour accused him of 
horse theft.  By raising the possibility that Ingledove was a dishonest thief, Lacour 
dishonored him before other white men.  Ingledove felt the sting of his accuser’s words 
all the more sharply because his defamer was black.  Indeed, Ingledove repeatedly 
reminded the court that his accuser, Lacour, was a “man of color.”  To be dishonored by a 
black man compounded Ingledove’s shame.   
Lacour’s accusations of dishonesty and theft were not the sole threats to 
Ingledove’s reputation.  Whatever his economic stature, Lacour was still a black man, 
and Ingledove was white.  The danger derived from the repetition of Lacour’s words.  
Lacour’s version of events gained additional credibility as it was repeated by propertied 
white men.  Because of their superior social standing, the voices and opinions of white 
men of property were thought to be inherently more believable and authoritative than all 
others.
29
  Repetition among reliable and impartial white men thus validated the 
accusation of theft.  Lacour’s allegations became the “common fame” or “common 
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  In each of the four trials involving the two men, no one questioned whether 
Ingledove had stolen Lacour’s horse; all assumed that he had (including witnesses for 
Ingledove).  Once Lacour’s words circulated amongst whites, they attained power—the 
power to dishonor a white man before other white men.  Dishonoring and publicly 
insulting Ingledove reduced him as a man.  A southern white man without honor was no 
man at all.   
Reputations were not equally vulnerable to public critique.  The gravity of an 
insult or defamation depended on the social and racial rank of the persons involved.  
Ingledove was, after all, a landless wage worker dependent on a black man for 
employment.  Due to his protected status in his Plaquemine community, Lacour could 
afford to be less judicious with his words even though he was a man of color.  Indeed, in 
some ways, Lacour was elevated to the position of an honorary white man, while 
Ingledove was degraded to the status of a “negro” as a result of his employment by a 
black man.  As a result, Lacour did not entirely disrupt the social and racial order by 
slandering Ingledove.  Slaves gossiping about white slaveholders was another matter 
entirely.   
 
Although denied entry to formal governing structures, slaves’ gossip served as a 
means to practice politics.  Their gossip was a form of governance and could potentially 
force slaveowners to change their strategies of rule and expand the definition of what 
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constituted a “good” and “bad” owner.  Slaves did not have access to such “big politics” 
as office-holding or voting.  However, in the “small politics” of everyday life in their 
communities, their words had sway.  The voices of slaves were the most restricted by 
law, but their gossip might, in certain circumstances, make or unmake others’ reputations, 
including the reputations of their masters.  Their words served as an essential tool for 
protecting their own interests.  In the politics of reputation, slaves’ words became 
weapons.  They could insult or gossip about someone they disliked or feared.  While they 
did not sit on the magistrate’s bench or in the halls of government where community 
leaders made decisions about conduct, enslaved African Americans helped to shape the 
rules of daily life.  Indeed, their speech served as a mechanism to exert informal political 
power in a society that denied them access to formal political arenas.   
Of course, to a large degree, slaveholders circumscribed slaves’ speech and 
limited their ability to use the power of reputation to their own benefit.  Slaves who 
insulted whites faced harsh penalties.  White southerners designed legal codes to severely 
penalize slaves and free blacks who committed crimes against deference.
31
  A Natchez 
jury condemned Beverly, an enslaved man, to the lash when he insulted John Pomet and 
his wife.  In a disagreement over the weight of some meat, Beverly, the Pomets claimed, 
“insolently insinuat[ed]” that they were “liars” and cheats, and shook his fist at them.  For 
his offense against the Pomets, the jury sentenced Beverly to twenty lashes.
32
  Although 
slaveholders often punished loquacious slaves or simply ignored their speech, 
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occasionally the words of enslaved men and women damaged the reputations of their 
superiors.  
Defamation and gossip had a kind of democratizing power because all reputations 
were subject to public scrutiny and could be strengthened or undermined by the gossip of 
others.  Even the most powerful and wealthiest leaders of a community held their 
positions at the will of the public.  Their authority was contingent on the fulfillment of 
their allotted roles within the social order.  When they failed to do so, they might face 
punishment, diminished political and social standing, dishonor, and loss of reputation.  
Having achieved the status of a man of good repute, a slaveholder could gain esteem 
from his neighbors, but he was neither immune to community sanction nor insulated from 
community judgment.  Sometimes the words of enslaved men and women undermined 
the reputations of their masters as proper patriarchs by exposing their disorderly 
households to public view.   
In the politics of reputation, gossiping about one’s superiors served as a weapon 
for those with limited legal rights.  Enslaved people’s gossip could damage the good 
name of whites and bring the actions and behavior of their superiors to the attention of 
the courts and local authorities.  As members of their masters’ households, slaves served 
as conduits of information about the personal lives, character, and conduct of their 
household heads.  Thus, they could use their speech to exert informal authority over their 
social betters.  The ability of enslaved men and women to spread gossip about their 
owners and other whites gave their words potentially subversive power.  In a church 
disciplinary hearing (which functioned similarly to the justice of the peace court), the 
Piedmont Baptist Church in Jefferson County, Mississippi, reprimanded an enslaved 
44 
 
woman belonging to David Ellis for spreading rumors about Ellis’s alleged immoral 
behavior—behavior that she insisted should exclude him from the Church.  Ellis, 
concerned about the effect these rumors had on his reputation among his fellow 
parishioners, asked the church elders to censure his enslaved woman’s speech.
33
  
Similarly, the Zion Hill Baptist Church in Amite County, Mississippi, excluded the 
enslaved woman Fanny Marsh for “contradictions in talk,” claiming that she had been 
gossiping and spreading false rumors about her master.
34
  Because slaveholders could not 
always control what their slaves said (although they certainly tried) or to whom they said 
it, the words of enslaved men and women attained influence beyond their official 
standing in their communities.   
Slaves used the power of gossip to bend others to their own will and critique the 
power and authority of their superiors.  Their gossip was a form of governance, and with 
it sometimes they forced slaveowners to measure up to slaves’ standards of what made a 
“good” master.  The gossip of slaves made slaveholders’ reputations vulnerable, 
particularly if owners did not live up to what was expected of them as household heads.  
Masters and mistresses needed to demonstrate the qualities and responsibilities associated 
with their position, and rumors of domestic disorder started by slaves could come back to 
haunt their owners.  
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Slaveholders who abused and neglected their slaves might face some kind of 
penalty.  Louisiana slaveowner Jean Baptiste Mengate faced criminal charges for assault 
when Josiah and Thomas Brown accused him of “treating his slave Amy with great and 
unlawful cruelty and barbarity—by beating with unlawful weapons—and unlawful means 
of punishment.”
35
  Excessive brutality called into question a slaveholder’s capacity as 
governor of his household.  Although slaveholders could use violence to control slaves, 
they were expected to deploy physical punishment rationally and deliberately rather than 
passionately and wantonly.  The harshness of the punishment needed to match the 
severity of the crime.  Honorable and capable slaveowners were expected to recognize 
the difference.
36
   
After William Surget’s slaves revealed their master’s vicious conduct to the 
public, he faced criminal charges for assaulting several of his slaves.  They made Surget’s 
behavior known as they appealed to his white neighbors for protection from his beatings 
and sought shelter to avoid his wrath.  Their bruised and bloodied bodies confirmed 
rumors of his brutality, and the white community reacted by indicting him for assaulting 
six of his slaves.  Surget was a member of the wealthiest family in Mississippi, and his 
brother, Natchez nabob Francis Surget, Sr., was the second-largest slaveholder in the 
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  His standing, however, did not shield him from 
punishment and public reprimand for abusing his power as a master.   
The voices of Surget’s slaves shaped the case against him and unmasked the 
brutal practices occurring within the Surget household.  They produced the information 
that dismantled Surget’s reputation as a competent master.  While his slaves could not 
formally testify against him, their words reached the courthouse through the voices of 
white intermediaries who had heard rumors of Surget’s violence.  Some of the most 
prosperous men in town cast doubt on Surget’s fitness as a household manager.  
Witnesses claimed that Surget abused his slaves “with whips, sticks, knives and clubs . . . 
in a barbarous and unusual manner” not equal to their crimes.  An honorable master 
disciplined his slaves with coolness and rationality—never in anger.  The broken bodies 
of Surget’s slaves called into question his ability to govern his household dispassionately.  
Surget’s “cruel” treatment of his slaves violated the standards expected of slaveholders, 
and his mishandling of his domestic affairs therefore threatened his standing in the 
community.  In the case of William Surget, excessive mastery would not be tolerated.  
Jurors fined him $358 for sadistically beating his slaves.  Although hardly a blow to his 
bank account, reputation required an audience, and in this particular public accounting, 
Surget lost.
38
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Just as Antoine Lacour’s words gained additional weight when they were repeated 
by white men, the speech of slaves gained legitimacy and became the “common fame” as 
whites repeated their words, first to others in the community and then in court.  Repeated 
accusations signified gossip’s persuasive power to become fact.  For instance, on the 
morning of June 17, 1830, Augustin, an enslaved man belonging to John Close, fled his 
master’s household and ran to the neighboring home of David Markham.  When he 
arrived, Augustin told Markham that his owner had “treated” him “most cruelly and 
shamefully.”  Shocked by the gravity of Augustin’s injuries, Markham then accused 
Close of beating his slave excessively and petitioned the court to seize Augustin and 
remove him from Close’s barbarous reach.  He also wanted Close to appear before the 
court to “show cause why [Augustin] should not be sold in order to place him out of the 
reach of the power which his Master had abused.”  Several witnesses repeated Augustin’s 
version of events, although none had witnessed the abuse firsthand.  Five white men 
claimed that they had heard that Close often whipped Augustin so severely that his skin 
fell from his body.  This kind of brutal and repeated abuse, witnesses affirmed, reinforced 
Close’s reputation as a “severe master.”  Although Augustin could not testify against 
Close, the judge requested his presence in court so that the jurors could observe the 
physical violence inflicted upon his person.  After white men and his own injuries spoke 
for him, the court ordered that he be seized from Close.  Frequent repetition of Close’s 
abusive treatment of his slave transformed Augustin’s accusations into common 
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In addition to their words, the behavior of slaves similarly influenced the 
reputations of their masters.
40
  Giving a slave too much freedom, for example, called into 
question the ability of a master to govern his household.  To many slaveholders, a 
master’s leniency represented a bigger problem than his ruthlessness:  “Some persons are 
too strict with servants; but for every one who errs in this way, one hundred may be 
found who go to the opposite extreme and let them idle away their time and do no more 
than half work.”
41
  As this slaveholder indicated, a well-run plantation did not allow 
slaves to drink, hire out, gamble, or trade independently.  A lax master was a bad master.  
Courts routinely prosecuted slaveholders whose slaves ran wild or lived on their own.
42
  
The behavior of Isabella Nichols’s slave, Ned Miles, caused her neighbors to question her 
ability to master slaves and head a household.  Ned faced criminal charges several times 
for his unruly behavior, indicating Nichols’s lack of control over him.  In 1818 alone, 
local Natchez authorities prosecuted Ned three times:  for living apart from his mistress 
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in a state of fornication with a white woman named Betsy Osteen, for assault and battery 
upon the same Betsy Osteen, and for selling alcohol without a license.  Nichols was 
charged with allowing Ned to live separate from her.  Because she allowed Ned to behave 
as a free man, Nichols’s local community questioned her capacity to govern a household 
properly.
43
   
William Surget, John Close, and Isabella Nichols faced criminal charges for 
needlessly beating or neglecting their slaves because they violated general understandings 
of the way slaveowners should behave—expectations reinforced in state law.  Both 
Mississippi and Louisiana law banned masters from inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishment upon their slaves and made it illegal for masters to allow slaves to live as free 
people.  Admittedly, however, what constituted cruel and unusual punishment was 
debatable.  In general, the law of cruelty toward a slave was fairly flexible.  Most often 
abusive or even sadistic masters did not face criminal charges for beating or even killing 
their slaves.  When they did, the charges were generally dropped.  For example, a 
Mississippi grand jury indicted George Tarleton for “maiming” his slave by castrating 
him, but the charges were later dismissed when Tarleton did not show up in court.
44
  
Masters regularly justified abuse by claiming that their slaves had misbehaved.  After 
being arrested for excessive punishment that resulted in the death of a slave, John Brooks 
successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by claiming that he had whipped the 
                                                 
43
State of Mississippi v. Osteen and Miles, Adams County, Mississippi,1818, Records of the 
Circuit Court, Group 1810-19, Box 39, File 43, CRP, HNF;  State of Mississippi v. Miles, Adams County, 
Mississippi,1818, Records of the Circuit Court, Group 1810-19, Box 39, File 43, CRP, HNF; and State of 
Mississippi v. Miles, Adams County, Mississippi,1818, Records of the Circuit Court, Group 1810-19, Box 
40, File 2, CRP, HNF.     
 
44
 State of Mississippi v. Tarleton, Adams County, Mississippi, 1846, Records of the Circuit Court, 




man forty to fifty times because he had run away.  The court dismissed the charges 
against Brooks.
45
   
Still, slaves had a keen sense of what constituted appropriate behavior by 
slaveholders, and when their owners violated it slaves passed the information on to others 
who might repeat it.  The words of enslaved men and women could set the community 
rumor mill in motion.  Slaves listened and observed.  They talked to visiting whites about 
their owners, gossiped about who was a kind master or a cruel mistress, chatted with 
passersby on the road, and traded stories at the local general store.   
For those with limited legal rights and excluded from formal political arenas, 
gossip served as a means to exercise power in the small politics of everyday life.  The 
gossip of slaves represented a form of governance because their words (and actions) 
influenced the behavior of others.  The information circulated by slaves about their 
masters and mistresses contributed to the meaning of what made a good and a bad 
slaveowner.  Excessive and wonton violence and poor management signified a 
slaveholder’s inability to govern slaves.  When slaveowners failed in their expected 
duties and others found out about it, they might lose valuable standing as did Isabella 
Nichols, or face criminal punishment as did William Surget.  By publicly speaking out 
against an abusive master, slaves critiqued the power of their superiors and sometimes 
received redress for past wrongs.   
 
When openly questioning their masters’ ability to govern their households or 
manage their slaves, enslaved men and women worked within the boundaries of their 
subordination.  The challenges they mounted in public were not assaults on the institution 
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of slavery.  Slavery’s legitimacy was not in dispute; only its excesses were.  By 
challenging slaveholders as proper masters, slaves in effect reinforced the system of 
slavery by making it work according to the highest southern ideal.  Setting limits on the 
unrestrained behavior of slaveholders helped uphold the institution of slavery.  But in the 
process, courts disciplined negligent and brutal masters.  By bringing the bad behavior of 
their owners to the attention of the local authorities, slaves improved their situations.  
Doing so, however, meant conceding their subordination. 
Similarly, free blacks wielding the politics of reputation as both offensive and 
defensive strategies also had to work within the limitations of their subordination.  They 
too reinforced their lesser position within the social order by calling upon their qualities 
as “good negroes.”  In exchange for individual legal success and protection from attack, 
free blacks reified the system that subordinated them.   
Thus, on the surface it appeared as if African Americans were partners in 
enforcing their own subordination.  The qualities of deference and consent that free and 
enslaved African Americans performed reassured white southerners that blacks 
remembered their place.  For African Americans, behaving deferentially by fulfilling 
their designated roles within the southern racial hierarchy was necessary in order to 
survive in a slaveholders’ republic.  It is possible, however, that this behavior obscured 
more than it revealed.  Such performances on the part of African Americans may have 
been feigned.  Political anthropologist James C. Scott argues that, despite appearances of 
consent, oppressed groups challenge those in power by creating a hidden, dissident 
political culture that manifests itself in daily conversations, jokes, folklore, and songs.  
This social and cultural world of the oppressed often surfaces in everyday forms of 
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resistance, like theft or the destruction of property, or in the arts such as theater where 
subordinates insinuate a critique of power.  This day-to-day resistance constitutes what 
Scott calls “infrapolitics.”  Infrapolitics conveys, in Scott’s words, “the idea that we are 
dealing with an unobtrusive realm of the political struggle.”
46
  Unlike open rebellions or 
headline-grabbing protests, the “circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate groups 
is, like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum.  That it should be invisible . 
. . is in large part by design—a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance 
of power.”
47
  What free and enslaved African Americans did and said openly, their public 
performance of the qualities expected of them by southern whites, may have been a 
“tactical choice” obscuring something else entirely.     
While the bondspeople belonging to George Tarleton and John Brooks and free 
people of color such as John Motton may have failed to obtain redress in court for the 
injustices they suffered, their actions were not in vain.  Evaluation of resistance should 
not concentrate solely on the triumphs of the agents involved.  Often they did not win.  
Focusing on victories alone as historically significant moments silences many of the 
actions of subordinate people and places them outside of history.  Moments of defeat 
were as important as moments of success because they helped shape the next round of the 
fight.  The actions of slaves and free blacks both inside and outside the legal arena—their 
gossip, insults, lack of deference, insurrection, and rebellious behavior—shaped the law 
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and southern governance more generally.  The indirect consequences of enslaved and free 
blacks’ actions were every bit as important as their conscious intentions.  White 
southerners’ fear of African American agency, their anxiety about the reach of African 
American speech, and their apprehension about blacks’ capacity to control their own 
lives shaped future litigation and statutory law.  Comprehensive laws curtailing and 
criminalizing African American speech, in particular, highlighted white unease about the 
power and scope of blacks’ words.  
Although they did not specifically challenge slavery or institutionalized racism, 
free blacks and slaves directly and indirectly used the courts to influence what their place 
within a slaveholding society would entail.  In so doing, they limited the authority their 
owners and social betters had over them and sometimes improved their situations.  In the 
politics of reputation, even the grandees were accountable to a public with considerable 
influence over their good name and social standing.  This public—which included free 
and enslaved blacks—enjoyed a power of its own.   In the small, face-to-face society that 
characterized the Old South, the public represented a constant and judgmental audience.  
For those denied access to the halls of government, gossip served as a means to practice 
politics.  For free blacks, acquiring a good reputation could mean the difference between 
ruin and prosperity.  By participating in the politics of reputation, African Americans 
seized a measure of power:  the power to protect themselves and elaborate their position 











“Forgetful of his Duties as a Husband”:  Married Women, Law, and the Politics of 





 “In truth, woman, like children, has but one right, and that is the right to protection.  The 
right to protection involves the obligation to obey.  A husband, a lord and master, whom 
she should love, honor and obey, nature designed for every woman,—for the number of 
males and females is the same.  If she be obedient, she is in little danger of mal-
treatment; if she stands upon her rights, is coarse and masculine, man loathes and 








In April 1849, Margaret O’Conner, an illiterate white woman living in Natchez, 
Mississippi, petitioned the Adams County chancery court for a divorce from her husband, 
Luke.  Throughout their seven-year marriage, she had “conducted herself with propriety,” 
Margaret claimed, “mainly from the fruits of her own industry provided for, and managed 
the household affairs of her said husband, with prudence and economy, and at all times 
treated her husband with kindness and forbearance.”  Despite her patience, love, and 
support, Luke treated her “in an insulting & threatening manner,” using the “most 
indecent and opprobrious epithets, degrading [her] to the level [of a] negro servant.”  He 
beat her, grabbed “her by the hair of her head, and dragged her across the room,” 
“menaced her with deadly weapons,” and assaulted her until boarders in their home 
intervened.  Luke, she lamented, was “almost daily intoxicated; and most of his time 
                                                 
1
 George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society (Richmond, VA: A. 




[was] filled with a regular alternative of revolting scenes of brawling debauchery and 
inebriety.”  He was “a man of violent, poisonous, and ungovernable temper, apparently 
without any moral feelings, and only restrained from atrocity by fear and force.”   
Luke was also a poor provider.  Margaret’s personal industry and labor supported 
them, as Luke owned no property of his own.  By “keeping a boarding house,” Margaret 
managed to “acquire and save a small property,” including two slaves and some “kitchen 
& bar furniture.”  In this endeavor, Luke represented nothing but a” nominal proprietor,” 
while she “furnished, provided for and managed” the house.  Furthermore, his “daily 
rounds of intoxication and brawling” made the boarders “extremely uncomfortable.”  
Unless “the timely interposition of the court” restrained Luke, Margaret ran the risk of 
losing everything for which she had worked so hard.  In addition to a divorce, Margaret 
also wanted her property—the boarding house, furniture, and two slaves, Arthur and 
Jane.  
 A month after she petitioned for divorce, Margaret and Luke O’Conner 
reconciled.  In an effort to make their marriage work, Luke pledged to cease his erring 
ways.  Margaret claimed that she forgave him and dismissed her lawsuit.  Yet, their 
fragile reconciliation did not last long.  Six months later, Margaret petitioned for divorce 
once again.  It appears that Luke had reneged on his promises and began threatening 
Margaret’s life with a “bowie knife and a loaded pistol.”  Moreover, he now lived in 
“open adultery” with “a slave named Jane,” a woman who had been purchased by 
Margaret.  He also contracted “a disease” from his “various immoral acts.”  As a violent, 
lazy, and adulterous drunk, Luke certainly fell far short of the model husband.  Instead, 
he required his wife to provide for him, manage their business, and make the household 
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decisions, while he drank and cohabited with her slave.  Fed up, Margaret would not 
dismiss her second petition, and the court granted her a divorce from the adulterous and 
abusive Luke.
2
      
Margaret O’Conner’s lawsuit against her husband offers an appropriate 
framework for understanding how the struggle over power within southern marriages and 
between subordinates and their superiors was fought in the terrain of law.
3
  For 
nineteenth-century southern ideologues like George Fitzhugh, the law and the courts 
offered little to married women because southern legal system supported the authority of 
men over all dependents.  Husbands represented wives in all matters, and wives’ access 
to the courts was thus circumscribed.  To allow wives redress in court against their 
husbands implied that wives had interests separate from and at odds with those of their 
husbands.  Nonetheless, many married women like Margaret O’Conner had a keen sense 
of the legal process in their communities and used the courts to limit their husbands’ 
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 Much of what is known about married women in the early nineteenth-century South tends to be 
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authority, improve their lot, and make their grievances known to those in positions of 
power.  By leaving the household and publicly petitioning the local courts for divorce, 
separations of property, and protection from domestic violence by their husbands, wives 
registered their voices in the public sphere.  With calculated use of the courts, wives 
demonstrated that the power of household heads was not absolute.
4    
Married women utilized legal venues to challenge their husbands, but their battles 
with their spouses did not begin and end in the courtroom.  Indeed, law was inseparable 
from community relations, and wives’ disputes were community affairs.  Not only did 
local communities intervene on the behalf of wives, reminding husbands that wives were 
also daughters, sisters, aunts, and neighbors; they also helped determine the outcome of 
cases, weighing in, providing information, and passing judgment.  The community 
constituted a discriminating audience.  The public character of married women’s lawsuits 
was critical.  Wives’ knowledge of the legal system as well as their capacity to harness 
their community networks empowered them to protect themselves, their children, and 
their property, and gave some wives leverage over their husbands’ actions.   
Not every wife sued her husband, of course.  Most did not.  The wives who did, 
however, enjoyed considerable legal success.  Yet, suing husbands required a particular 
formula.  African American and white women used a similar approach to secure verdicts 
in their favor.  Employing the familiar language of subordination, they demonstrated that 
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they had fulfilled their expected roles within their families while their husbands had 
failed as legitimate patriarchs.  Just as local communities rewarded free blacks for 
behaving according to their place within the southern social hierarchy, they also protected 
wives who behaved obediently and chastely.  And just as local communities disciplined 
brutal and neglectful masters, they also punished violent and adulterous husbands.  By 
challenging their spouses’ capacity to govern their households properly, married women 
embedded themselves more deeply in a patriarchal gender system in which wives were 
subordinated to the power of husbands.  At the same time, however, these Mississippi 
and Louisiana wives transformed that subordination into a usable legal principle.  They 
employed the local legal culture to their advantage and ultimately limited their husbands’ 
power over them.  While they did not directly challenge household patriarchy, married 
women used the courts to play an important role in framing what their place within it 
would entail.  Husbands held most of the cards in southern marriages, but wives held a 
few of their own.    
 
Given the nature of marital power in the antebellum South, lawsuits like Margaret 
O’Conner’s challenged many of the inequalities embedded in the southern legal system.  
Once married, wives forfeited their legal personhood.  In Mississippi, under the unity of 
person principle (coverture) of Anglo-American common law, a married woman’s legal 
existence was incorporated into that of her husband’s.  Husband and wife became one 
person—the husband.  This principle limited a married woman’s ability to act at law.  As 
a feme covert, she could not sue or be sued in her own name.  She could not enter into 
contracts.  She could act as neither an executor, administrator of an estate, or legal 
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guardian.  Nor could she convey property she brought into her marriage.  Once married, a 
wife’s personal property came under the exclusive control of her husband, and he could 
spend it, sell it, or appropriate her wages.  A husband could make all managerial 
decisions regarding his wife’s real property, but he could not sell or mortgage it without 
her consent.
5
   
When it came to the rights and duties of husbands and wives, Louisiana’s civil-
law system, which had its origins in Roman law rather than British common law, shared a 
great deal with Anglo-American common law.  While wives in Louisiana could hold 
separate property, their husbands enjoyed the exclusive right to manage the property they 
held in community.  Wives could neither enter into contracts without their husbands’ 
permission, nor initiate lawsuits.  The Louisiana Civil Code was explicit on the subject of 
marriage and family responsibility.  A husband and wife owed each other “fidelity, 
support and assistance.”  A wife was “bound” to her husband, who in turn was “obliged 
to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required for the conveniences of life, in 
proportion to his means and conditions.”6  The doctrine of marital unity articulated in the 
law of both states mandated a married woman’s subservience to her husband.  
Questioning a household head’s domestic authority, even in its most sadistic 
forms, challenged a finely tuned social and political hierarchy.  The patriarchal 
household, with its networks of kinship, served as the constituent unit of southern society, 
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one in which yeomen and planters alike grounded their claims to masterhood.7  The 
southern household represented a site of both production and reproduction that 
guaranteed the authority of men.  As the northern middle class increasingly moved 
toward a more companionate view of the home and domestic relations by creating an 
ideology of public and private spheres, the white South saw itself as the defender of an 
organic model of the household.8  This model reinforced the centrality of male control 
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over households and the individuals within them.  The customary arrangements of work 
and space within the southern household did not conform to northern bourgeois beliefs 
about gendered division of labor and spheres of influence.  Northern middle-class 
distinctions between public and private, work and home, and men’s and women’s spheres 
had little meaning in southern households.  Southern women belonged to a slave society 
that differed significantly from the urban northern bourgeois society.  While northern 
women of the propertied classes made new claims to influence and authority within the 




While the size and wealth of southern households differed, both yeomen and 
planters established their claims to autonomy and independence on their ability to 
exercise authority over dependents (women, children, slaves, and servants) within their 
households.  The state recognized and supported the male head as the sole representative 
of the family in all economic, legal, and political matters.  State power derived from a 
network of patriarchs who reigned over their households, and dependents were connected 
to the state only through their household head.  Essentially they had no government but 
the household.
10
  As the proslavery apologist George Fitzhugh explained in 1854, “Two-
thirds of man-kind, the women and children, are everywhere the subject of family 
government.  In all countries where slavery exists, the slaves also are the subjects of this 
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kind of government.  Now slaves, wives and children have no other government; they do 
not come directly in contact with the institutions and rulers of the State.”
11
  All 
subordinates owed obedience to the household head in return for his representation, 
protection, and economic support.   
To most southerners, the importance of family and the centrality of marriage were 
the foundation of a civilized and stable society.  The household hierarchy gave each 
person specific responsibilities.  The ideal husband provided for his dependents, used 
restraint rather than violence in disciplining them, managed the family finances with care, 
responsibly represented the household in all legal and political matters, and resisted 
temptations such as drink, infidelity, and gambling.  The ideal wife exhibited 
characteristics of virtue and obeyed her husband.  Deviance from these expectations and 
ideals challenged the viability of marriage as well as the proper roles of men and 
women.
12
   
Patriarchy, however, was never as perfect in practice.  Marriages did not always 
live up to such social prescriptions, and husbands and wives did not always act as they 
should.  The lower courts provided some women with an important venue in which to 
protect their limited legal rights, improve their immediate situations, and contest their 
husbands’ tyrannical control.  Judges and juries frequently awarded married women 
verdicts that challenged household patriarchy and granted them alimony, child custody, 
divorce, protection from domestic violence, and the right to administer their property as a 
feme sole (with the rights of a single woman).  
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Wives could sue their husbands under certain circumstances.  Wives sometimes 
used the courts to leave their marriages.  Women could petition for absolute divorce or 
for separation from bed and board—a legal separation in which neither party could 
remarry—on a number of grounds ranging from adultery to cruelty.  In the early 
antebellum period, both men and women could receive a divorce only for adultery, 
abandonment, or bigamy.  A liberalization of divorce law occurred throughout the United 
States during the antebellum period, especially between 1830 and 1860, and both 
Mississippi and Louisiana increasingly expand the grounds for divorce.
13
  By the late 
antebellum period, the grounds for divorce or a legal separation included insanity or 
idiocy, impotence at the time of marriage, criminal activity on the part of the spouse, 
habitual drunkenness, nonsupport, and cruelty.  Cruelty was interpreted broadly by both 
wives and the courts:  it could mean slander or attempted murder, calling a wife a liar in 
public or domestic violence, refusal to provide care for a sick wife, or failure to provide 
adequate clothing for the couple’s children.  Its expansive definition gave judges, juries, 
and litigants flexibility when interpreting divorce law.
14
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Because few alternatives to marriage existed for southern women, however, most 
wives chose to stay in their marriages.  In the rural counties and parishes of the Natchez 
District, women had little opportunity to make an income that allowed independent 
living.  Beleaguered wives therefore needed to find ways to expand their authority and 
increase their independence within their marriages and counterbalance their husbands’ 
control over them.   
Married women also sued their husbands to protect their property.  They did so 
most frequently in Louisiana because Louisiana’s civil law protected the separate 
property of married women beginning in the colonial period, well before Mississippi did.  
If Louisiana wives believed that their husbands were mismanaging their property or if 
their husbands’ creditors endangered their own assets, they could sue for a separation of 
property.  This separation granted married women the legal rights of single women, 
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Mississippi did not have a separate property law for wives until 1839, when the 
state legislature passed one of the nation’s first Married Women’s Property Acts in 
response to the national banking crisis of 1837 when a wave of bankruptcies threatened 
southern household stability.  Supported in part by wealthy fathers hoping to protect gifts 
they gave to their daughters from unsuccessful husbands, the law shielded women and the 
property they inherited or earned through their own industry and labor from the business 
errors of their husbands.  Moreover, it allowed wives to possess and administer property 
in their own names free from their husbands’ creditors.  Even before 1839, some 
Mississippi wives of means established trust estates administered in equity (chancery) 




In order to obtain legal separations (divorces, separations from bed and board, or 
separations of property), married women had to work within the boundaries of their 
subordination by first demonstrating that they had performed the roles expected of them.  
In order to be successful, petitioners had to exhibit ideal spousal behavior in their tales of 
marital discord.
17
  The very nature of the separation process required a demonstration of 
fault.  A woman therefore needed to show that her husband had violated his domestic role 
as patriarch or head of household in some fundamental way, while at the same time 
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demonstrating her innocence.  Married women used the antebellum expectations of 
womanhood and the idealized roles and characteristics of wives to establish themselves 
as the injured party.  Female petitioners consistently called on their qualities of 
domesticity, propriety, and submissiveness when asking the court for a separation.  
Wives also attempted to prove their husbands’ fault by demonstrating their failure as 
heads of households.  Emilie Brout’s account of her marriage to Ursin Heno was fairly 
typical.
18
  In her petition to the district court, she claimed that she had “always been a 
dutiful wife, attentive to her business and a good mother.”  Despite her obedience, she 
had experienced “on the part of her husband all kinds of vexations, excesses, cruel 
treatments, outrages, and defamation.”
19
  Similarly, Margaret Richards complained that 
although she had been a “kind faithful, prudent and affectionate wife,” her husband had 
“treated her in a cruel, outrageous, dishonorable and inhuman manner.”
20
  Not all 
household heads were able to meet the responsibilities of legitimate patriarchal authority, 
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Women understood that they needed to demonstrate to the court that they were 
model wives, dutiful and compliant rather than high-spirited or independent-minded, in 
order to obtain legal separations from their husbands.  Deviance from this behavior 
generally resulted in failure.  If a husband could prove that his wife did not act chastely or 
obediently, he could usually get the court to dismiss the suit or he could successfully 
countersue for a divorce himself.  This is what happened in Elila and John Toumy’s 
divorce in Adams County, Mississippi.  In 1837, Elila petitioned the circuit court for a 
divorce from John, claiming that he beat her, treated her cruelly, and habitually drank.  
But John countersued, asking for a divorce himself.  Elila, he claimed, had purposefully 
tried to have him incarcerated and now lived in a state of adultery with her “seducer.”  
Witnesses on his behalf testified that they had heard rumors that Elila had murdered her 
first two husbands.  Because Elila had not acted as a proper wife, she did not receive a 
ruling in her favor.  Instead, the judge granted John’s divorce and declared that he was no 
longer financially responsible for Elila.
22
  When Susan Thames O’Neal petitioned for a 
separation of bed and board in 1854, she accused her husband, Albert, of cruelty and 
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physical abuse.  But Albert, as well as witnesses on his behalf, testified that Susan had a 
bad temper and had threatened to take his life, and the district court judge dismissed her 
case.
23
    
The importance of the appearance of respectability, propriety, submissiveness, 
piety, and obedience—all qualities used to describe the southern “lady”—raises the 
question:  for whom was a legal separation intended?  The ways in which women had to 
frame their petitions, calling on their traits as modest and subservient wives, qualities 
supposedly inherent in the lady, suggest that separations were reserved solely for white 
women of the upper classes.  Class and race deeply divided southern women.  The figure 
of the lady, especially the plantation mistress, dominated southern ideas of womanhood; 
her clothing, her breeding, her leisure time, her freedom from household and farm labor 
all differentiated the lady from her poorer or enslaved counterparts.
24
   
Judges looked after well-bred and delicate women—ladies the judiciary felt 
required protection from depraved and abusive husbands.  Some judges believed women 
of the poorer classes were accustomed to rough treatment and violence within their 
marriages and their homes.  The abuse poor women endured at the hands of their 
husbands was more routine, possibly expected, and thus not cause for divorce.  Justice 
George Goldthwaite of the Alabama Supreme Court certainly made such a class-based 
distinction when he claimed that “between persons of education, refinement, and 
delicacy, the slightest blow in anger might be cruelty; while between persons of a 
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different character and walk of life, blows might occasionally pass without marring to 
any great extent their conjugal relations or materially interfering with their happiness.”
25
  
Many southern ladies did in fact claim that their parents had brought them up delicately 
and protected them from want and violence, making their husband’s behavior all the 
more outrageous.  In her petition for a separation from bed and board, Hetty Jewell 
testified that “she was tenderly raised” by a “wealthy father” and was unaccustomed to 
the kind of cruelty meted out by her vicious and neglectful husband.  Judges responded 
by protecting delicate women like Hetty by granting their requests.
26
   
The standards of decorum required of southern ladies did not make them less 
willing to sue their husbands and broadcast their private woes to the public.  In legal 
proceedings, women of the propertied classes volunteered all the dirty details of their 
marriages, however shameful or discomforting and despite the damage it might do to 
their reputations.  Lavinia Erwin, the daughter of Joseph Erwin, a Louisiana planter, 
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claimed that her husband, William Aborn, had abandoned her and was living “publically 
and Openly with his Concubine in the Village of Plaquemine.”  As a result of his “wicked 
conduct” and “vicious habits,” he had also “caught contracted and carried upon his 
person dangerous Infectious [and] disgraceful” venereal “diseases” which “threaten and 
endanger” her life.  Despite what her petition revealed to her neighbors and friends about 
the private details of her marriage, Lavinia risked her reputation as a southern lady in 
order to free herself from the “worthless” William.
27
  Coincidently, in 1843, shortly after 
Lavinia’s divorce, Caroline Walker, a manumitted slave once belonging to Joseph Erwin, 
Lavinia’s father, also sued her husband for divorce.  The judge initially granted her 
alimony, her “wearing apparel,” and custody of her daughter, but dismissed the case 
when she failed to appear in court and charged her with the court costs.
28
 
As Caroline Walker’s lawsuit suggests, free black women relied on the mercy of 
the local courts when they faced marital discord they could not fix themselves.  In the 
local courts, both free black women of all classes and poor white women sued their 
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husbands for divorce in similar ways as white women of means, and with similar 
results.
29
  Whatever their social status or race, women who sued their husbands for 
divorce or separation used similar tactics.  If they said the right things, conducted 
themselves as respectable wives, and demonstrated that they had performed their 
prescribed roles within their marriages, families, and communities, then judges and juries 
ruled in their favor.  These women demonstrated that they were models of southern 
femininity, and the courts responded to them as such.  Laurinda Griffin, an illiterate and 
propertyless white woman, sued her husband, Young Griffin, for a divorce.  Despite her 
industrious and virtuous nature, shortly after Laurinda married Young, he abandoned her 
and then committed adultery.  She also claimed that he was insolvent, with no intention 
of ever working.  Knowing that alimony was not an option, Laurinda simply wanted to be 
rid of him and to have her rights as a single woman restored.  The judge granted her a 
divorce and ordered her husband to pay the court costs.
30
  When Ann Mather Bienville, a 
free woman of color, petitioned the East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, district court for a 
separation from bed and board from her husband, St. Luke Bienville, she told the court 
that she had conducted herself as “a faithful dutiful and affectionate wife” and had gained 
the “good opinion of her friends and neighbors.”  She had cared for him devotedly and 
obediently, yet he treated her with cruelty, beating her and refusing to feed her or their 
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four children.  Despite her “patience & forbearance,” living with St. Luke had become 
“impossible & insupportable,” and Ann asked for and received a legal separation.  St. 
Luke, then, bore sole responsibility for their marital disunity while Ann established 
herself as faultless.  St. Luke was the antithesis of a responsible and respectable head of 
household.  He failed to act as he should.
31  
 
While definitions of femininity were intensely racialized in the antebellum South, 
free black women also employed the trope of the sexually virtuous wife when suing their 
husbands.  Free black and enslaved women confronted different standards from 
propertied white women.  White womanhood emphasized domesticity, purity, and 
decorum.  Black womanhood represented debasement, hard labor, and sexual 
availability.
32
  In spite of stereotypes depicting women of color as innately hypersexual, 
however, free black women also used the courts to protect their reputations as sexually 
virtuous when suing their husbands.  When Aurore Lauvee, a free woman of color living 
in Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana, sued Victore Leblanc, her free black husband, she 
claimed that he had ruined her good reputation by inflicting “injuries” upon her 
"peculiarly distressing and detrimental to her sex.”  Victore’s “wonton cruelty and 
unbridled lust” had destroyed Aurore’s “reputation and good fame as a woman of virtue.”  
His "savage disposition & beast-like habits led him to assault, outrage, and injure" her.  
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During the two years she lived with him, Victore impregnated her with a child he refused 
to support.  Aurore wanted $10,000 in damages, “plus interest,” for the two years she had 
endured his abuse, as well as a public apology for the damage he did to her reputation.  
She also asked the court to force Victore to pay her “two hundred dollars annually for the 
support of the child.”  The court found for Aurore.  The amount of support or damages 
awarded, if any, is, however, unknown.
33
  Aurore certainly held herself to the same 
sexual standards as elite white women.  By using the court as a venue to safeguard her 
sexual honor and separate herself from the abusive Victore, Aurore expressly rejected the 
stereotype that defined black women as naturally libidinous.  Instead, she posited a view 
of herself as a virtuous and chaste woman by nature and expected the court to uphold and 
protect that conception—and succeeded in doing so.    
 
Women crafted their petitions for legal separations from their husbands in ways 
that reinforced their subordinate status and bolstered existing gender norms based on 
patriarchal marriage.  In the process of protecting virtuous wives from depraved 
husbands, courts buttressed patriarchal marriage and reified female subordination.  
Judges and juries punished an errant head of household by awarding his wife a divorce or 
a separation of property.  From this perspective, local communities reinforced and 
legitimized patriarchal authority and hierarchal gender norms, as opposed to weakening 
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them.  Setting limits on patriarchal excess helped sustain the legitimacy of patriarchy.  
These men had violated their expected roles as legitimate heads of households by abusing 
and neglecting their wives, rather than caring for and protecting them.  They simply did 
not act as men should.  Punishing deviant and abusive husbands reinforced the hierarchal 
structure of marriage by making the system work according to the highest ideal.  By 
providing women with the legal resources to escape deficient marriages, courts 
legitimized patriarchy.  
The courts, however, simultaneously provided a space for some wives to 
challenge their husbands’ power over them and limit how that authority should be 
exercised.  The married women who sued their husbands were shrewd litigators and used 
their subordination as a source of power.  The expectation that, as wives, they were owed 
protection by their husbands served as their entry point to the legal system, and they 
employed this expectation to their benefit.  Indeed, it was precisely because they were 
meant to be protected and well cared for that they had access to the courts in the first 
place.  At issue was not whether they should be subordinate, but the nature of their 
subordination.  Wives thus co-opted their subordinate status and transformed it into a 
workable legal principle—one that allowed them to negotiate for a degree of autonomy 
and additional control over their lives, their children, and their resources.  They may have 
drawn on longstanding images of female submission, weakness, and silence, but their 
insistence on being heard in public, legal settings directly challenged those traditional 
ideals.  Wielding the trope of female powerlessness was a rhetorical strategy and, in 
effect, a strategy for obtaining power because it gave wives standing in court.  Wives’ 
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lawsuits against their husbands suggested that the patriarchal household was not itself 
inviolate.    
Wives knew enough about the legal grounds for separation, as well as the social 
expectations of married men and women, to frame their petitions in a way that both 
echoed the law and positioned themselves as long suffering victims.  Often, their 
testimony quoted the laws that protected them (perhaps guided by lawyers).  Catherine 
Wilkins, the daughter of a wealthy Natchez resident, Stephen Minor, referred to both the 
1839 and 1846 Mississippi Married Women’s Property Acts in her bill of complaint 
against her husband, James Wilkins, and the trustee of her property, Samuel Davis.  Some 
years before, Catherine had inherited $20,000 in stock from her father and $10,000 from 
her uncle.  Her husband managed the property, and because he owned nothing of his own, 
her wealth supported their household and family.  But, Catherine claimed, James was a 
poor manager, and their house was in disrepair.  In light of “the act of the Legislature in 
relation to the rights of married women passed in 1839, and its amendment of 1846,” 
Catherine insisted that she was “competent to hold her property in her own name or the 
proceeds of it.”  These laws granted her the capacity to manage and control her property, 
she told the court.  She asked that the judge dismiss her trustee and remove the control of 
her property from her husband, who could not responsibly manage it.  The judge agreed, 
and Catherine became the administrator of her property.34  Women knew enough about 
the law to frame their petitions in ways that would help guarantee their legal success.  
The fact that married women’s petitions shared a similar formulaic quality in both tone 
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and text suggests that the formula was a recipe petitioners knew well, and one they used 
because it worked. 
Many married women were savvy enough to ensure that the courts acknowledged 
their independence, autonomy, and ability, rather than just their helplessness.  Wives’ 
petitions for separations of property bring this issue to the fore most explicitly because 
these disputes generally had an important effect on power relations within marriages, 
particularly when husbands owned no property of their own and depended on their wives’ 
property to support them.  Wives frequently employed the courts to take legal control of 
the family finances when their husbands could not manage the household themselves.  
Manette Bandon claimed that she had brought a dowry worth $4,700 into her marriage to 
Duncan Robertson.  Manette worked constantly and, through her “own individual 
industry and labor,” accumulated both real and personal property, including seven slaves.  
She put a great deal of effort into supporting her family and, like so many other wives, 
stepped in when her husband failed.  Duncan, she claimed, contributed nothing to his 
family.  In fact, he barely worked at all, expected her to provide for him, and accrued 
nothing but debt.  He squandered the family resources he was supposed to manage 
prudently, and, as a result, his creditors and their lawyers had attempted to seize her 
property to settle his debts.  His bad decisions and rabid creditors endangered the fruits of 
her hard labor.  With mouths to feed, Manette took decisive action and sued Duncan for a 
separation of property.  The Louisiana district court judge granted the separation, 
declared all the property she described in her petition to be her own, restored her to the 
legal status of a single woman even though she remained married to Duncan, and granted 
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her a judgment against him for $4,700.
35
  Now Duncan faced another creditor—his wife.  
With her in charge of the family property, and particularly because he had none of his 
own, the power dynamics of their marriage shifted.  In effect, because Duncan owned 




The married women who appeared in the Mississippi and Louisiana courts were 
notably protective of the property they had accrued through their own industry.  Wives 
were incensed when their husbands made decisions about their property without their 
authorization, especially when the husband made bad choices or represented his wife’s 
interests poorly.
37
  When Elizabeth Maignen sued her husband, Bonaventure Granet, she 
claimed that his “significant” debts had forced him “to make a complete surrender of all 
of his property to his creditors.”  Her “large family” “relied on [Elizabeth’s] industry and 
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talents” to support them.  She had recently started a school for young women, where she 
managed “to make a decent living for her and her family.”  Her husband’s poor decisions 
and sizeable debts threatened the livelihood of her children, and she wanted him as far 
away from her property as possible.
38
 
While husbands had the legal right to control their wives’ labor and earnings, 
wives did not cede to that right easily—especially in cases where women felt their 
husbands offered little in return but heartache and want.  In an effort to care for her 
children, Sarah Read used the Mississippi chancery court to wrench control of her 
property away from her estranged and insolvent husband, William Read.  In early 
December, 1848, Sarah filed suit against William, an “indigent” without “any property 
real or personal” or “regular employment.”  Shortly after marrying him, Sarah had found, 
“much to her disappointment and mortification,” that William was “thriftless, of careless 
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and indolent habits [and] unsettled in purpose; without employment and dependent upon 
his friends for the first necessities of life.”  “During her coverture” with William, Sarah 
provided for the “maintenance and education” of their three children through her own 
“industry,” while he contributed nothing.  William eventually abandoned Sarah and their 
children. While they had received no word from him in years, she had heard that he was 
still worthless and lazy, “ever contin[uing] in the same thriftless and unprofitable career 
which he ran while he [had] lived with” her.  Sarah claimed that she possessed no real or 
personal property other than a promissory note for $8,000 given to her by her brother, an 
enslaved woman and her child whom she had been forced to sell to satisfy her husband’s 
debts, and a small “tract of land” that William had sold, keeping the $1,500 profit.  Soon 
after they married, William took great interest in the promissory note.  “Under the color 
of his marital rights,” he signed the note over to himself, without her “knowledge or 
consent.”  She feared that she and her children would never see a dime of it, as William 
would squander the entire sum “for his own exclusive personal gratification.”  She 
wanted the judge to recognize the promissory note as belonging to her, and the court 
rendered a verdict in her favor.
39
   
With verdicts in support of hardworking wives, judges and juries conceded 
women’s competence.  Granting wives alimony, child custody, divorce, and the right to 
control their property as feme soles, indicates that, on some level, the courts found some 
women proficient household managers.  Indeed, in cases like those of Manette Bandon or 
Elizabeth Maignen, it was the wife’s labor that sustained the household.  Wives could 
plan their children’s futures, carefully dispense money, manage their finances, run a 
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household, and make long-range preparations regarding their homes, farms, land, and 
slaves. When granting a woman legal separation from her husband, some judges and 
juries demonstrated a belief in female self-reliance.
40
  
By depending on their wives to manage the household and support the family, 
husbands such as Manette Bandon’s, Elizabeth Maignen’s, and Catherine Wilkins’s 
jeopardized their reputations in their local communities.  Southern men, by both law and 
custom, were responsible for the economic well-being of their households.  Charges of 
thriftlessness, the inability to repay debts, or the incapacity to manage one’s finances 
could have ruinous consequences and might even endanger a man’s position in his 
community.  Financial trustworthiness was a central tenet of southern male life.  In 
antebellum Mississippi and Louisiana, the decision to offer or deny credit depended on 
personal ties and experience with the prospective borrower, or without those, on 
information gathered from outside parties concerning the borrower’s reputation.  A lender 
did not extend credit to strangers without a sense of their reputation as creditworthy.  A 
damaged reputation might therefore result in the loss of crucial sources of livelihood.
41
   
Married women who proclaimed their own innocence, chastity, and obedience 
were not the only wives whose behavior highlighted their husbands’ inability to manage 
their households.  Disobedient, disorderly, and unchaste women also challenged their 
husbands, albeit in different ways.  Wives who violated standards of respectability, 
committed adultery, abandoned their spouses to live with other men, or came and went as 
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they pleased also highlighted their husbands’ inability to properly manage their 
households.   
An unruly wife may not have had legal grounds to sue for divorce, but she could 
force one by cohabiting with another man or humiliating her husband by abandoning him.  
When Zenon Bourgeat petitioned for a separation from bed and board from his wife, 
Mary, he claimed that "she abuses him by day and by night" and ran off at all hours of the 
day.  She destroyed his property, sold all the beds, and made him sleep on the floor.  Her 
cruelty, he said, was "indescribable.”  She had threatened to kill him so often that he 
feared she would make good her threats, particularly because she had already caused the 
death of an enslaved woman.  Furthermore, she spat terrible insults at him in public, 
greatly damaging his good reputation.  Witnesses on his behalf believed her to be 
“trouble” and claimed that she had killed an enslaved woman because of her 
extraordinary "jealousy.”  Mary Bourgeat was no model wife.  By terrorizing her spouse, 
coming and going as she pleased, and reigning over her husband’s household, she seized 
a power that belonged to men.  Errant wives such as Mary Bourgeat claimed a right to 
mastery over their marriages.  Stepping out at all hours of the day also suggested a lack of 
chastity, compounding her husband’s shame because he could not be certain of her sexual 
fidelity.
42
     
Just as a headstrong wife suggested a disorderly household, so too did an 
adulterous spouse.  Unchaste women signified sexual deceit.  The adulteress represented 
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the dishonest opposite of ideal wifehood and womanhood.
43
  For southern white women 
in particular, honor was synonymous with sexual virtue—sexual purity for unmarried 
women and sexual decorum for married women.  Unlike the antebellum northern middle 
class, which promoted the doctrine of female “passionlessness,” white southerners did 
not deny that women were subject to sexual desire.
44
  They did, however, attempt to 
control female sexuality and expected single women to be chaste and married women to 
be faithful to their husbands.  Husbands were responsible for their wives and were thus 
the proprietors and protectors of female sexual virtue.   
Rumors of unchaste wives greatly damaged the reputations of their husbands by 
implying that they were cuckolds.  To admit that one was a cuckold was a profound 
humiliation.  Robert Lowes bemoaned “that notwithstanding his love, kindness, and 
provident management as a husband” his wife, Nancy, “publicly defamed him,” “brought 
shame and disgrace to” his name by committing adultery, and, finally, abandoned him, 
and “now lives in open shame and concubinage” with one Peter Jones.
45
  Cuckolds were 
the butt of antebellum songs, jokes, and rituals.  A cuckolded husband was beneath 
contempt in southern society because he signified domestic disorder.  Unchaste wives 
indicated a general depravity within the household and a loss of male control.  A 
cuckolded man failed to maintain household order and lost his authority over his wife.  
Cuckoldry also called into question the paternity of his wife’s children and raised the 
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possibility of having to provide for a child he may not have fathered and passing on his 
inheritance to a bastard.  An adulterous wife signified a man’s failings as a lover and a 
family leader.  She publicly humiliated her spouse and jeopardized her husband’s 
reputation as a legitimate household head.   
Women like Mary Bourgeat and Nancy Lowes contravened the authority of their 
spouses by attempting to govern their marriages.  They refused to accept their status as 
subordinated wives and reversed the traditional understandings of household authority.  
The behavior and actions of unruly and misbehaving wives reflected poorly on husbands 
who could not manage their households. 
The public character of wives’ behavior and of their accusations against their 
husbands was critical.  Wives who accused their husbands of being inept patriarchs 
exposed their husbands’ failures and made their private lives public.  In a culture where 
one’s standing rested on the question of honor, reputation, and respectability, the power 
of peers to influence a husband’s conduct was a device women used to their advantage.   
 
Married women brokered both legal and extralegal means to dictate the terms of 
their marriages and employed their considerable social networks to help constrain the 
power of their husbands.  Wives commonly drew upon local legal culture, which 
operated on a middle ground somewhere between law and custom.  Many cases of abuse, 
neglect, or other sources of marital discord never made it to formal legal venues.  The 
boundaries between custom and local law were not obvious, and petitioning for a legal 
separation was often only the final course of action in a long process that began outside 
of the courtroom.   
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Conflicts between husbands and wives were public battles.  Community 
involvement preceded trials and continued long after the verdicts.  Women ran to the 
shelter of neighbors, fought with their husbands in the street, and asked brothers or other 
male relatives to act as co-petitioners.  They implored observers to become witnesses, 
named their husbands’ mistresses, and openly accused their spouses of deplorable 
behavior.  A couple’s most intimate life became public knowledge well before the ink on 
the petition dried.  Even after they approached the courts, wives continued to involve 
their local communities in their marital disputes.  Initiating a legal separation was itself a 
public act.  Petitioning for divorce or separation of property involved the judge or 
magistrate, the sheriff and his deputies, possible witnesses, and lawyers, as well as 
anyone else who happened to be in court that day.  In addition, both Louisiana and 
Mississippi law required that spouses publish a notice of their divorce petition in a local 
newspaper for a month.  Wives aired their dirty laundry for all to see.   
Women used their petitions to condemn publicly the character and actions of their 
husbands.  For some married women, the court represented more than a judicial body or a 
site of dispute resolution.  The courts also served as a site of governance.  When they did 
not live up to the standards expected of them as husbands, men faced punishment.  There 
was a line they simply could not cross without consequences.  Women’s lawsuits against 
their husbands, especially successful ones, served as a warning to other men.   
Because of the public nature of litigation in the Old South, women could use their 
lawsuits to shame men into changing their behavior.  Sometimes women approached the 
courts in order to force men to do right by them, only to dismiss the case when they 
received the result they desired.  Mina Klotz used the local court to extract a marriage out 
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of Simon Weil, although one that ultimately brought her little but heartache.  In early 
July, 1856, she sued him for a breach of marriage promise, claiming that he had seduced 
her shortly after they met with “the light & beauty of his conversation the elegance of his 
demeanor and the seductive and fascinating power of his address.”  “He soon found his 
way into her heart,” she exclaimed, “and induced her !alas! to love not wisely but too 
well.”  He had declared that he wanted to marry her in the presence of others, but then 
refused to do so.  She asked the court to force him to pay her damages for her distress, 
but when he finally agreed to marry her she dropped the case.  Although she asked the 
local court to grant her damages for breach of promise, what she really wanted was for 
him to marry her.  She used the court to coerce Simon into living up to what he had 
promised her.  Yet the court could not force him to do right by her permanently.  Less 
than one year later, Mina found her way to the courthouse once again, this time suing 
Simon, now her husband, for separation from bed and board.  He had abandoned her, she 
reported, and asked the court to order him to return home.  He did so, and once again, 
having achieved her desired result, Mina dropped her lawsuit against him.  Mina’s and 
Simon’s rapprochement did not last long.  Ten months later, she sued him again for a 
legal separation.  He had abandoned her a second time, calling her a “whore” unworthy 
of his love.  The judge once more ordered Simon to return to his marital home, although 
this time Simon had absconded for good.
46
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Community sanction was an effective tool for enforcing social norms and 
coercing better conduct out of husbands.  Wives hoped that kin and neighbors might 
convince delinquent husbands to cease their abusive behavior and behave as men should.  
When confronted with marital problems that they could not negotiate themselves, some 
women initially approached kin or neighbors for care, shelter, or aid.  The litany of 
hardships women described in their petitions and the number of years many wives 
endured abuse, indicate that divorce, in particular, was often a last resort.  Women 
understood that they needed financial resources to live outside marriage and that the 
public airing of their private grievances could lead to humiliation.  In their petitions, 
women regularly described how family and friends intervened when irresponsible 
husbands left their wives destitute or sheltered wives who ran from husbands in fear for 
their lives.  
Family members played an important role in policing domestic disputes, 
chastising errant spouses, and offering married women protection and relief.  In 1808, 
Rosalie Belly, a free black woman, appeared before the Iberville parish court claiming 
that her husband, Antoine Dubuclet, also a free person of color, had beaten and whipped 
her at diverse times during their marriage.  Because of his “cruel & malicious” temper, 
she told the court, she could no longer live with him.  She wanted him out of their house, 
and away from her property, as well as alimony sufficient to support her and their 
children.  By abusing Rosalie, Antoine also ran afoul of his father-in-law.  On the same 
day Rosalie sued her husband, her father, Pierre Belly, a white Frenchmen, former judge, 
and one of the most prosperous planters in the region, also filed suit against Antoine 
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Dubuclet.  Like Rosalie, he too tried to eject Antoine from the Belly-Dubuclet household, 
although he used a different tactic.  Pierre Belly told the court that Antoine lived as a 
tenant on his plantation and had possession of four of his slaves.  He wanted to evict 
Antoine and reclaim ownership of his plantation and slaves.  In his response, Antoine 
admitted that he was in fact in possession of the plantation and the slaves, but not as a 
tenant.  When he married Rosalie, Antoine contended, Pierre Belly had conveyed the 
plantation and the slaves to him and his wife.  Belly, he claimed, had no legal grounds to 
evict him.  The court agreed, and Antoine remained in control of the property.  Both 
Rosalie and her father lost their joint endeavor to rid themselves of Antoine and protect 
their family property.
47
  But battles between married couples reminded husbands that 
wives were also daughters, sisters, and aunts.  Many fathers such as Pierre Belly and 
other male kin intervened when a husband treated his wife poorly.   
 Wives’ disputes with their husbands also involved local communities.  Married 
women sometimes approached justices of the peace, lawyers, deacons, pastors, and other 
important community members to negotiate settlements with their spouses.  People often 
went to magistrates to resolve their quarrels in an effort to avoid making formal 
charges.
48
  Even after a woman petitioned for divorce, the courts might send arbiters to 
attempt to mediate a resolution between the parties.
49
   
Fellow church members frequently intervened on behalf of beleaguered or abused 
wives, charging husbands with misdeeds and sanctioning them before the congregation.  
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In 1817, the Salem Baptist Church in Jefferson County, Mississippi, investigated a man 
for “abusing his wife and other conduct.”  After he admitted to whipping her, the church 
excluded him from its membership as punishment.
50
  In 1847, the Magnolia Baptist 
Church in Claiborne County, Mississippi, investigated Wallace Ben, a free black man, 
when his wife claimed that he had “fallen into sin” and committed adultery.  A 
“committee” of white and black members investigated, found him “guilty” of adultery, 
and excluded him from the church.
51
  The Piedmont Baptist Church in Jefferson County, 
Mississippi, excluded Willis Moore after his wife accused him of bigamy.
52
   
If community involvement failed, wives called on the local courts for help.  
Frances Sharpe Harris tried everything she could think of before she sued Gowin Harris, 
her husband of twenty-nine years, for divorce in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana.  In her 
petition, Frances claimed that “she at all times conducted herself towards” Gowin “as a 
good and dutiful wife,” but he was “unmindful of the obligations and duties of a 
husband,” and he treated her in the “most inhumane manner.”  In 1826, after several 
years of marriage, Gowin sneaked out of their Mississippi house in the middle of the 
night, taking all of the property he “could carry off,” and leaving her and their eight 
children “without any means of support.”  After his departure, her parents supported her 
and her children.  A few years later, with the help of her male kin, Frances tracked Gowin 
to Louisiana, but he continued to flee from place to place.  Finally her brother-in-law 
found Gowin living in Iberville Parish.  He threatened Gowin and demanded he provide 
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for his family as a man should.  Gowin reluctantly acquiesced, and Frances and her 
children moved back in with him.  But Gowin continued to treat them with “bitter 
hatred.”  He demonstrated “a considerable dislike” for his children, had “no house to take 
them to,” and “awaits the first favorable opportunity to abandon them entirely,” Frances 
told the court.  His behavior was “outrageous and unmanly.”  He was the antithesis of a 
husband, father, and provider.  She knew it was only a matter of time before he would 
abandon them again, taking all of their remaining property.  In fact, she had recently 
learned of his latest plot to rid himself of them—a plan that involved abandoning them 
along the Mississippi River.  Frances would not allow her children to be left “destitute 
and unprotected” a second time.  She had used her considerable kin networks to force 
Gowin to behave as a proper husband.  She had sought advice from her neighbors, 
comfort from her children, financial support from her parents, and help from her male 
kin—all with the hope that someone might convince her husband to cease his erring 
ways.  She endured his abuse for years, and, when he continued to show no signs of 
repentance, she sued him for a divorce.  The court granted Francis a separation from bed 
and board and custody of her children and ordered Gowin to pay her $1000 to help care 
for them.  With eight young children to support and no property to speak of, the money, if 
Gowin paid it, probably did not last long.  However, considering he had planned to run 




Communities also took matters into their own hands and used the courts to punish 
wayward husbands.  Sometimes kin, friends, and neighbors sued a woman’s husband 
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themselves, especially if they had boarded or cared for his wife and children.  Pauline 
Bergeron fled Baptiste Bergeron’s household after he beat her while she was pregnant.  
She sued him for a separation from bed and board, and while she waiting for the court to 
make its decision, she and her children lived with her mother, Marie Louise Lacroix.  
Lacroix also sued Baptiste Bergeron, claiming that he had left Pauline and the children 
penniless, forcing her to clothe and feed them for two and a half months.  The district 
court ordered Baptiste to pay Lacroix $125, plus court costs, for providing for his 
family.
54
   
Community members who protected abused and neglected wives sometimes faced 
the wrath of their husbands.  Husbands also sued the people who aided their spouses or 
who harbored their runaway wives.  Natchez resident Thomas Jackson claimed that on 
very morning he married Rebecah McKinney, her friends helped her abscond.  He left 
Rebecah at the Fretwell house after their wedding ceremony, and when he returned a few 
hours later, the Fretwells had "secreted" her from him and refused to let him see her.  He 
petitioned the local county court for a writ of habeas corpus, demanding Rebecah’s 
return, but she never turned up.  Evidently she had not wanted to marry him in the first 
place and had run off to parts unknown to him.
55
  William Wilkinson sued James Foster 
for $10,000 in damages, claiming that Foster had convinced his wife, Eleanor, to stay 
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with his family and would not let her return.  Wilkinson claimed that he and Eleanor had 
lived together harmoniously until she met the Foster family.  He blamed Foster for his 
influence over Eleanor, claiming that he was the reason she would not return home.
56
     
The local community also played an important role in determining the outcome of 
particular lawsuits.  Judgments depended on the knowledge of observers and witnesses 
who knew the involved parties.  Judges and juries relied on witnesses to bring 
“information” regarding the reputation of the husband and the wife, as well as evidence 
of the crime or mistreatment allegedly committed.
57
  Community members helped 
determine the seriousness of an offense through an assessment of both the perpetrator and 
the victim.  Both had to be investigated.  Was the wife dutiful and chaste, or was she 
willful and headstrong?  Was the husband a good provider, or did he squander his 
resources gambling and drinking?  Witnesses provided information about an individual’s 
actions and character.  Justices of the peace, county and parish court judges, clerks of the 
court, and members of the jury were also part of the local community and often knew the 
individuals in a given case.  They knew which witnesses to trust and which to ignore.  
They knew when a husband did not care for his wife or children and when a wife 
behaved badly and had a high temper.   
In the face-to-face societies of the antebellum South, an individual’s reputation in 
his or her community played an important role in separation cases.  The outcome of such 
proceedings could hinge on local knowledge about a person’s reputation, particularly 
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when husbands responded to their wives’ petitions by denying all of the charges or 
accused their wives of immoral behavior. Witnesses helped the court assign fault by 
providing information about who behaved according to accepted social and marriage 
norms and who did not.  For example, in 1847, Jane Davis, a free black woman living in 
St. Landry Parish, told the local court that her husband of twelve years, William 
Edmonds (also a free person of color), had broken his “marital vows” and “abandoned, 
deceived, and maltreated her.”  Not only did he “humiliate her” by seeking the 
“embraces” of another woman, but William also denied that he and Jane were ever 
“united in the bonds of Lawful wedlock.”  He consistently “defames and blackens her 
reputation,” Jane claimed, by spreading rumors that she was “of doubtful fame & 
chastity.”  She told the court that their “living together was insupportable” and asked that 
they be “separated in bed and board.”  William denied Jane’s allegations and claimed that 
she worked as a prostitute and had once been jailed for slander.   
In order to clear up the contradictory statements made by the couple, the court 
turned to Jane’s and William’s local community.  Character witnesses, black and white, 
male and female, would settle the confusion by answering the following questions:  What 
reputation did Jane have in her community?  Was she known for her “chastity, integrity 
and general worth”?  Was Jane a “common prostitute”?  “Did she keep company with 
women of ill fame”?  Had they ever heard “whispered” rumors questioning her 
“chastity”?  Was Jane really married to William?  Witness after witness testified on 
Jane’s behalf.  William Nanly claimed that he “considered Jane to be a woman of 
chastity, of good repute, faithful to her husband and a good mother to her children.”  He 
knew her as “the wife of Edmonds.”  Mary Russell said that Jane was “a respectable, 
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honest, virtuous and industrious woman” who “kept respectable company and always 
resided with respectable people.”  James Bird swore that he knew “no blemish against her 
character. . . . She kept company with the best of our people.  She never kept company 
with women of ill fame.”  Thomas Jordan claimed that Jane “was always a gal that kept 
decent company—went to Church on Sunday—and was never seen in the streets at 
night.”  Eliza Smith testified that she “was never acquainted with Jane by the name of 
Jane Davis,” but instead was “acquainted with Jane Edmonds wife of William Edmonds 
free man of color.”  Margaret McClellan, a white doctor’s wife who had employed Jane’s 
mother as her housekeeper for several years, said Jane “bore a good character for 
integrity and industry.”  While witnesses on William’s behalf testified that they had heard 
rumors questioning Jane’s character and reputation, the court, swayed by the 
overwhelming evidence supporting Jane, found in her favor.
58
  Wives like Jane Davis 
used the politics of reputation to their advantage, calling on witnesses to attest to their 
good behavior and their husbands’ failings.   
 
In cases of wife beating, married women similarly mobilized both the courts and 
their community networks to protect themselves from violent husbands.  Obtaining court 
protection from domestic violence, however, was difficult.  White men had great latitude 
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to use violence against dependent members of their household.  Throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, the “rule of thumb” served as the standard for measuring cruelty in 
wife beating.  Beating a wife with any instrument wider than a man’s thumb was 
considered excessive.
59
  It is difficult to know just how commonplace domestic violence 
was, but wife beating occurred in households across classes and races.  Some men beat 
their wives routinely and others with excessive brutality.  William Porter whipped his 
wife “with a cow hide,” then stripped off her clothes and threw her naked in the street.
60
  
Allen Ellis habitually drank and punched his wife “in a barbarous and evil manner.”  He 
“cruelly tore out” her hair, “choked her violently,” and repeatedly threatened to kill her.
61
  
Ansel Davis liked to beat his wife both in “private and at the supper table, at her home, 
[and] in the presence” of her children, her mother, her husband’s niece, and “other 
persons.”  His abuse was so frequent that she often fled for “the safety of a neighbours 
house” unless her injuries were bad enough “to confine her to her bed.”
62 
  Lydia Ireson 
claimed that her husband “brutally assailed her, struck her repeatedly in the breast and 
about the head and choked her” so violently “as to leave the prints and marks of his hands 
upon her throat.  And at the same time threatens to take her life and made efforts to get a 
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large Knife with which he swore he would kill her.”
63
 Minerva Robertson’s husband, 
James, chased her out of their house on a number of occasions, threatening to kill her.  
While “in a great passion and high temper,” he threw cups and saucers at her and broke 
all of their china.  Worst of all, however, he beat her while she was pregnant.  He later 
turned her and their newborn child out of the house without sufficient clothing or any 




Despite the difficulty of obtaining redress, married women did occasionally take 
abusive spouses to court to attempt to curb the violence.  While many antebellum 
southerners considered domestic violence a private family matter, local officials 
sometimes prosecuted men who assaulted their wives.
65
  Assault and battery was, after 
all, a matter of law.  A battered wife could file a breach of the peace complaint against 
her husband, an action that forced him to appear before a justice of the peace and post a 
bond, or “surety,” promising to “keep the peace” toward his wife.
66
  Judge Henry 
Tooley’s Natchez magistracy consistently prosecuted violent husbands.  Justices of the 
peace like Tooley handled most incidents of domestic violence, although cases 
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sometimes moved to the higher courts.  For example, in the case of Cornelius Stranahan, 
who beat his wife while intoxicated, a Natchez circuit court jury decided “that a husband 
had no right to whip his wife in any case.”
67
   
A number of men found themselves behind bars because their wives had put them 
there.  John Bacon was jailed for punching his wife in the presence of the local judge and 
ordered to post a $500 bond.
68
  Mary Harrison had her husband, Charles, arrested for 
assaulting her and endangering her life.  The magistrate ordered him to post a bond to 
keep the peace toward her, but after Charles would not (or could not) post the $200 bond, 
he was jailed.
69
  William Murray spent time in the local jail for pointing a gun at his 
wife’s chest and threatening to kill her.  Even threatening a wife without physical 
violence could be grounds for a breach of the peace complaint.
70
  William Ducaye found 
himself in jail for “using abusive language to his wife therefore causing her to believe 
that her life is endangered.”
71
  
More often, however, after initially charging their husbands with assault and 
battery, wives requested that the courts dismiss their cases, claiming that the parties had 
settled their differences.  In 1818, Ann Camp asked for protection from her husband, 
John Camp, because he beat her badly, forcing her to flee her home.  He had threatened 
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to kill her before, and this time she thought he just might do it.  A notoriously violent 
man, John Camp faced assault and battery charges four times in 1818 alone, and seven 
times between 1816 and 1818.  Despite her initial fears, Ann later requested that the court 
drop the charges against her husband, stating “I wish you would let that suit that is 
between Mr. Camp and myself be dismissed as it is not my wish for it to be carried in 
court as we have made it up ourselves.”
72
  Perhaps he sobered up, cooled down, and 
apologized.  Perhaps he promised never to hurt her again.  Or perhaps he terrorized her 
into dropping the charges.  It is impossible to know.  Either way, Ann’s complaint to the 
local authorities placed John under increased public scrutiny.  The watchful eye of the 
community might have been enough to keep him from beating her again.   
Charging husbands with assault and battery was not the perfect solution for an 
already bad situation.  Spending time in jail as a result of their wives’ accusations 
probably did not make many men eager to reconcile with them when they returned home.  
For a poorer woman, the bond her husband had to post might deplete important resources 
from her household.  But having him arrested did get him out of the house and away from 
his family, however temporarily.  More importantly, though, it put him and his abuse in 
the public eye, where he might be monitored more carefully in the future by neighbors 
and by local authorities.   
Men who beat, or in extreme cases of domestic violence, killed their wives could 
face terrifying community responses.  The local Natchez community came within 
minutes of murdering James Foster for the beating he inflicted on his wife, Sarah Foster, 
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that ultimately caused her death.  When the court acquitted him of murder due to 
insufficient evidence, an angry mob of nearly 300 people attacked him as he emerged on 
the courthouse steps.  The diverse crowd, which included planters’ sons, riverboat men, 
slaves, apprentices, prostitutes, and ordinary citizens attending court that day, seized 
Foster and whipped him for nearly half a day.  They then partially scalped him, poured 
hot tar over his head and shoulders, and plastered him with feathers.  As the crowd called 
for his lynching, the sheriff finally intervened and took Foster to the jailhouse for his own 
protection.
73





By confronting their spouses and airing their grievances in court and to their 
neighbors, married women openly challenged their husbands.  When a woman stood up 
in court before the assembled judge, jury, witnesses, and spectators, she seized a degree 
of power to define the terms of her marriage.  Making their marital discord notorious in 
their communities may have helped force husbands to treat their wives better or to 
acquiesce to their wives’ demands.  Since the state recognized and supported the husband 
as the sole representative of the family in all legal and political matters, publicly defying 
him was a political act.  A husband’s honor and identity was intimately tied to his status 
as an independent householder.  Being a head of a household meant being someone who 
controlled a wife, children, and other dependents such as slaves.  This position gave a 
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man public significance and political clout.  He was the sovereign of a domain, a person 
who represented the family in all political matters.  Mastery over his household was the 
foundation of his political rights.  Loss of this status was a profound source of shame.  By 
challenging their household heads, through whom state power flowed, wives not only 
challenged their husbands, they also challenged the state.  By highlighting their 
husbands’ households as disorderly, southern wives practiced politics.  They also 
demonstrated that their husbands’ authority was not absolute. 
When petitioning the courts for protection from abusive, adulterous, or neglectful 
husbands, women established a relationship with the state and with those in positions of 
authority.  The act of petitioning had long been the means by which individuals without 
formal political power made themselves heard in the civic sphere.  Women frequently 
turned to petitioning to gain access to and make demands on those in power.  For the 
unenfranchised, petitioning both symbolized and ignited political action.  Petitions 
carried the words of ordinary women to state lawmakers and judges and made their 
requests known to those who wielded authority.  For example, antebellum southern 
women—both white and black—petitioned their state legislations for many things, 
ranging from pleas for divorce, requests for corporate charters, and the allocation of 
funds for voluntary societies.
75
  When petitioning the local courts for protection from 
their husbands, married women may not have been engaged in collective political action, 
but they were attempting to improve their lot and make their grievances known to those 
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in positions of power.  Through their petitions, married women forged a relationship 
between themselves and the state—a relationship they otherwise did not have.  
In exchange for individual legal success, however, married women reinforced 
patriarchal marriage by employing the language of subordination and by citing the social 
expectations of husbands and wives.  Married women needed to work within the 
boundaries of their subordination; otherwise, they risked legal failure.  After all, 
antebellum southern women, married or single, remained subordinate to men, lacking in 
political rights, and limited in their legal rights.  Their marginalized status in southern 
society, however, makes their knowledge of the law and their use of the courts to 
improve their own situations all the more startling.  Wives did not contest patriarchy 
itself, but they did dispute their husbands’ abuse of it.  While they did not overthrow the 
gender system that subordinated them, southern women used the courts to define what 
their place in it would be.  They turned their subordination into a working legal principle 
and with it challenged their husbands’ right to beat them, to manage their property with 
impunity, to neglect them, or to abandon them and leave them destitute.  These 
Mississippi and Louisiana wives, then, deployed their subordination to their benefit, 
pushing at it and expanding its boundaries.  In doing so, they negotiated an improved 

























- Thomas R. R. Cobb (1858) 
  
 
“Pity me, and pardon me, O virtuous reader!  You never knew what it is to be a slave; to 
be entirely unprotected by law or custom; to have the laws reduce you to the condition of 








In May 1826, Phoebe, a woman of color enslaved in Washington, Mississippi, 
sued her owner for her freedom and the liberty of her two children.  Although she was 
free and the daughter of a white woman from Kentucky and a “mulatto” father, William 
Boyer held her and her children as his slaves.  While living as free people in Kentucky, 
several unsavory characters, including her white uncle, had kidnapped Phoebe and her 
children and sold them into slavery.  Declaring that they deserved the “liberty guaranteed 
by the laws of the state,” Phoebe asked the court for their freedom.  Boyer, however, 
insisted that she and her children were born slaves and denied that they were free persons.   
Phoebe had a murky past and the circumstances of her birth proved difficult to 
uncover.  Her mother, she claimed, took great care to “conceal her parentage” resulting 
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from the “disgrace” she faced for having “relations . . . with a negro.”  Recently, though, 
Phoebe had met several “respectable persons” who could confirm the details surrounding 
her birth and prove that she and her children were in fact “free and not slaves.”  Indeed, 
several white witnesses testified on her behalf.  Jeremiah Mathers recounted that the 
“general report from old settlers and residents in the neighborhood” supported Phoebe’s 
claim to freedom.  She was, Mathers informed the court, the child of Sally Kimberland, a 
white woman, and thus entitled to her liberty.  Walter Miles, a resident of Kentucky 
familiar with Sally Kimberland, divulged that it was “common knowledge in the 
neighborhood” that Kimberland was Phoebe’s mother and a white woman.  Miles also 
testified that slave traders had kidnapped Phoebe and her children, brought them down 
the Mississippi River, and sold them as slaves.  With such evidence in her favor, the court 
found for Phoebe and her children and granted them their liberty.
3
 
Although denied legal rights and excluded from formal political arenas, enslaved 
people like Phoebe mobilized the local courts and their community networks on their 
own behalf, often successfully.
4  Slaves had a number of opportunities to learn something 
about law and the operation of the local courts.  The culture of legal localism in the 
antebellum South led even the most marginalized of southerners to view the legal system 
as something connected to them.  They went to court to redress wrongs done to them and 
to make public demands on those in positions of authority.  Moreover, slaves approached 
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the courts as shrewd litigators.  They demonstrated an intimate knowledge of southern 
laws and the workings of the local courts.  As the case of Phoebe suggests, a wide range 
of southerners understood the legal system.  Even the most marginalized southerners 
participated in local law-making processes, leaving their imprint on the local legal 
system.  Indeed, the slaves who sued their masters for their freedom used the courts to 
their own benefit and sometimes challenged those who enslaved them.   
When suing for their freedom, however, slaves confirmed their subordination and 
worked within its boundaries.  By going to the courts to petition for legal liberty, slaves 
reinforced legal slavery.  Using the courts to gain their freedom by contending that they 
were illegally enslaved, meant implicitly acknowledging that there were circumstances in 
which persons could legally be enslaved.  Those suing for their freedom did not challenge 
the legitimacy of the institution of slavery, just its excesses and wrongs.  Although they 
defied individual slaveholders, their lawsuits were systematically reassuring to the racial 
status quo.  Still, slaves’ knowledge of the southern legal system, coupled with the ability 
to harness extensive social networks, gave them a degree of power to improve their 
immediate situations and negotiate for increased autonomy over their lives. 
 
Because law was pervasive in the everyday life of the Old South, slaves had 
frequent and direct contact with local legal processes and enjoyed many opportunities to 
learn about the law.  Slaves witnessed a great deal of the law in action.  They observed 
monthly county courts, watched hearings and inquests, and sometimes even offered 
information themselves.  Slaves swarmed the courthouse steps during court week—as 
objects of sale, defendants in criminal actions, litigants in lawsuits for their freedom, or 
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witnesses in trials involving other slaves.  They served as body servants and carriage 
drivers for masters with court business and labored as peddlers, marketers, and hired 
hands.  From the vantage point of the courthouse steps, enslaved men and women 
observed, participated in, and gossiped about a considerable amount of legal action.
 
 
Much of the southern courts’ legal business concerned slaves.  In Adams County, 
Mississippi, for example, at least half of the circuit court trials involved the commercial 
law of slavery.
5
  William Johnson, a leader of the free black community in Natchez, 
frequently noted in his diary that disputes involving slaves commanded a good deal of the 
court’s attention.  In January 1844 in a typical entry, he observed that “A trial Came of[f] 
before Esqr Woods to day and . . . Parkhurst was tried for Stealing a Darkey belonging to 
Fields. .  . . Justice Woods required bail in the Sum of One Thousand Dollars.”
6
  Inside 
the courthouse, white southerners battled over unpaid debts for slave hires or sales, 
fought over damaged, sick, or recalcitrant slaves, and assigned responsibility for slave 
patrols or blame for failed crops.  They rewarded slave catchers, disciplined runaways, 
penalized poor whites who sold slaves liquor or bought goods from slaves, punished 
insurrectionists, and ordered the execution of slaves found guilty of capital crimes.  
Southerners used the courts to convey the land upon which slaves labored and the 
plantations and farms where they lived.  They probated wills involving slave property, 
manumitted loyal servants, and hashed out their understandings of race and racial 
identity.   
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Slaves themselves came before the courts for a variety of reasons:  as damaged or 
stolen goods, as objects of theft, as criminals to be punished, as witnesses in the trials of 
other slaves, and as victims of abuse.  They appeared as concubines in lawsuits for 
divorce, as fugitives, and as property seized to settle debts.  They also sued their owners 
for their freedom and were the objects of disputes over attempts to manumit them.  For a 
people with little formal legal status, slaves occupied a significant portion of the court’s 
time.   
It is difficult to know with certainty how enslaved men and women interpreted the 
power of the courts in their lives, but the rule of law was hardly beyond their 
comprehension.  Indeed, slaves’ narratives consistently described the authority and place 
of law in African American life.  The draconian face of the law was a central theme in 
slave narratives.  Harriet Jacobs’s narrative begins with a declaration of her legal status:  
“I was born a slave.”  The remainder of her opening paragraph describes a number of 
legal issues faced by slaves—the conditions under which her father hired out his labor, 
his failed attempts to purchase his children, her description of herself as property, details 
about manumission and inheritance laws, and the impossible position slave parents faced 
because they could not legally protect their children.  The paragraph ends with a legal 
statement as well:  “The reader probably knows that no promise or writing given to a 
slave is legally binding; for, according to Southern laws, a slave, being property, can hold 
no property.  When my grandmother lent her hard earnings to her mistress, she trusted 
solely to her honor.  The honor of a slaveholder to a slave!”
7
  Jacobs’s awareness of her 
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legal status as property is a pivotal theme in her narrative and something she affirms on 
nearly every page.  William Wells Brown, a former slave and novelist, also addressed the 
power of law in the world of a slave.  He opens his 1853 novel, Clotel, or The President’s 
Daughter, with a discussion of the centrality of law in African American life: 
In all the slave states, the law says—“Slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, 
reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal in the hands of their owners 
and possessors, and their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents, 
constructions, and purposes whatsoever.  A slave is one who is in the power of a 
master to whom he belongs. . . . He can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire 
anything, but what must belong to his master.  The slave is entirely subject to the 
will of his master, who may correct and chastise him, though not with unusual 
rigour, or so as to maim and mutilate him, or expose him to the danger of loss of 
life, or to cause his death.  The slave, to remain a slave, must be sensible that 
there is no appeal from his master.”  Where the slave is placed by law entirely 
under the control of the man who claims him, body and soul, as property, what 





For most enslaved people, then, the southern legal system represented a merciless 
taskmaster.  State law was an arm of the slaveholding class and was enacted to maintain 
the institution of slavery.  Southern laws denied slaves civil and political rights and made 
them into property.  These laws stipulated that anyone born of a slave mother was the 
property of his or her mother’s owner, who had the legal right, according to the Louisiana 
Civil Code, to “sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor.”
9
  If enslaved 
people could use the same laws as free people, they too would have been free.
10
  They 
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could not enter into contracts, and because marriage was a civil contract, they could not 
legally marry.  They could not testify against whites in either civil or criminal trials.  
Southern law also stripped slaves of other individual rights.  Most legislatures required 
them to carry passes when they left the boundaries of their owners’ plantations, limiting 
their movements.  When they did leave their masters’ property, enslaved people 
encountered slave patrols organized by the county and empowered by statute to whip 
them on the spot, arrest them, and turn them over to the justice of the peace.  Whites 
could corporally punish a bondsperson, but southern law made it a crime for a slave to 
insult or strike a white person.  Slave codes made certain acts committed by slaves 
criminal that were not considered crimes when committed by whites.  Slaves also 
sometimes faced harsher punishments than whites who committed the same offenses.
11
   
For slaves charged with crimes, legal proceedings were frightening affairs.
12
  In 
Louisiana, slaves were especially vulnerable because the state tried them separately and 
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differently than it tried whites and free blacks:  in special tribunals made up exclusively 
of slaveholders.  Different rules applied to the trial of slaves than to the trial of whites.  
For example, Louisiana slaves did not have the right to challenge jurors either for cause 
or peremptorily, while whites and free blacks could issue both types of challenges.
13
  In 
Mississippi, slaves faced special tribunals for non-capital offenses, but were tried in the 
circuit court for capital crimes.  Here, too, slaves confronted different rules than whites.  
For instance, the punishment for giving false testimony was exceedingly steep, and 
Mississippi judges issued instructions to slaves intended to demonstrate the draconian 
nature of the law.  Court officials warned slaves not to lie or they would receive “thirty-
nine lashes . . . at the public whipping post” and have their ears “nailed to the pillory” for 
two hours and then “cut off.”
14
  Mississippi slaves who appeared in court as witnesses in 
criminal proceedings involving other slaves met with the same warning.  Moreover, 
whether they were tried by special tribunals or by the circuit court, slaves were 
surrounded by white faces.  The judges and juries were white men.  They never faced a 
jury of their peers.       
For enslaved men and women, access to the southern legal system was limited 
and law represented an exacting and menacing presence in their lives.  It punished them 
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and barred them from using the courts in their own interest.  Yet, the very constraints 
slaves faced informed them about the law and the legal process.  Their interactions with 
the law, however intimidating, taught them how the legal system worked.       
 
Given the hostility enslaved men and women faced when they appeared in court 
as defendants, it is surprising that slaves like Phoebe found ways to use the law to their 
own benefit.  For some enslaved people, the courts could serve as an avenue of redress 
and a place to resolve their grievances and protect their interests.  The law, after all, did 
involve rules, rules that all members of the community were expected to follow.  For 
some slaves, then, the courts may have symbolized a site of fairness and justice, perhaps 
a notable contrast to the arbitrary punishments meted out by masters, mistresses, and 
overseers on the plantation or in the big house.
15
  On occasion, enslaved men and women 
did mobilize the legal system on their own behalf despite their lack of formal legal rights.  
Moreover, slaves demonstrated an astute understanding of the southern legal system.  
Slaves occasionally circumvented the statutory prohibitions that limited their 
access to the courts and sued whites.
16
  In the fall of 1825, Bob Moussa, an enslaved man, 
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sued two white men, Valerian Allain and Villeneuve Leblanc, in the district court in West 
Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, over a bill of sale that had transferred him, as human 
property, from Allain to Leblanc.  Moussa claimed that the sale violated the terms of his 
late master’s will.  For most of his twenty-four years, Moussa had belonged to Julien 
Poydras.  Poydras, however, had died the previous year, leaving a will that would be 
fought over in the Louisiana courts by his slaves and his heirs for more than a decade to 
come.  In his will, Poydras stipulated that his heirs sell each of his six plantations in 
Pointe Coupee Parish at the time of his death, along with all of his slaves.  The purchase 
of these six plantations and the hundreds of people living and working on them came 
with strict conditions.  Poydras specified that none of the slaves, including their future 
children, could be sold apart from the plantation on which they resided.  They were “to be 
considered attached” to the plantations and could not be removed from them.  In addition, 
the purchasers were to treat the slaves with “humanity.”  After twenty-five years, or when 
the individual bondsperson reached the age of sixty, whichever came first, each slave 
would be freed.  Once free, they could no longer be compelled to work, could remain on 
the plantation if they chose, and would receive an annual stipend of twenty-five dollars as 
“a relief against the infirmities of age.”   
Poydras’ heirs, however, ignored the provisions of the will and sold off much of 
the property in pieces.  Shortly after his death, Allain bought the plantation where 
Moussa lived and labored.  Allain then sold Moussa to Leblanc against Moussa’s “will 
and inclination.”  Moussa asked the court to declare the sale null and void, to “restore” 
him to his plantation on False River in Pointe Coupee Parish, and to forbid Allain from 
separating him from the plantation a second time.   
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It would be remiss to underestimate the enormous challenges Moussa faced when 
lodging a complaint before the court.  He had to leave his master’s property without 
permission, secure an attorney to represent him in court, and find a way to compensate 
his lawyer.  Moreover, he defied Allain and Leblanc at great personal risk.  Confronting 
his masters (in public no less) was dangerous.  The consequences of loss could be 
devastating, perhaps even violent.  Beyond these practical concerns, he faced larger 
structural barriers.  Indeed, given the racial inequalities embedded in the southern legal 
system, it is remarkable that he approached the courts at all.  As a slave his sole legal 
right was to sue for his freedom, not to seek enforcement of a white man’s will.  Moussa 
lost because he technically had no right to sue.
17
  
Other slaves, however, sued whites in disputes over property and won.  Milly, an 
enslaved Mississippian, successfully prosecuted a white man, Peter Brown, twice for 
sizeable debts he owed her.  The first time Milly sued Brown, she used the Adams 
County circuit court to recover the $110 she had lent him.  As evidence of the debt, Milly 
provided the court with a promissory note signed by Brown indicating that he had 
borrowed the money from her and promised to repay her “without delay.”  The jury 
found for Milly and awarded her a judgment for $127.
18
  Several months later, Milly sued 
Peter Brown a second time in order to recover a debt of $550.  Once again, she presented 
the court with a promissory note signed by Brown.  This time the jury awarded Milly a 
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verdict of $584, and the judge overruled Brown’s motion for a new trial.
19
  Although a 
slave, Milly must have acquired considerable property to be able to lend out such large 
amounts of money, property she successfully protected and recovered in court despite her 
status as a slave.  Legally, she could neither own property without her master’s 
permission nor initiate a lawsuit for anything except her freedom.  Yet, Milly did both.  
Such claims and privileges should have been out of her reach. 
Cases like Milly’s are particularly maddening for the twenty-first century 
researcher because so much information is missing from the record.  Her lawsuits were 
formulaic and read like thousands of other debt recovery cases.  There is no indication of 
the local knowledge that must have played a role in the court’s decision.  Milly’s 
litigation also leaves many questions unanswered:  who was she and who was her owner?  
How was it that a slave earned such a significant amount of cash?  Why didn’t she use it 
to buy her freedom?  Why didn’t the court simply dismiss the case?  As a slave, she did 
not have the legal right to initiate these lawsuits.  Why didn’t Brown appeal and claim 
that technically she could not sue him? What was her relationship to Brown? Perhaps she 
was his concubine and the debt he owed her was simply a way of passing money to her to 
defraud his creditors or avoid his heirs.  These questions cannot be answered with the 
available evidence, and they highlight the difficulties of interpreting such records.  It is 
clear, however, that Milly used the courts to sue a white man twice.  And twice she won 
when she was not entitled to be in the courtroom in the first place.     
Sometimes local authorities prosecuted instances of theft on the behalf of slaves.  
In 1854, Daniel Smith, a Natchez resident, faced larceny charges, a warrant for his arrest, 
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and $3,000 bail for stealing a gold watch and several coins from an enslaved man named 
Bill who belonged to Jacob Croizen.  Because of his status as a slave, Bill could not 
pursue the case himself.  However, Joseph Hawk, a white man, brought the theft to the 
attention of the justice the peace on behalf of Bill.  Five additional white witnesses 
appeared before the justice of the peace to claim that the property belonged to Bill and to 
provide evidence that Smith had “carried it off.”  The case never made it to trial, 
however.  Shortly after his indictment David Smith died of cholera, and the court 
dismissed the case.
20
  In Mississippi and Louisiana, slaves could not testify in cases 
involving whites, making it all the more difficult to prosecute those who committed 
wrongs against them.  But as this case suggests, enslaved men and women might 
circumvent the statutory bans on their testimony by getting a white witness to file suit 
and pursue the case for them.
21
   
Cases such as Moussa’s, Milly’s, and Bill’s were rare, however.  Yet, both 
Mississippi and Louisiana law granted enslaved people one legal right:  the right to 
institute a civil suit for their freedom in the circuit (Mississippi) and district (Louisiana) 
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  Suing for freedom was the only time a slave could initiate a lawsuit legally and 
was a right they defended vociferously.  Indeed, slaves sometimes claimed they were 
wrongfully enslaved and sued their owners for their freedom.  If they could prove that 
their owners illegally held them as slaves, they won their lawsuits more often than not.
 
 
Slaves sued for their freedom on a number of grounds, from the enforcement of promises 
of freedom made in their late masters’ wills to accusations of kidnapping, to safeguarding 
self-purchase contracts.  Moreover, they artfully employed their knowledge of the law 




  Enslaved men and women occasionally used the courts to enforce the terms of 
their late owners’ wills, especially if those wills promised them their freedom.  Often 
these transactions went smoothly enough, particularly if the estate’s debts did not exceed 
its assets and did not deprive the heirs of their inheritance.  Sometimes, however, 
executors and heirs ignored the wishes of the deceased and refused to liberate the 
enslaved people in question.  After all, freeing slaves meant the loss of valuable human 
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property.  Heirs and executors profited handsomely by keeping enslaved people freed by 
will in bondage.  Freeing slaves also created free blacks, a class of people southern 
whites considered subversive.  Slaves promised their freedom by their deceased masters, 
nevertheless, sought redress in court and sued heirs and executors for their liberty.
24
      
Sometimes a lawsuit or the threat of a lawsuit was an effective enough strategy in 
convincing heirs and executors to free a slave, as Peter, an enslaved man belonging to the 
late Moses Kirkland, found in 1824.  Immediately after Peter petitioned the district court 
in West Feliciana Parish for his freedom, Kirkland’s heirs filed an answer to his petition 
admitting that Kirkland had freed Peter in his will and promised to liberate him without 
delay.  The court declared Peter a free man and made the defendants pay the costs of the 
lawsuit.
25
   
Typically heirs did not surrender valuable slave property so easily and often went 
to great lengths to hold in bondage slaves who had been promised their freedom.  In April 
1833, Bob and Milley, two enslaved people freed by will in Adams County, Mississippi, 
sued their late master’s testamentary executors for their freedom and the liberty of their 
seven children.  Bob and Milley claimed that their master, Timothy O’Hara, had 
stipulated in his will that when their youngest child reached ten years of age, the entire 
family would be freed.  O’Hara instructed his executors to take them to Ohio to free them 
if Mississippi law did not allow the emancipation, and O’Hara even designated funds for 
that purpose.  Yet, after his death, Bob and Milley claimed, one of his executors, 
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O’Hara’s heir John Nugent, took possession of the family, continued to “fraudulently” 
hold them “in bondage and slavery . . . as his own absolute property,” and “appropriated” 
their labor “for his own use and the use of his creditors.”  Nugent’s creditors had recently 
sued him, Bob and Milley told the court, and he had listed them for sale to cover his 
debts.  In addition to their freedom, he owed them $300 that O’Hara had bequeathed to 
them in his will.  They asked the court to declare them free and require Nugent to pay the 
$300.  The court agreed, awarding them their liberty and $300 and condemned Nugent to 
pay the court costs.
26
   
In an effort to retain valuable property, some heirs attempted to keep the 
provisions of wills secret.  Slaves sometimes labored for years after the death of their 
owners before they realized they should have been granted their liberty and sued.  In 
some cases, courts even awarded slaves back wages, compensating them for the years 
they had worked without pay.  Mary, an enslaved woman in East Baton Rouge Parish, 
Louisiana, claimed that she was “ipso facto free” according to the terms of her late 
master’s will.  She told the court that her former owner, John Marshall, “conscientiously 
believing that civil and religious Liberty is the natural right of all men,” gave Mary and 
her five children to his daughter, Miriam Morris, for five years, after which they were to 
be liberated.  But Miriam and her husband, Gerard, left Mary in “complete ignorance of 
the existence of the will and provisions thereof, and did illegally and fraudulently detain” 
her in the “bonds of slavery.”  She should have been freed several years prior.  She 
therefore asked the court to grant her and her children their freedom and sought $2,000 in 
damages for her “services rendered during the eight or nine years of her illegal 
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detention.”  The district court found for Mary, granted her and her children their freedom, 
and ordered the Morris family to pay her $900 compensation and cover the court costs.
27
   
Although slaves in both states could—and did—sue for their freedom, Louisiana 
slaves had an advantage.  While Louisiana law denied enslaved people the capacity to 
contract for wages or enter into marriage contracts, the Civil Code allowed slaves to enter 
into one type of contract:  a contract for their freedom.
28
  Indeed, antebellum law in 
Louisiana did not permit slaves to own property without the permission of their masters, 
but it did allow slaves the right to self-purchase.  A slave’s ability to contract for his or 
her freedom was unique to Louisiana and a legacy of the Spanish right of coartaciόn.  
While enslaved people in other states on occasion purchased their liberty if their masters 
allowed it, only Louisiana slaves enjoyed the legal capacity to enter into a contract to 
purchase their freedom.
29
   
Even in Louisiana, however, a number of factors limited a slave’s self-purchase.  
Because enslaved people could not force a sale, their owners had to approve it and permit 
their slaves to hire themselves out for wages or peddle goods in their spare time for cash.  
Slaves wanting to purchase their freedom needed skills or goods to sell.  Yet, if they 
could raise the money to purchase their freedom and their owner was amenable, state law 
allowed them to contract for their liberty.  Slaves in New Orleans had the greatest success 
contracting for their freedom because they enjoyed more opportunities to work for wages 
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in their spare time.
30
  Still, from time to time slaves in the rural areas of the state made a 
determined effort to purchase their freedom and entered into contracts with their owners 
for their liberty. 
 When their contracts fell apart, Louisiana slaves turned to the courts to safeguard 
the bargains they had made with their owners and to protect their interests.  Deceitful and 
greedy owners sometimes pocketed the purchase price and denied the existence of the 
agreement.  Slaves’ self-purchase contracts were, however, legally enforceable.  When 
owners violated the terms of those contracts, their slaves could sue them in court for their 
freedom.
31
  In 1854, Tom, an enslaved man living in Pointe Coupee Parish, sued his 
owner, Rene Porche, for his freedom, claiming that Porche was “contractually obliged” to 
grant him his liberty.  In his petition, Tom informed the court that five years earlier, he 
had entered into a self-purchase contract with Porche for $200.  He had fulfilled his end 
of the bargain and paid Porche the agreed-upon amount, Tom contended, yet Porche 
refused to live up to his end and continued to hold him as a “slave for life.”  Tom asked 
the court to enforce the terms of his contract and “condemn” Porche to “liberate & 
emancipate him according to law.”  Moreover, several white men testified on Tom’s 
behalf, supporting his assertion that Porche had publicly acknowledged his “contract to 
emancipate Tom.”  For example, William H. Cooley claimed that “Tom had come to him 
to ask him to sue Porche for his freedom,” and because he knew that Tom had paid him 
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the agreed upon price, Cooley thought Tom had a “clear case.”  The district court judge, 
however, disagreed, and dismissed the case, claiming that the contract was not in 
compliance with state law.
32
   
 When their owners died, slaves also sued heirs and estate administrators to honor 
their contracts with the deceased.  Milien, a man of color, petitioned the district court in 
St. Landry Parish claiming that in September 1852 he had entered into a contract with his 
mistress, the late Carmalitte Lacasse, to purchase his freedom for $550.  Although he 
paid the agreed-upon price, the administrator of his mistress’s estate, Florian Sonnier, 
advertised him for sale at auction, along with “some little property” Milien possessed, 
including two horses, twelve heads of cattle, and a bale of cotton.  He asked the court for 
a writ of injunction prohibiting Sonnier and his “aiders and abettors” from selling him 
and his property.  Moreover, he wanted the court to enforce the terms of his contract with 
the late Lacasse and declare him a free man.  The court granted his request for a writ of 
injunction, but the outcome of his freedom suit is not known.
33
 
Slaves in the Natchez District had the greatest success securing their legal liberty 
if they could prove that they were free people who had been kidnapped and illegally 
enslaved.  The local legal record in the Natchez District is rife with instances of free 
blacks claiming that they had been kidnapped and sold into slavery.  In the first half of 
the nineteenth century, with the enormous expansion of sugar and cotton production in 
the Lower South and the rapid growth of a booming internal slave trade, more than a 
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million enslaved men and women were transported from the eastern seaboard to the 
southern interior.  Initially slaveholders themselves moved their slaves to the interior.  
Yet, over time, they increasingly relied on slave traders—a new faction of merchants 
whose sole business was to deal in human beings—to build their labor force.
34
  The trade 
in human beings to the southern interior also encouraged the kidnapping of free blacks 
and nearly free people—often term slaves (those with a fixed number of years to serve 
before becoming free), indentured servants, or people promised their freedom by 
individual manumission or statute.  Kidnapping occurred often enough to create fear 
among black people in free states.  The abduction of free people of color was an 
attractive option for slave traders and their agents because it garnered high profits while 
keeping costs low.
35
   
The slave trader enjoyed a sordid reputation in southern society as a dishonest and 
lecherous drunk who made it his business to separate families.  Motivated solely by 
money, slave speculators were traders in diseased bodies, sharp dealers of disorderly and 
criminal slaves, abductors of free people, and generally dishonest.  Portraying the slave 
trader as an outcast or a monster served a particular purpose, however.  By stigmatizing 
the slave trader, southern slaveholders created a figurative distance between themselves 
and those individuals who made it their business to deal in human beings as property.  
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With these stereotypes, slaveowners in effect separated the institution of slavery from the 
marketplace.  They conveniently ignored their own culpability in the development of the 
internal slave trade and insulated themselves from responsibility for the more unsavory 
aspects of buying and selling human beings.
36
  
Slaveholders were not the only people to wield the stereotype of the insalubrious 
slave trader to their advantage.  Slaves suing for their freedom also employed the image 
of the slave speculator on their own behalf.  Indeed, in kidnapping lawsuits, the slave 
trader often emerged as the ultimate villain.  John Neal, a man of color, claimed that 
slave speculator Branch Jordon held him illegally as his slave and sued him for his 
freedom in Mississippi in 1828.  In his petition, Neal insisted that Jordon had kidnapped 
him and described Jordan as an “outsider,” a “transient person,” a “dishonest” man, and a 
“dealer in slaves.”  Although Neal offered the court no additional proof of his free status, 
the court granted his request.  The fact that he was held as a slave by an allegedly 
dishonest, transient slave trader may have been evidence enough of his kidnapping.
37
 
Although it was difficult to do so, some people of color found legal remedies for 
their unjust and illegal enslavement.  While many states enacted statutes against 
kidnapping, the laws were hard to enforce given the voracious demand for enslaved 
laborers and the greed of those involved in the slave trade.  It was often up to those 
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illegally held in slavery to seek the means to secure their rightful liberty.  In February 
1834, Charles and Betsy (alias Lisette) sued Philip Rocheblanc for their freedom in 
Iberville Parish, Louisiana.  They claimed that for more than six years Rocheblanc had 
“illegally, forcefully, and unjustly deprived them of their liberty” by keeping them as his 
slaves.  They were free people of color and residents of Illinois, Charles and Betsy told 
the court, where by “virtue of the Constitution and Laws of the State . . . slavery does not 
and can not by Law exist.”  Despite Rocheblanc’s knowledge of their free status, he 
“illegally, fraudulently, secretly, and with the intention of depriving them of their liberty” 
seized them in St. Louis and brought them to Louisiana where he “kept them in a state of 
slavery.”  Rocheblanc had even boasted that “they ought to be free . . . in the presence of 
witnesses,” they told the court.  They were “entitled to their liberty” and insisted on 
“legal redress.”  In addition to their freedom, they wanted monetary damages for the six 
years they had labored for Rocheblanc without pay—a total of $900—and the costs of the 
lawsuit.  The jury found in favor of Charles and Betsy, awarded them their freedom, and 
demanded that Rocheblanc pay them $900 and cover the court costs.  The court also 
refused Rocheblanc’s motion for a new trial.  Charles and Betsy received the “legal 
redress” they desired.
38
   
For kidnapped people of color, attaining legal freedom was an arduous process.  
Although Charles and Betsy regained their liberty, they lost six years of their lives as 
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slaves.  For others it took even longer, and some never recouped their freedom at all.  
Solomon Northrup’s twelve-year struggle for freedom underscores the difficulties 
kidnapped people faced when attempting to regain their liberty.  After being drugged and 
abducted in Washington, D.C., by two con artists who sold him into slavery, Northrup 
was eventually sold at auction in New Orleans.  He spent several years enslaved in 
Louisiana, seeking every opportunity to attain his freedom, but without success.  After 
failed attempts to send letters home to notify his family about his condition and location, 
Northrup eventually gained the assistance of a white carpenter and abolitionist, a Mr. 
Bass.  After learning of Northrup’s tragic predicament, Bass agreed to mail letters on 
Northrup’s behalf, despite the risk such an act posed to both his safety and Northrup’s.  
Sending clandestine letters home with details of his whereabouts triggered an extended 
struggle for his release.  Northrup’s wife had trouble proving his free status to the 
governor of New York, Washington Hunt.  After finally deciding to help Northrup, Hunt 
appointed Henry Northrup, a member of the white family Solomon Northrup’s father had 
served for years, as the official state agent to rescue Solomon.  Henry Northup negotiated 
with a former Louisiana senator, a Supreme Court justice, and the U.S. secretary of war 
to provide support for his mission.  Henry Northrup still confronted obstacles locating 
Solomon despite his careful preparations and found him only with the help of a 
sympathetic local sheriff.  After finally regaining his freedom, Solomon Northrup filed 
kidnapping charges against his abductors.  The charges were dropped because of 
technicalities, and, unlike Charles and Betsy, Northrup never received remuneration for 
the twelve years he spent as a Louisiana slave.
39
 Without white allies willing to come to 
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his aid (both in Louisiana and New York), Northrup might not have been released from 
bondage.   
The most successful litigants had local white witnesses to confirm their freedom.  
In 1822, Benjamin and Bradford Lewis sued J. W. Clark and David Slater for their 
freedom in the Superior Court in Natchez.  They were free men of color from Indiana 
who had been “forcibly taken to the state of Tennessee and . . . sold as slaves” to Clark 
and Slater.  Moreover, their captors now conspired to “take them to distant ports [to] 
dispose of them as slaves for life.”  After several white men appeared before the court 
and declared that Benjamin and Bradford were free men, the jury found in their favor and 
granted them their liberty.
40
 
In kidnapping cases, in particular, witnesses played a central role in helping 
determine outcomes because they provided details about events outside the courts’ 
jurisdictions.  Without local knowledge of the people and circumstances involved a given 
case, courts frequently turned to testimony offered by distant witnesses.  Frank Irwin, a 
man of color suing for his liberty, claimed that he was “without friends” in Louisiana, 
and witnesses from outside of the local community helped the district court in West 
Feliciana Parish determine his status.  In his 1837 petition to the court, Irwin contended 
that he was born a slave in Pennsylvania and gained his liberty at the age of twenty-one.  
He then moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, and lived there for several years as a free man before 
he was “seized and delivered as a slave” by a kidnapper named Harris.  Harris “carried” 
him to Kentucky, Irwin recounted, and “after much cruel treatment,” sold him as a slave 
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to Thomas Powell, a Kentucky man temporarily residing in Louisiana.  Powell denied 
Irwin’s allegations and insisted that he was his slave.   
Neither Irwin nor Powell (or the circumstances that brought them together) were 
well-known in the greater West Feliciana Parish community.  Thus, witnesses from 
outside the area proved central for the local court to determine Irwin’s status and the 
course of events that brought him to Louisiana.  The district court in West Feliciana 
Parish issued a “commission” to examine witnesses in Ohio and Kentucky to establish 
the facts in the case.  These witnesses provided their testimony to justices of the peace 
and notaries public from their home jurisdictions, who then sent the interrogatory to the 
court in Louisiana.  Moreover, for those not familiar with Irwin and his circumstances, 
descriptions of physical characteristics from the witnesses ensured they were dealing with 
the right man.  Witnesses portrayed him as “dark but not very black,” “tall,” “large 
boned,” “with blunt & heavy features,” and a “clumsy looking negro.”  The court then 
matched those descriptions to the man petitioning the court in West Feliciana Parish for 
his freedom.     
The witnesses’ accounts, however, painted a blurred picture.  Indeed, in his 
opinion, the judge remarked that he had “no small difficulty in reconciling their 
testimony.”  Witnesses on Irwin’s behalf claimed that although he had been born a slave 
in Pennsylvania in 1809, his master freed him when he reached the age of twenty-one.  
Several white men from Kentucky, however, recounted a different version of the story.  
These men claimed that Irwin was born a slave in Pennsylvania in 1809 and brought to 
the state of Kentucky shortly after his birth. He remained in Kentucky as a slave on the 
farm of General James Taylor until he ran away in July 1830 to Ohio, where he lived for 
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several years.  Taylor found Irwin in Cincinnati a short time after he “eloped,” though 
due to his age and infirm condition, he did not capture Irwin himself.  Thus, Irwin 
remained in Cincinnati and lived as a free man.  In 1836, however, Taylor sold Irwin to 
his son-in-law, a Mr. Harris.  Harris promptly traveled to Cincinnati, seized Irwin as his 
property, brought him to Kentucky, and sold him to Powell.   
After sorting through the various accounts from faraway witnesses, the Louisiana 
judge drew the following conclusions:  Irwin was born in 1809 in Pennsylvania and lived 
in Cincinnati from 1830 to 1836 with his master’s knowledge.  All of the witness 
testimony supported these suppositions.  Thus, the judge deduced, Irwin was a free man 
because he was born in Pennsylvania and lived in Ohio in the years after the 1787 
Northwest Ordinance prohibited slavery north of the Ohio River.  Moreover, the judge 
continued, “even if he was born a slave, having resided in the state of Ohio with the 
knowledge of his owner at that time, he is therefore free.”  Taylor, the judge argued, 
essentially consented to Irwin’s residence in Ohio because he did not take any legal 
action to recapture him.  Therefore, the judge declared Irwin a free man and ordered 
Powell to pay the costs of the lawsuit.  Although Powell appealed, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana affirmed the lower court’s decision and again ordered Powell to pay costs.  
While the witnesses offered competing accounts, the judge uncovered the corresponding 
pieces of the story and used that testimony to determine Irwin’s rightful status as free.
41
   
The information witnesses provided, their testimony about the events in question, 
their assessments about the character and actions of the people involved in the disputes, 
and their opinions on the matters at hand helped weave together a story about the 
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circumstances of a case.  These narratives aided the court in its attempts to assess the 
litigants’ competing claims.  Through their use of witnesses, slaves’ wielded their ties to 
their communities—both local and distant—to their advantage and employed their 
extensive social networks on their own behalf.   
 
Legal disputes involving slaves did not begin and end in the courtroom.  Slaves 
commonly drew upon their local communities and leveraged their considerable social 
networks in their battles for legal freedom.  They called witnesses, found allies, cultivated 
respectable reputations in their communities, and sought legal help from their 
neighborhoods.  They learned valuable lessons from fellow slaves.  Indeed, suing for 
one’s liberty was part of a much broader process.   
When wrongfully enslaved and suing for freedom, it helped if slaves had 
powerful allies willing to come to their aid, as cases like Solomon Northrup’s suggest.  
John Hamm, a man of color petitioning for his liberty in Natchez, employed the 
assistance of a prominent and talented local attorney and rallied the support of several 
white men in his efforts to secure his freedom.  In his petition to the Adams County 
Superior Court in 1819, Hamm told the court that he was an indentured servant and the 
son of a white servant woman, Elizabeth McGuire, and a black slave.  His mother died 
“shortly after his birth” in Kent County, Maryland, and he “was bound as an apprentice” 
to a local man named William Sutton until his twenty-first birthday.  With the permission 
of his master, Hamm relayed, he attended an evangelical “camp meeting” in the woods of 
Kent County in August 1816.  During the meeting, however, Hamm’s cousin (also an 
African American) and two other unsavory characters kidnapped him.  They then 
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“forcibly . . . brought him down the river to Natchez where he was transferred from one 
to another until . . . James H. Steele” bought “him as a slave for life.”  He asked the court 
for his freedom from Steele and Charles Green, two local men.   
In his legal battle for his liberty, Hamm had many influential people on his side, 
including his lawyer, William B. Griffith, a gifted litigator and one of the leading 
attorneys in the state.  Griffith commanded respect in Natchez and throughout 
Mississippi.  He ran a successful law practice and had several prominent partners, 
including John A. Quitman, a politician who would later serve as the governor of 
Mississippi and as a judge on the High Court of Errors and Appeals (the predecessor to 
the Mississippi State Supreme Court).  Griffith had a reputation for fair dealing and 
frequently represented enslaved people in their lawsuits for their freedom.
42
     
Griffith went to great lengths to help Hamm secure his liberty.  He began by 
seeking out Hamm’s master in Maryland and sent him a letter requesting his assistance.  
Griffith asked Sutton to secure the depositions of several local witnesses familiar with 
Hamm’s status as an indentured servant and privy to the events in question.  He gave 
Sutton precise instructions on how to conduct the depositions in order for them to be 
legally admissible in the circuit court in Natchez.  Griffith also called upon his own 
professional and personal networks to support Hamm’s bid for freedom.  He suggested 
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that Sutton seek the council of Ezekiel Chambers, a Maryland lawyer and the brother of 
James Chambers, a Natchez resident and a close friend of Griffith’s.
43
  Chambers, 
Griffith believed, would “see that everything [was] done in due form” and 
“immediately.”  Moreover, Griffith wanted the witnesses to address the following 
questions:  was Hamm the son of a white woman and a slave father?  What was Hamm’s 
reputation “in the neighborhood?”  Did anyone in the neighborhood think of Hamm as 
“as slave for life or was he ever claimed as such by anyone?”  Did he have any 
identifiable marks on his body?  Was he an indentured servant?  If so, “by whom and for 
how long a period?”  How was he kidnapped and by whom?  Griffith insisted that the 
witnesses provide “full & explicit . . . answers, and state everything which [they] thought 
[would] be material” in order to help “rescue a fellow from an unjust & cruel state of 
slavery.”  
Sutton swiftly came to Hamm’s aid.  He wrote to the judge in the case, William 
Shields, and provided him with a copy of Hamm’s indenture agreement.  Sutton insisted 
that Hamm was his apprentice and his responsibility.  Whether motivated by human 
feeling for Hamm or by a desire to recover his indentured servant, Sutton pledged to do 
anything in his “power to [help] release him from the unrighteous bonds which the 
inequity of his fellow man forced him to wear.” 
Ezekiel Chambers, the Maryland attorney, wrote a letter to the Natchez judge 
assuring him that Hamm was an indentured servant borne of a white mother.  Hamm’s 
cousin, “a negro man named Phil,” kidnapped him and sold him to a slave trader.  “His 
freedom,” Chambers claimed, “was not in the least degree controversial.”  In addition to 
his own opinion on the matter, Chambers sent the court the depositions of twelve white 
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witnesses, including several people familiar with Hamm since his birth.  Without 
exception, each witness claimed that Hamm was an indentured servant and not a slave, 
the son of a white mother and a slave father, had been kidnapped in Maryland, and 
illegally sold into slavery.  Due to the fragmentary nature of the record, the verdict in 
Hamm’s lawsuit is missing.  But given the overwhelming evidence in Hamm’s favor, 
Griffith’s stature in the Natchez community, his success in helping other wrongfully 
enslaved people secure their legal freedom, and the number of whites who offered their 
assistance, it is likely that Hamm obtained his liberty.
44
    
Having credible white men supporting their lawsuits certainly provided slaves 
with an advantage in the courts.  Elias Wilson, a man of color held in the Natchez jail as a 
runaway, successfully secured his release after two white men swore an oath that he was 
a free person and not a slave.
45
  The oath of those with high social standing in their 
communities garnered respect and signified the legitimacy of the account in question.  In 
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Not all white men’s words carried the same weight, however.  When Debby sued 
her master, Anthony Campbell, for her freedom in 1821 Natchez, she enlisted the help of 
James Grafton.  Before she came into Campbell’s possession, Debby had belonged to 
Daniel Grafton, James Grafton’s brother who had died some years past.  Both Debby and 
James Grafton maintained that she was an indentured servant and not a slave for life.  
Grafton claimed on oath that he had read the indenture agreement (although it had since 
gone missing) between Debby and his brother.  He also insisted that his brother 
frequently stated that once Debby served her fourteen years, he would set her free.  
Anthony Campbell, a prominent journalist, politician, and a Pine Ridge planter, denied 
Debby’s claims and contended that she was a slave for life.  Without the indenture 
contract, neither Debby nor Grafton could prove to the court’s satisfaction that she was 
entitled to her freedom.  Indeed, in his opinion, the judge stated “that the declaration of 
Grafton is not sufficient to show her title to freedom.”  His word was not enough to free 
her in light of the evidence presented by Campbell.
47
   
 Robert Colston, a man of color suing for his freedom in St. Landry Parish, 
Louisiana, called upon the word of two of the most powerful men in the nation—
President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams—to support his 
efforts for legal liberty.  Colston claimed to “enjoy the privileges of the free,” until Dr. 
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Moses Littell snatched him in Washington D.C. “by violence and force . . . and reduced 
[him] to a state of slavery.”  Littell, “alleging that he had purchased [Colston] as a slave,” 
then sold him to John D. S. Arden of Louisiana.  He asked the court to issue an order to 
remove him “from the illegal and forcible possession of those who [held] him,” and 
declare him a free man.  In his answer to Colston’s petition, Arden insisted that Colston 
“was a slave before and at the time” that he had “purchased him.”  He had bought 
Colston “fairly and for a good & bona fide price” from agents in Baltimore who produced 
a legal bill of sale for Colston.  Moreover, Colston “was born a slave,” Arden claimed, 
and he wanted the judge to dismiss the lawsuit.   
 Colston, however, offered indisputable proof to support his claims.  As evidence 
of his free status, Colston supplied the court with a transcript of a trial in which the circuit 
court of the District of Columbia found him guilty for the theft of a congressman’s gold 
watch.  He also provided the court with a subsequent pardon document issued by James 
Monroe and John Quincy Adams.  Both of these records described him as a “free 
mulatto” and convinced the Louisiana court of his free status.   
 President Monroe claimed he pardoned Robert Colston because of Colston’s 
father, George Colston’s, reputation as a respectable and upright man.  He knew George 
Colston personally, Monroe declared in the pardon document, and insisted that he was “a 
man of virtuous and industrious habits of life and well spoken of by those who had long 
known him.”  The “good character and merits” of George Colston “specially moved” 
Monroe to “wholly exonerate” his son.  Robert Colson had engaged in “vicious 
practices,” but his father had promised to see “to his reformation.”  His father’s 
133 
 
reputation saved him from a $100 fine and a public whipping of thirty-nine lashes.
48
  
Without the trial transcript and a presidential pardon explicitly describing him as a free 
man of color, his reputation as a convicted thief probably would have made his attempts 
at legal liberty all the more arduous.  Indeed, the reputations of enslaved men and women 
played an important role in their lawsuits.   
For slaves suing for their freedom, leveraging reputation represented a defensive 
legal strategy.  Because they had to prove they were fit for the responsibilities of 
freedom, slaves needed to cultivate respectable reputations and then use others’ positive 
assessment of their character and actions to support their case.  Slaves could use their 
good reputations to defend themselves against those who might object to giving them 
their freedom.  After all, these freed slaves might remain in the neighborhood after the 
conclusion of their lawsuits.  They needed to demonstrate that they would not be 
disruptive or criminal forces, or become public charges, and could add something of 
value to the local community.
49
 
Slaves, then, often attempted to demonstrate that they had performed their 
expected roles within the social order when petitioning for their freedom.  Cultivating 
relationships with powerful white allies, for instance, meant that they had to behave (and 
show that they had behaved) in ways expected of them as subordinated people.  They 
worked within the boundaries of their subordination by highlighting their attributes as 
“good” slaves.  Slaves frequently insisted that they were obedient, well-behaved, 
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 Mississippi and Louisiana laws governing the manumission of slaves also insisted that slaves 
demonstrate respectable qualities or show they had performed some kind of meritorious service for their 




industrious, had served their masters devotedly, and neither prone to running away nor 
engaged in criminal activity.  When Tom sued Rene Porche for his freedom (discussed 
above), he used his good reputation to support his claims to liberty.  Tom filed an 
amended petition with the court simply to insist that he was fit for the responsibilities of 
freedom because he “had led an honest & industrious life.”  Several white men testified 
on his behalf and provided the court with a positive character assessment of Tom.  For 
example, Emile Jarreau stated that Tom was not “a rogue,” “thief,” or a “runaway.”  An 
assessment such as Jarreau’s about Tom’s reputation helped shield him from possible 
attack.
50
  By emphasizing their positive attributes and obedient behavior, enslaved men 
and women defended themselves against potential claims that they were unfit for 
freedom. 
Wielding reputation also proved an effective offensive legal strategy as well.  In 
the face-to-face communities of the Old South where one’s standing rested on notions of 
honor, reputation, and mutual obligation, the public nature of slaves’ lawsuits might have 
a negative effect on the reputations of those they were suing.  Just as wives damaged the 
reputations of their husbands by publicly highlighting their inability to properly manage 
their households, the petitions of slaves could jeopardize their masters’ reputations in 
similar ways.  These lawsuits indicated that the slaveholder had failed in some way—
failed to honor his promises to and agreements with a slave, failed to control a resistant 
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and litigious slave, or failed to realize that a lying slave trader duped him into buying a 
kidnapped free person.  These failures might reflect poorly on him as an inept master.
51
   
The kinds of legal strategies enslaved men and women employed in the courts—
calling witnesses, seeking powerful allies, leveraging the politics of reputation—probably 
stemmed from lessons learned within their own communities.  The slave neighborhood 
served as a kind of law school, providing enslaved people with the practical legal 
education necessary to face slaveholders in court as shrewd litigators.  Within their 
neighborhoods, enslaved men and women told stories and listened to the tales of others, 
gossiped, and conspired.
52
  They collected information about criminal and civil trials, 
executions of convicted slaves, brutal masters and overseers, the reach of slave patrols, 
and whippings and punishments.  They discussed the deaths of owners and heirs’ legal 
contests over wills, sympathetic attorneys and judges, disputes over manumissions, 
battles for freedom, courtroom policies, legal gossip about town, and the laws governing 
their lives.  From those in their neighborhoods, they learned lessons about which 
strategies worked and which did not.  Enslaved Mississippians in the immediate Natchez 
area, for instance, probably discussed attorney William B. Griffith’s reputation for 
successfully representing slaves in their lawsuits for freedom.  Those with experiences 
with him, those who had learned a bit about the law from watching him and interacting 
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with him, and those who had heard stories about him brought that information back to the 
neighborhood.        
The experiences of others in the neighborhood provided enslaved men and 
women with an indispensable legal education.  They discovered the strategies that 
worked and those that did not.  While Bob Moussa, a slave who sued two white men to 
enforce the terms of Julien Poydras’s will (discussed above), failed to obtain redress in 
court for the personal injustices done to him, his actions were not futile.
53
  Over the next 
decade, sixty-two enslaved men and women who had once belonged to Poydras learned 
valuable lessons from Moussa’s defeat and used the Louisiana courts to enforce the 
provisions of their late master’s will.  For example, Moussa lost because he did not have 
the legal right to instigate a civil suit for anything but his freedom.  However, the slaves 
who sued after him found an important and powerful ally to stand up with them in court 
and initiate their lawsuits for them—Poydras’s nephew, Benjamin Poydras.  With 
Benjamin Poydras’s help, they fought to enforce the finer points of the will—
manumission dates, promises for humane treatment, annual stipends without requiring 
work, and to stop sales separating them from the plantations where they lived and 
labored.  All but eleven won their lawsuits—lawsuits that directly influenced the 
distribution of over two million dollars in property and prompted future litigation 
between Poydras’s heirs.
54
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Moussa’s lawsuit did not become binding legal precedent.  After all, he lost his 
case and remained Leblanc’s slave.  But his actions in court shaped the next round of the 
battle over Poydras’s property.  Because the dominant view of the law is utilitarian, failed 
cases are often viewed as having no effect on the law and lawmaking-processes.  In this 
winner-take-all model of American law, the success of a lawsuit is measured by 
courtroom victories, direct results, and immediate change.  To dismiss the importance of 
Moussa’s lawsuit, however, would be to ignore the more nuanced (and less tangible) 
social or political effects of a given case and to overlook an essential ingredient in 
understanding the historical development of the law.  Moreover, it mistakenly renders 
those with little socio-economic or political power largely irrelevant in law, except as 
victims of it.  Moussa’s failures in court, after all, helped provide sixty-two other 
enslaved people with the legal knowledge necessary to challenge their owners, improve 
their lives, and influence the dispersal of an enormous estate.  
 
 The enslaved men and women who initiated civil suits on their own behalf in the 
local courts of Mississippi and Louisiana successfully employed their extensive 
community networks and knowledge of the southern legal system to their advantage.  
Indeed, they approached the courts as astute litigators, wielding the law to their own 
benefit and challenging those who enslaved them.  For some enslaved men and women, 
the courts represented a site of justice and fairness—a place to air grievances and redress 
past wrongs.   In ways similar to wives petitioning the local courts in order to force their 
husbands to behave better or acquiesce to their demands, slaves strategically petitioned to 
publicly shame their owners, force better treatment, gain increased privileges, or secure 
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their freedom.  While slaves used several strategies to petition the courts and sought the 
aid of witnesses and allies, enslaved litigants were the prime movers behind their cases.  
White men like Robert Griffith and Mr. Bass acted at the behest of slaves.   
Confronting a slaveholder in court was an act of resistance.  Suing for freedom 
probably was not the first time slaves defied their masters or challenged the terms of their 
enslavement.  Indeed, Jean Louis, an enslaved man in Louisiana, ran away and hid on a 
neighboring plantation to avoid his sale before he initiated a lawsuit for his freedom 
against his owner.
55
  Slaves brave enough to battle an imposing court system probably 
resisted their masters in other ways as well in an attempt to dictate the conditions of their 
bondage.  For some slaves, then, suing in court was perhaps an extension of tool 
breaking, temporarily absconding, feigning illness, and work slow-downs as strategies for 
increased autonomy over their lives.   
When suing for their freedom, however, slaves conceded their subordination and 
worked within its boundaries.  Successful petitions for freedom required enslaved men 
and women to perform a kind of narrative gymnastics.  They needed to transform their 
legal enslavement from a masters’ right under the law into a crime.   Using the courts as a 
pathway to freedom by contending that they were wrongfully and illegally enslaved, 
however, meant acknowledging that there were circumstances in which they could be 
justly and legally enslaved.  After all, laws allowing slaves to sue for freedom were not 
intended to protect the rights of slaves; instead, these laws were meant to protect the 
rights of free people.  Those suing for their freedom were not challenging the legitimacy 
of the institution of slavery, just its excesses and wrongs.  By going to the law to petition 
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for legal freedom, slaves affirmed legal slavery.  They sought their freedom on the terms 
dictated by a slaveholding system and confirmed its authority.  By accusing slaveholders 
of illegally holding free people in bondage, enslaved men and women reinforced the 
system of slavery by making it work according to the highest southern ideal.  Still, the 
courts freed wrongfully enslaved people and gave others a degree of control over their 
lives.  Although they did not directly challenge their masters’ right to enslave them, 
slaves in Mississippi and Louisiana used the local courts to play a central role in 
negotiating what their place within a slaveholding society would be.   
 































“This Useless and Dangerous Portion of our Population:”
1
 Free Black Litigants and 
the Local Courts  
 
 
“As we have before remarked, a free negro is an anomaly—a violation of the unerring 
laws of nature—a stigma upon the wise and benevolent system of Southern labor—a 
contradiction of the Bible.  The status of slavery is the only one for which the African is 
adapted; and a great wrong is done him when he is removed to a higher and more 
responsible sphere.”
2
   
 
- Jackson Semi-Weekly Mississippian, May 21, 1858  
 
 
In spring 1849, William Johnson, a leader of the free black community in 
Natchez, Mississippi, became involved in a legal dispute with a neighbor, Baylor Winn, 
that led to Johnson’s death.  Johnson and Winn had been friendly for many years.  Their 
friendship dissolved, however, after Winn purchased the swampland adjacent to 
Johnson’s and, in blatant disregard of the boundary lines between their properties, began 
cutting timber on Johnson’s land.  Before suing Winn in court, Johnson first attempted to 
compromise with him.  At the suggestion of his lawyers he asked Winn to settle the 
dispute by agreeing to resurvey the boundary line between their land.  Winn refused.  
Johnson secured a court-ordered survey, but after discovering that Winn continued to cut 
timber on his land, Johnson sued Winn for trespassing.  In May 1851, before the lawsuit 
went to a final trial, Johnson proposed another compromise that included a survey paid 
for by both parties.  This time Winn agreed, and Johnson dismissed the suit.  The 
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disagreement between the two men, however, was far from over.  A month later, in mid-
June 1851, Winn ambushed Johnson and fatally shot him in the presence of three African 
American witnesses, including Johnson’s son.  Johnson died the next morning after 
naming Winn as his assassin.  Local authorities arrested Winn and jailed him for two 
years, but after three trials, Winn was released from custody.
3
       
The day after Johnson’s murder, a Natchez newspaper, the Courier, printed a 
tribute to Johnson, extolling his good reputation.  The Courier portrayed Johnson as a 
man with a “peaceable character . . . [in] excellent standing” in the community.  Johnson 
held “a respectable position on account of his character, intelligence, and deportment.”  
“Many of [the] most respected citizens” of Natchez attended his funeral, and Reverend 
Watkins of the Methodist church insisted that Johnson’s “example [was] one well worthy 
of imitation by all of his class.”  The Courier implicated Winn as Johnson’s murderer and 
said that he “repeatedly . . . threaten[ed] Johnson’s life.”  While most in Natchez knew 
Winn as a man of color, Winn himself claimed “to be a white man, and [had] voted and 
given testimony as such.”  Because only African Americans witnessed the crime and 
could not testify against whites, the Courier maintained that Winn’s race might decide his 
fate.
4
  Indeed, it did.  Despite Winn’s reputation as “black hearted wretch” and the 
certainty about town of his guilt, Winn escaped conviction by claiming to be white.
5
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Johnson’s reputation as a fair-minded businessman, slave owner, and friend to 
powerful white men had long offered him and his family an elevated and protected 
position in the larger Natchez community and allowed him privileges usually denied free 
people of color.  Born a slave in Natchez and the son of a slave woman and her white 
master, Johnson’s father manumitted him in 1820 and set him up in business as a barber.  
Johnson swiftly become one of Natchez’s most prosperous and respected free blacks.  
Among free people of color in Mississippi, Johnson was something of an aristocrat.  At 
the time of his death, he had accumulated more than $25,000 in property.  This figure 
included the three most successful barber shops in Natchez, a small plantation south of 
town called Hard Scrabble, two houses in town, slaves, and farm tools and livestock.   
In personal and business matters, Johnson conducted himself much like a white 
man of the merchant class.  He set high standards of respectability and conduct for 
himself, his family, and his apprentices, and felt superior to most of the free black and 
poor white populations in Natchez and the surrounding area.  Although he could not vote 
or hold office, Johnson paid close attention to party politics and was a lifelong Democrat.  
He read voraciously, educated his children, and attended art exhibits and music concerts.  
Johnson engaged in a good deal of business with local residents, white and black.  
Although he was once enslaved himself, Johnson regarded slavery in much the same way 
as white slaveowners and bought and sold slaves.  He rented buildings and rooms to 
white men and hired them as laborers and overseers on his farm outside of town.  In one 
year, he made sixteen loans to local whites totaling more than $2,000 and made a profit 
through the interest he charged them.  He entered into contracts with whites and other 
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free blacks, and when he sued in court to enforce them, he hired white attorneys to 
represent him.   
Johnson also allied himself with white men in Natchez.  His associates included 
nabob, Colonel Adam L. Bingaman, a wealthy and respected white man and prominent 
Whig politician who had a long relationship with a free black woman.  Johnson’s home 
on State Street was in the white section of town.  His neighbors included banker Gabriel 
Tichenor (who was the former owner and father of Ann Battles Johnson, Johnson’s wife) 
and Peter Lapice, a prominent businessman and owner of Whitehall and Arnolia 
plantations. 
Johnson’s privileged position shielded him from many of the restrictions that free 
blacks faced, especially campaigns to remove free people of color from the state.  While 
other free blacks petitioned to remain in Mississippi, the Johnson family did not have to 
present such petitions to the local courts or the state legislature.  Their standing in the 
community spoke for itself, and they never faced persecution.  However, Johnson did 
have to secure petitions for his free black apprentices and called upon his connections to 
the white community when doing so.  He asked several of his white acquaintances to sign 
the petitions supporting his apprentices’ requests to remain in the state.  Indeed, as he 
commented in his diary, “Those names are an Ornament to Any paper—Those are 
Gentlemen of the 1
st
 Order of Talents and Standing.”
6
  
Johnson’s good reputation also protected his mother, Amy Johnson, an infamous 
troublemaker, from court action.  Until her death in 1849, Amy Johnson enjoyed a certain 
amount of notoriety in Natchez.  Although only five feet tall, she was prone to fighting 
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real and imagined adversaries, battles that extended from the streets into the courtroom.  
In 1816, she sued Alexander Hunter, a white man, for damages after a fistfight and 
received $25 compensation.
7
  Her son estimated that his mother fought three public 
quarrels a week and averaged one a day with her family.  In spite of her fractious nature, 
Amy Johnson’s status as the mother of a successful barber and property owner probably 
shielded her from trouble with local authorities.  Although she approached the local 
courts several times to fight her battles and sued whites and blacks a number of times to 
recover damages for assaults, Amy Johnson never faced criminal charges.
8
   
Johnson himself never openly challenged the conventions of the world in which 
he lived.  Instead, he struggled to fit into that world and gain its acceptance.  He never 
attained the social equality he craved, however, and despite his elevated status amongst 
free blacks, Johnson was vulnerable.  His murder in 1851, in particular, served as a 
reminder that he was black man in a white man’s regime.  It was a bitter irony that his 
death was avenged by law no more than if he had remained a slave.  Johnson’s murderer 
went unpunished because Mississippi law banned blacks from testifying against whites.  
While Winn was reputed to be a man of color, the prosecutor could not prove his “negro 
blood,” and in each of the three trials the court did not admit the eyewitness testimony.  
While Johnson behaved respectably, acquired skills that made him valuable in the 
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community, demonstrated that he was not a threat to the racial status quo by buying and 
selling slaves, and allied himself with local whites, he still remained at risk.  In the end, 
all of his efforts to gain an elevated position in his community would not be enough to 
obtain justice in court for his murder.  The benefits of a good reputation and community 
support had limits.
9
   
 
As the life and death of William Johnson suggests, in order to survive in a society 
dominated by whites, free blacks developed a number of strategies to protect themselves, 
their families, and their property.  They cultivated reputations as “good negroes,” learned 
marketable skills in order to add something of value to the larger community, developed 
relationships with whites willing to defend them in court and in daily life, and even 
accumulated slave property in order to demonstrate their dedication to self-advancement 
within the southern social order.   Survival meant working within the boundaries of their 
subordination and demonstrating that they were not a threat to a slave society.  The 
strategies they developed, moreover, afforded some free blacks with a measure of 
security and safety and provided them with necessary advantages when they went to 
court to protect their interests and limited rights.
10
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Free people of color, however, remained at risk.  Surviving and prospering in the 
slave South as a free black was no easy achievement.  Their freedom was precarious.  
The presumption of slavery always shadowed free people of color.  In response to the 
maturation of a plantation society in the southern interior and the incessant demand for 
slave labor, the specter of slave uprisings in St. Domingue and fear of slave rebellions 
such as Nat Turner’s in 1831, increased sectional tensions, and anxiety over abolitionists’ 
attacks on the institution of slavery, white southerners reinforced racial boundaries 
between whites and blacks in both law and daily life.  By the 1830s, whites in the slave 
South had made race the chief indicator of distinction in the region and replaced their 
more flexible system of social hierarchy with a systematic ideology of white 
supremacy.
11
  Blacks, defenders of slavery claimed, were a distinct race suited only for 
enslavement because it provided them with the direction, guidance, and benevolent 
discipline they otherwise lacked.  Slavery civilized people of African descent, who were 
not suited for the responsibilities of freedom, and kept them from descending into the 
savagery and debasement to which they were biologically inclined.  If slavery was the 
natural state of people of color, then free blacks were an aberration and a potentially 
subversive, dangerous, and unsettling example to slaves.
12
  Southern whites assigned 
African Americans—both enslaved and free—a permanently inferior status based on skin 
color and denied them economic, political, and legal rights.   
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Both prejudice and policy led white southerners to legally subordinate free blacks.  
Southern lawmakers did their best to make sure they enjoyed few rights.  Many states 
tried to equate free blacks with slaves in an effort to diminish their status as free persons.  
Every southern state except Louisiana denied free blacks the right to testify in court in 
cases involving whites, making it all the more difficult to prosecute whites who 
committed wrongs against them.  Because they could not sit on juries, whites decided 
their fate in court.  They had to carry papers proving their freedom and might be arrested 
as fugitive slaves if they could not produce these papers.  They had to periodically 
register with their local governments.  For example, in 1858 the Claiborne County, 
Mississippi, Board of Police summoned over forty free black families to appear before 
the county court to “show satisfaction” that they were legal residents of the county and 
the state.
 13
  Free blacks were highly subject to vagrancy laws.  Indeed, they were treated 
as vagrants if they left their county of residence in search of work.  State laws and 
municipal ordinances prohibited free people of color from practicing a number of 
occupations.  By 1850, free blacks in Louisiana could not operate billiard halls, coffee 
houses, or sell liquor, and they could not be employed as riverboat captains.  In 
Mississippi, they could not work as typesetters in a printing establishment for fear that 
they might publish and distribute subversive or abolitionist literature.  Violations of such 
laws could result in criminal prosecution, public whipping, and, in some cases, sale into 
slavery.  State legislators in both Mississippi and Louisiana enacted legislation forcing 
free blacks to leave each state and barred non-resident free people of color from entering.  
Towns and cities also added their own restrictions.  For example, an 1843 law in New 
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Orleans allowed local police to arrest free blacks born outside of Louisiana and 
incarcerate them until it could be determined whether or not they posed a threat to the 
peace of the city.
14  
Free blacks did, however, have standing before the law.  In Louisiana, free blacks 
could testify against whites in both civil and criminal actions, and they had the right to a 
trial by jury in the same courts as whites, not special tribunals reserved for people of 
color—enslaved or free—like much of the rest of the slave South, including Mississippi.  
While Mississippi denied people of color the right to testify against whites in either civil 
or criminal cases, in practice, however, individual free black Mississippians sometimes 
circumvented these statutory prohibitions in civil actions and sued whites to protect their 
property, recover debts, or enforce the terms of their contracts.  Free black men in both 
Mississippi and Louisiana had the legal right to make contracts and possess property, 
including slaves.  Single free women of color functioned on legal par with free black 




Although deprived of citizenship, relegated to a debased status, threatened with 
violence, and faced with exclusionary laws and other measures, many free blacks in 
Mississippi and Louisiana went to court to defend their position and resist the 
humiliations imposed upon them.  Free blacks frequently used the local courts to protect 
their interests and sued whites over debts owed them, broken contracts, property disputes, 
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and a number of other disagreements.  Much like slaves suing for their freedom or 
married women suing their husbands, free blacks were shrewd litigators and wielded their 
ties to their local communities to their advantage in court.  In so doing, however, they had 
to strike a delicate balance between deference and self-assertion when initiating lawsuits.  
As long as free blacks conceded their subordination and did not challenge their position 
within the southern hierarchy overall, they found redress for wrongs done to them and 
debts owed to them in the local courts of the Natchez District.  
 
In order to survive in a society where the power of whites seemed unlimited, free 
blacks developed a number of strategies that provided them with advantages in court and 
tied them to their local communities.  Free blacks needed to demonstrate that they 
remembered their subordinate position in southern society.  They knew that white 
southerners could be unforgiving to those who forgot their place and failed to live up to 
the expectations of whites, and they supported, rewarded, and defended the free people of 
color they found worthy.  Whites in Mississippi and Louisiana demanded deference and 
obedience from free blacks in their communities and reinforced those demands in the 
laws of both states.  According to Louisiana law, “Free people of color ought never to 
insult or strike white people, nor presume to conceive themselves equal to white; but on 
the contrary, they ought to yield to them in every occasion, and never speak or answer to 
them but with respect, under the penalty of imprisonment, according to the nature of the 
offense.”
16
  Free blacks needed to be on guard constantly.  Even a careless boast might be 
interpreted as insolence against white people and would justify them in “correcting” free 
black offenders.  Those who did not accommodate to whites frequently faced criminal 
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charges for crimes against deference, such as insulting whites, not yielding the road, or 
failing to perform the duties their station in life demanded.  In one case, thirty-two white 
members of the Richard family in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, sued Celeste, a free 
woman of color, claiming that she pretended to be free and refused to serve them.  They 
demanded that the court discipline her for her lack of obedience and force her to return to 
their service as their slave.
17
  Indeed, free blacks had to convince their white neighbors 
that they knew their place.  They had to be above reproach.       
Thus, free blacks needed to develop reputations as “good negroes”:  obedient, 
sober, industrious, and deferential or risk the consequences.  Reputations for such 
behavior shielded them from the nearly unlimited number of criminal charges that might 
be mounted against them and from the restrictive laws that circumscribed their lives.
18
  
When Peter Bell, a free man of color in Natchez, Mississippi, faced charges “for keeping 
an irregular and disorderly house of ill fame” and being “an evil example [to] others” in 
the community, he countered the charges by calling white witnesses to testify to his good 
and honest reputation.  The jury found him not guilty.
19
   
Establishing themselves as honest, respectable, and responsible, however, was not 
always enough to gain acceptance or support among the white community.  Free blacks 
also needed to develop marketable skills to provide indispensible services to the larger 
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community.  Moreover, if they could build their businesses and accumulate a measure of 
prosperity with the help of slave labor, then they proved themselves all the more 
trustworthy to white planters.  In return, those planters might come to their aid in court 
and provide them with a measure of security.      
Free blacks’ marketable skills enhanced their reputations in and ties to their 
communities, and helped them forge favorable relationships with whites, advancing their 
positions.  These skills gave free blacks something of value to offer their community.  It 
made them less expendable.  Skilled laborers like kettle makers or barbers performed 
indispensable services for whites, and these services had important legal and material 
benefits.  Their improved standing in their communities helped them petition to remain in 
Mississippi and Louisiana, especially as lawmakers passed legislation requiring free 
blacks to leave each state.  William Hayden, a free black barber living in Natchez, 
successfully petitioned the state legislature in 1829 to remain in the state after ensuring 
lawmakers that he did a good business, had a good reputation, and owned property.  John 
Minor, a cotton planter and a member of one of Mississippi’s wealthiest families, 
testified to Hayden’s “character” as well as the services he provided, and declared him a 
“fit subject” to remain in the state.  He was handy and well-behaved, and because of this 
local planters believed he should stay.
20
  In 1859, Ann Caldwell, another free person of 
color living in Natchez, used her proficiency as a nurse to remain in the state of 
Mississippi.  Over one hundred white residents of Natchez co-signed her petition and 
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claimed she was a faithful nurse with a good character.
21
  Free blacks’ specialized skills 
boosted their standing in their community, granted them more control over their work, 
additional leverage in their negotiations for hire, and provided them a better bargaining 
position when approaching the courts to protect their contracts.  Such skills also gave 
them a level of prosperity that made it possible to initiate lawsuits, hire lawyers to 
represent them, and pay court costs.
22
 
Free blacks like William Johnson also cultivated reputations for adhering to the 
racial status quo and some accommodated to the social order set by southern whites by 
accumulating slave property.  By demonstrating that they did not hesitate to own and 
exploit slave labor, free black slaveowners—some even recently freed slaves—reassured 
their white neighbors that they supported the institution of slavery.  As masters of black 
slaves themselves, free black slaveowners proved to whites that race did not decide their 
loyalties.
23
  Slaveownership also represented an opportunity to gain a level of prosperity 
and wealth—and wealth could also provide free blacks with the means to initiate lawsuits 
to protect their interests.  Moreover, a reputation as a respected slaveowner could have 
legal benefits, as Marguerite Ove, a free black Louisianan, found.  Ove sued Arnaud 
Lartigue for $3000 in damages for failing to return the slaves she had hired out to him.  
After witnesses came to her aid and claimed that she was a responsible slaveholder and 
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good neighbor and declared the slaves her property, the court found for Ove and ordered 
Lartigue to return her property and pay the court costs.
24
 
In order to prove their worthiness as valued members of the larger community, 
free blacks needed the support of whites willing to publicly affirm their good behavior 
and worth and come to their aid.  Making connections with the right white allies, people 
who knew them personally, judged them as individual human beings, valued their work, 
and defended their character could offer them much needed security.  By engaging the 
assistance of whites, free blacks wielded their ties to their local communities to their 
advantage.   
The support of white allies offered free blacks legal benefits.  These supporters 
backed free blacks’ petitions to the local courts and state legislatures to remain in the 
state, as William Hayden and Ann Caldwell found.  They served as witnesses in their 
trials, and sometimes testified against other whites.  They requested pardons from 
governors based on local knowledge about free blacks accused of crimes.  They posted 
security bonds for free blacks without the financial means to do so themselves.  They 
paid court costs.  They swore oaths on behalf of free people held as slaves.  They gave 
legal advice, and they offered their services as attorneys to black litigants.  Indeed, white 
allies helped free blacks attain legal redress in court for wrongs done to them or debts 
owed them.  
A bad reputation, no marketable skills, and lack of support from the white 
community could have devastating consequences, as Lewis Burwell found in 1822 when 
the magistrates’ court in Natchez found him guilty of “being a free negro” and refusing to 
                                                 
24
 Ove v. Lartigue, Records of the Fourth Judicial District Court, #320, Pointe Coupee Parish, 
Louisiana, 1816.   
154 
 
leave the state of Mississippi.  Because Burwell could not post a $600 security bond 
guaranteeing his “good behavior,” and because he did not leave the state after thirty days 
when ordered to do so, the court ordered his sale as a slave to the “highest bidder.”  No 
one came to Burwell’s aid.  On the contrary, it appears that the white community in 
Natchez was anxious to be rid of him.  Burwell probably had a poor reputation among 
slaveowners.  In 1818, the court found him guilty twice for selling liquor to slaves 
without their masters’ permission, and in 1819 charged him with assaulting a slave 
belonging to David Eliot, a local slaveholder.  Without white allies willing to come to his 
aid to confirm his value to the community and general worth, Burwell was enslaved.
25
  
Burwell’s enslavement points to the precarious position of many free blacks.  Survival 
meant remembering one’s place and proving oneself worthy of the support of white 
southerners.  Burwell did neither and paid the price.    
 
While many free blacks in Mississippi and Louisiana engaged their white 
neighbors as legal allies, some engaged whites as legal foes.  Suing whites, however, was 
dangerous.  Free blacks risked appearing uppity.  Free blacks needed to employ a careful 
mix of deference and self-assertion in court in order to protect themselves.  They could 
not forget their position within a southern racial order dedicated to white supremacy.  But 
their very survival might mean using the courts to protect their limited legal rights, 
especially their right to own property or to enforce the terms of their contracts.  
                                                 
25
 State of Mississippi v. Burwell, Adams County, Mississippi, 1822, Records of the Circuit Court, 
Group 1820-29, Box 12, File 32, CRP, HNF; State of Mississippi v. Burwell, Adams County, Mississippi, 
1818, Records of the Circuit Court, Group 1810-19, Box 40, File 80, CRP, HNF; State of Mississippi v. 
Burwell, Adams County, Mississippi, 1818, Records of the Circuit Court, Group 1810-19, Box 40, File 81, 
CRP, HNF; and State of Mississippi v. Burwell, Adams County, Mississippi, 1819, Records of the Circuit 
Court, Group 1820-29, Box 1, File 27, CRP, HNF.  
155 
 
Moreover, having the courage to seek redress in court against a white person might have 
added to their stature and increased their standing in the eyes of whites, especially since 
jurors often found in favor of black litigants.   
While free blacks needed to behave according to their position within the southern 
hierarchy, part of proving themselves worthy to their white neighbors meant the 
willingness to go to court to protect themselves and their property.  Propertied white men 
probably would not respect another man who did not safeguard his property.  By custom 
and law, southern men handled the economic aspects of their households.  Part of being a 
competent householder meant prudently managing one’s property.  In order to 
demonstrate that they were capable of heading households and able to handle the 
responsibilities of freedom, free black men had to go to court to defend their livelihoods.  
Their reputation as adept heads of households depended on it.  Men like William Johnson 
used the courts to safeguard their property and, in so doing, demonstrated to the larger 
community that they were competent and responsible householders.  Indeed, free men of 
color sued whites in order to protect their property.  “Black Ben,” a free man of color 
living in Natchez, Mississippi, sued several white men to recover a number of unpaid 
debts.  For example, he sued William Brooks twice for sizeable amounts (once in 1814 
for $870 and again in 1816 for $902), money Brooks owed him over contracts for cotton.  
In both instances, the court found for Ben.
26
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Free black men also sued whites over broken labor contracts and wages owed 
them, lawsuits they won more often than not.
27
  While free blacks’ contracts had legal 
protections, this did not mean that they could contract as if they were white persons.  
They were, after all, degraded persons within the social order, and their subordinate 
position probably meant that they were at a disadvantage when contracting for wages or 
prices.  Contracts were often slanted in favor of whites.
28
  Free black men did, however, 
use the courts to enforce the agreed upon terms of their contracts with whites and looked 
to the law to protect them in the same way that it protected whites.  In 1835, John Hardes, 
a free black Mississippian, sued William Mosby, a white man, for the $240 Mosby owed 
him for carpentry work he performed on Mosby’s cotton plantation.  Although Mosby 
claimed he already paid Hardes and denied he owed him anything further, the jury found 
for Hardes for $240.
29
  In 1859, Leandre Decuir, a free black Louisianan, received a 
judgment for $519 plus interest and court costs from a white man, Patrick Gleason, who 
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hired him to raft and run timber.
30
  Honore Roth, a Louisiana mason, brick maker, and 
kettle settler, often sued his white employers to recover the money they owed him for the 
labor he performed.
31
   
Despite the risks, some free black men were remarkably forceful when going to 
court to enforce the terms of their contracts and looked to the courts to protect them as 
they would whites.
32
  The language Louis de Cadoret used in his 1821 lawsuit against his 
employer was particularly inflammatory and a striking difference from the deferential 
tone taken by free blacks like William Hayden.  Cadoret did not call upon his reputation 
as a “good negro.”  Instead, he demanded equal protection and justice from the court and 
accused his employer of being dishonorable.  Cadoret, a resident of Point Coupee Parish, 
Louisiana, claimed that Joseph Decuir, a white planter, had hired him as “laborer and 
overseer” on his plantation for a year and contracted to pay him $300 for that labor.  
Despite the fact that Cadoret “faithfully performed his duty, and never gave cause for 
complaint,” Decuir dismissed him after a few short months and paid him only part of his 
promised wages.  Then, when Cadoret complained about the broken contract and 
demanded the money owed him, Decuir offered to allow him to remain on the plantation 
picking cotton at a far lower wage.  Cadoret, being a man “without money, and without 
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employment,” wanted the court to enforce the original terms of his labor contract and 
compel Decuir to pay him for the remainder of the year.  Due to Decuir’s “perfidy in 
hiring [Cadoret] with the intent to cast him out on the world when it would be difficult to 
find employment,” he wanted the $244 owed him.  And because he “suffered great injury 
in being deprived of the opportunity of hiring with some planter of known integrity,” he 
also wanted $1,000 damages.   
For Carodet, the court represented more than a site of dispute resolution:  it was 
also a site of governance.  Cadoret did not ask for back wages and damages only.  He also 
used his lawsuit to publicly reprimand Decuir.  He ended his petition with this striking 
remark to the court,  
[H]e [Cadoret] had the happiness of living in a country governed by laws that 
protected the liberty and rights of a poor overseer, no less than an opulent planter, 
that having once dismissed him, the contract was dissolved and could not be 
renewed without mutual consent; that he would never contract with a man who, 
wallowing in his riches, hired an overseer by the year, during the busy season, and 
when he had less to do, perfidiously dismissed him, thru. . . avarice; as if he had 
acted thru ignorance of the law, yet his religion must have taught him that to 
defraud a laborer his salary, is one of the four sins that cry to heaven, equally with 
willful murder, of which the latter crime, not only of [Decuir’s] conduct, but from 
his present threats the Petitioner might reasonably think himself exposed to 
become the victim should he return to the service of Joseph Decuir.   
 
Despite the risks that using such language might pose, Cadoret let Decuir know what he 
thought of him—in public, no less.  He accused Decuir of dishonesty, greed, and criminal 
behavior.  In Cadoret’s estimation, Decuir was not an honorable man, and he wanted the 
community to know it.  Cadoret publicly shamed Decuir before his peers, and perhaps 
forced better behavior out of him.  He also reminded Decuir of his responsibilities as a 
good employer and expected the court to uphold those responsibilities.   
159 
 
Cadoret positioned himself as person with “rights” to defend and demanded equal 
protection from the courts.  In his view of the law, the “poor overseer” enjoyed the same 
rights and protections as the “opulent planter,” white or black.  Cadoret viewed his labor 
as his property to sell, property his employer “perfidiously” and “sinfully” disregarded.  
As the owner of his labor, he was entitled to put that labor up for sale and benefit from its 
rewards.  It was property he expected the courts to help him protect, especially since 
Decuir was an untrustworthy man without “integrity.”  He insisted the law come to his 
aid and safeguard his bargain.
33
  For those free blacks who worked for wages like 
Cadoret, the ownership of one’s labor was critical to their status as free persons.  Free 
blacks’ right to contract, to possess property, and to own one’s labor and oneself 
represented crucial hallmarks of their freedom and placed them in stark contrast to slaves.   
Although Cadoret’s forceful language was unusual, other free black men used the 
courts to sue whites and assert their rights to the fruits of their own labor and to protect 
their property.  They too approached the courts as knowledgeable and experienced 
litigators and viewed the courts as a site of fairness and justice where blacks should be 
equally protected by the law.  In September 1818, Augustin Borie, a free black planter, 
petitioned the district court in Iberville Parish, Louisiana asking to “dissolve” the 
“partnership” that existed between himself and Jean Baptiste Lorrie, a white cotton 
planter.  Two years prior, Borie and Lorrie contracted to build a cotton gin “in 
community” situated on Borie’s land.  But, Borie claimed, some “difficulties” had 
recently arisen between the two men, which had made it “disadvantageous to continue 
their community” and co-partnership.  Because Borie and Lorrie held the gin “in equal 
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proportion,” Borie wanted it sold and an “equal division” of the profits distributed to the 
two men on “equitable . . . terms and conditions.”  Lorrie, however, denied that the “co-
partnership” still existed between himself and Borie and claimed that the cotton gin 
should belong to him because he alone provided the materials and the labor.  In his 
defense, Lorrie summoned two witnesses, Jacques Rivere and Jean Trapper, both free 
men of color.  While the cotton gin resided on Borie’s property and “both parties were 
equal sharers in all the expenses that accrued, of every kind,” Rivere and Trapper 
recounted, Lorrie had supplied the wood to construct it and the labor “of three of his 
negroes” to build it.  Furthermore, they claimed, Lorrie “worked as hard as one of his 
negroes himself.”  Other witnesses, such as Preval Robilliard, claimed that while the two 
men had entered into a contract to build and share the cotton gin as “equal partners” and 
in “equal portion,” Lorrie provided the lion’s share of the capital to construct and 
maintain it.  Although a valuable commodity, Lorrie allowed the cotton gin to reside on 
Borie’s plantation rather than his own and provided much of the labor and materials for 
its construction.  After considering the evidence, the jury denied Borie’s request to 
dissolve the partnership.  Three years later, Borie and Lorrie were back in court again, 
fighting over the same cotton gin.  This time Lorrie sued Borie, claiming that while the 
two contracted to share the profits of the cotton gin “equally,” Borie had kept the 
proceeds and now owed Lorrie three thousand dollars.  The two men came to an 
agreement without further court intervention, however, and requested that the court 
dismiss the lawsuit.
34
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Rather than behaving obsequiously or deferentially when suing a white man, 
Borie insisted that the law protected him equally, specifically asking the court to make an 
“equitable division” of the property.  He consistently used the terms “equality” or “equal” 
to describe his “mutual bargain” with Lorrie.  He was neither reluctant to sue a white 
man, nor intimidated by the formality or mystery of the judicial process.  Instead, he 
understood the ins and outs of the southern legal system and expected it to work to his 
advantage.  Borie was also a frequent and skilled litigator and sued several white men in 
his lifetime.  Indeed, between 1815 and 1840, Borie was involved in over twenty 
lawsuits.
35
   
While free black men needed to demonstrate that they were worthy members of 
southern society and competent householders, free black women were equally litigious 
and used the courts to protect their property and livelihoods.  Free black women also 
engaged their white neighbors as legal foes and consistently received verdicts in their 
favor.  Some sued whites repeatedly.  When Rachel, Elizabeth, and Ellen Rapp, all free 
black women, successfully sued John Fletcher, a white man, in Louisiana for a $500 debt 
he owed them, he fled to Mississippi to avoid repaying them.  They pursued him 
doggedly from New Orleans to Natchez, attempting to recover the money.  Once in 
Mississippi, the three women sued him again, this time receiving a second judgment for 
$800 plus interest and court costs—three hundred dollars more than the first verdict.
36
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Marguerite, a free black woman from Iberville Parish, Louisiana, frequently went to court 
to reclaim the money owed her by white men.  In 1831, she sued William Janes for the 
$105 he owed her for renting her slave, Urbin.  Later that year she sued Simon Allain for 
an unpaid debt of $64.
37
  Josephine Degruise, a free woman of color, sued the children of 
her recently deceased employer in 1859 for $2,000 in back wages “for eighteen years of 
long and useful services” as a nurse and “faithful servant” to their father.  While the court 
ordered an inventory of the estate in order to see if it could meet her demand for pay, the 
outcome of the case is not known.
38
 
The women of the Belly family of Iberville Parish, Louisiana, were particularly 
litigious and sued whites in court to protect their property and redress wrongs done to 
them.  Daughters of Pierre Belly, a Frenchmen, planter, and judge, and Rose Belly, Pierre 
Belly’s former slave and long-time consort, the Belly daughters and their descendants 
managed to carve out a place for themselves in a white man’s world and prosper.
39
  They 
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 In August 1779, Rose arrived in Louisiana on board the brigantine La Golondrina.  She was part 
of a shipment of thirty slaves sent to Pierre Belly by his business agent in Jamaica.  Her arrival marked the 
beginning of a long and loving relationship with Pierre Belly that lasted nearly thirty five years, produced 
six daughters, and ended only with his death in 1814.  Rose lived with Pierre as his wife and their 
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did so, however, according to the terms dictated by white southerners in a slave society.  
They cultivated reputations as respectable, able, honest, and prosperous members of their 
community.  They behaved as whites of equal financial status.  They married free black 
men of similar Afro-French backgrounds, prosperous men who took up arms alongside 
whites as part of the Eighth Regiment during the War of 1812.  They educated their 
children with private tutors and sent them to France for additional schooling.  Instead of 
challenging the institution of slavery, they bought and sold slaves to labor on their 
enormous plantations.  With the land, slaves, and money they inherited and accrued, 
coupled with their influence and talent for business and their skills as astute litigators, the 
Belly daughters and their husbands amassed substantial estates.  Of the six Louisiana free 
blacks who owned more than fifty slaves in 1860, three were descendants of Pierre and 
Rose Belly.  By the eve of the Civil War, Pierre and Rose Belly’s descendants formed 
one of the most affluent free black family groups in the United States.
40
 
                                                                                                                                                 
community accepted them as married.  Pierre freed Rose and their daughters during his lifetime and legally 
recognized the girls as his “natural children,” born of Rose, “commonly called Rose Belly free negro 
woman.”  Pierre and Rose baptized each of their daughters in the Catholic Church.  Several years before his 
death, Pierre, a former judge and easily the wealthiest planter in Iberville Parish, passed much of his 
property to Rose, who managed it and cared for their children.  Later in his will, Pierre bequeathed one half 
of what remained of his estate to his surviving brother and sister, both residents of France, and bestowed (in 
accordance with Louisiana law) one fourth to Rose, and one fourth to his daughters. When he died in 1814, 
Pierre’s holdings included 5,593 arpents, five plantations, ninety-six slaves, a house, cabins, a corn mill, a 
kiln, and many other improvements.  Rose died fourteen years later, in 1828, conferring her property to 
their daughters.  Pierre and Rose were interred together in a family tomb in the St. Raphael Cemetery in 
Iberville Parish.  On Pierre Belly, Rose Belly, and their descendants, see Ulysses R. Ricard, Jr., “Pierre 
Belly and Rose: More Forgotten People,” The Chicory Review 1, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 2-17; and Succession of 
Pierre Belly, Records of the Probate Court, #65, Iberville Parish, Louisiana, 1814. 
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 Immediately after the Civil War, the Belly descendents, like their white planter counterparts, 
faced financial losses due to the general economic decline in the post-war South.  However, their economic 
decline corresponded with a rise in their political activity during Reconstruction.  Respected in their 
community, propertied, and well-educated, the Belly descendants became leaders in the struggle for racial 
equality in postbellum Louisiana.  Pierre G. Deslonde, grandson of Pierre and Rose Belly, served as a 
delegate to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1867-68, a member of the House of Representatives 
from 1868 to 1870, and the Louisiana Secretary of State from 1872 to 1876.  Another grandson, Antoine 




The Belly daughters, perhaps because their father was a judge, enjoyed 
considerable legal acumen and consistently used the courts to protect their interests.  
They entered into contracts with whites, and sought to protect the terms of those contracts 
in court.  For example, in 1828, Marie Francoise Belly brought a claim against Louis 
Bousagne, a white man, for the $130 he owed her.  She had “contracted to board 
Bousagne and to furnish him with two horses for the space of one year,” but, despite her 
repeated “demands” for payment, he did not compensate her until she took him to court.
41
  
They often sued their white neighbors over property disputes or slave warranties.  Two of 
the Belly women even sued their husbands for protection against domestic abuse and for 
divorce.  The local courts provided them with the means to protect themselves, their 
families, and their property.  After the Civil War, Pierre and Rose Belly’s granddaughter, 
Josephine Dubuclet Decuir, wife of the wealthy sugar planter, Antoine Decuir, sued the 
owner of the steamship “Governor Allen” for denying her access to a cabin set aside for 
white passengers.
42
  Although she initially won that lawsuit, the United States Supreme 
Court later overturned it, employing a rationale that would eventually be used to support 
the “separate but equal” doctrine.  As with men like Louis de Cadoret and Augustin 
Borie, the women of the Belly family were skilled litigators and used the courts to 
improve their position in southern society. 
 
When free blacks sued whites in court to protect their property, enforce the terms 
of their contracts, or demand pay for the labor they performed, they assumed a far 
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 Mrs. Josephine Decuir v. John G. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1; 1875. 
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different relationship with southern whites than the master/slave relationship.  By 
confronting their white adversaries in court, they forced white southerners to recognize 
them as worthy adversaries.  Despite their limited rights, free men and women of color 
demonstrated an astute understanding of the law and the intricacies of the southern legal 
system.  They stood up in court and used this knowledge to challenge their superiors, 
sometimes a great personal risk.   
Free blacks, like wives and slaves, mobilized their extensive community networks 
on their own behalf as they faced their neighbors in court.  Their disputes did not begin 
and end in the courtroom.  Indeed, law was inseparable from community relations, and 
free blacks’ lawsuits were community affairs.  Local communities intervened on the 
behalf of people of color.  Free blacks’ knowledge of the legal system as well as their 
capacity to harness their community networks armed them with a measure of power to 
protect themselves, their families, and their property. 
In order to survive in a slaveholders’ world dedicated to white supremacy, free 
blacks needed to employ a scrupulous mix of deference and self-assertion when initiating 
lawsuits.  Challenging the southern racial hierarchy was dangerous and sometimes 
unwise.  They had to be constantly on guard and demonstrate that they remembered their 
place.  In ways similar to other marginalized southerners, free blacks conceded their 
subordinate status and worked within its boundaries.  In doing so, they reinforced their 
marginalized position in the southern racial hierarchy. 
Relations between whites and blacks, however, were not just a set of rules handed 
down by southern slaveholders, lawmakers, or racial theorists.  The sharpening of racial 
boundaries and the resultant repression of free blacks was an uneven process.  Free 
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people of color employed several strategies to defend themselves, their place in southern 
society, their families, and their property, demonstrating their resilience and fortitude.  
White southerners may have chosen intolerance as their guiding ideology, but they were 
sometimes fully capable of tolerance in their day-to-day lives.  The position of free 
blacks within southern society was locally negotiated, locally determined, and locally 









































In June 1857, Irma, an enslaved woman in Iberville Parish, Louisiana, sued John 
Baptiste Rils, the executor of her late owner’s estate, for her freedom.  Her former 
owner’s will, Irma claimed, promised her her liberty, yet Rils had to take “the legal steps 
to carry out the provisions of the will.”  She asked the court to declare her free.  In his 
response to Irma’s petition, Rils conceded that Irma’s late owner had granted her a 
“bequest for her freedom” in his will; yet, “the laws and policies of the state no longer 
permitted the emancipation of slaves.”  Indeed, in March 1857, a few months before Irma 
sued for her legal liberty, the Louisiana legislature prohibited all emancipations of 
slaves.
1
  Thus, Rils argued, he did not have “the legal power or authority” to free her.  
The court agreed, dismissing the case as a nonsuit and denying her request to appeal her 
lawsuit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
2
  The Louisiana courts had ceased to be a site 
of legal redress for slaves like Irma seeking their freedom.  The coming years, however, 
would decide her fate—the Louisiana Constitution of 1864 abolished slavery.  If she had 
not yet attained her freedom by other means, on January 1, 1865, Irma gained her legal 
liberty.  Her world changed dramatically in the years between her 1857 lawsuit and end 
of the Civil War.  
During the war, most courts in the Natchez District (as well as other areas of 
Mississippi and Louisiana) ceased to function.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana closed 
its doors in late April 1862, and by early May Union troops succeeded in capturing New 
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 Irma v. Rils, Records of the Sixth Judicial District Court, #977, Iberville Parish Louisiana, 1857. 
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Orleans.  The first Union warships travelled upriver to Natchez, Mississippi, in May 
1862, but Natchez was not occupied by the Union army until the summer of 1863.  The 
Adams Circuit Court closed in 1863 and did not reopen until 1866.  In September 1863, 
parishioners of the Fellowship Baptist Church in Jefferson County, Mississippi, 
expressed the sense of lawlessness many in the area felt with the following lament in its 
minute book:  “War!  War!  War!  No civil law!  But Anarchy and Misrule.  Military 
sway by Friend and Foe!  Property Rights and Religion will nigh all gone!”
3
  
After the Civil War, the courts convened once again, hearing the lawsuits of 
wives suing their husbands, blacks suing whites, and the newly free suing their former 
masters.  But the relationships between southern subordinates and their superiors had 
changed, and in the case of slaves and their former owners, had changed dramatically.  
White women and African Americans continued to go to court to protect their interests, 
make demands on those in positions of power, and challenge the authority of their 
superiors—lessons they learned and tactics they perfected in the decades leading up to 
the war.   
 
When white women and African Americans went to court in the Natchez District 
between 1820 and 1860, they did so as skilled litigators, despite their limited legal rights 
and exclusion from formal politics.  Their intimate knowledge of the law, coupled with 
an astute ability to harness their community networks, gave them a degree of power:  the 
power to improve their situations and the power to help shape the rules that governed 
their lives.  Indeed, the struggle for power between subordinated people and their 
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superiors was sometimes fought over in the terrain of law.  The lawsuits of wives, slaves, 
and free people of color against their husbands, masters, and social betters demonstrated 
that the authority of white men was far from absolute.  Mastery took work.  It required 
negotiation.  White women and African Americans used the courts to play a role in that 
negotiation of power.  
Part of why subordinates attained redress in court for the wrongs done to them by 
their superiors, however, was because of the limited nature of the challenges they 
mounted.  They did not directly confront patriarchal marriage or the institution of slavery.  
Instead, they challenged its excesses and wrongs.  By working within the boundaries of 
their subordination, they reified the system that subordinated them.  Yet, the tropes of 
subordination—of deference, of powerlessness—that white women and African 
Americans called upon when going to court also gave them legal standing.  Marginalized 
litigants used the stereotypes of the obedient wife in need of protection, the good and 
deferential negro with something to offer the larger community, and the well-behaved 
slave who had served his master faithfully as a rhetorical strategy.  They transformed 
their subordination into a usable legal principle and used it as a strategy of power.  This 
strategy granted women divorces, slaves their freedom, and free blacks additional 
autonomy over their lives.  
The public nature of subordinates’ disputes was critical.  The local courts were 
inseparable from social relations on the ground, and as such, white women and African 
Americans could wield their ties to their local communities to their advantage.  Not only 
did local communities intervene on the behalf of marginalized people, they also helped 
determine the outcome of cases, weighing in, providing information, and passing 
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judgment.  In the local courts, both subordinates and their superiors were judged as 
human beings, as individuals.  The authority of even the most powerful and wealthiest 
leaders of a community was sometimes contingent on the fulfillment of their allotted 
roles within the social order.  When they failed to fulfill those roles, they faced legal 
action, weakened political and social standing, and loss of reputation. 
For marginalized people, the courts served as a site of governance.  Because of 
the public nature of litigation in the Old South, subordinates could use their lawsuits to 
shame their superiors into changing their behavior.  When white men did not live up to 
the standards expected of them, they faced punishment.  There was a line they simply 
could not cross without consequences.  With the lawsuits they mounted in public, wives, 
free people of color, and slaves critiqued the power and authority of their superiors.  
While they did not sit on the magistrate’s bench or in the halls of government where 
community leaders made decisions about conduct, white women and free and enslaved 
African Americans helped to shape the rules of daily life.  Indeed, their litigation served 
as a mechanism to exert informal political power in a society which denied them access 
to formal political arenas.  In the “small politics” of everyday life in their communities, 
their words had sway well beyond what their status as subordinates could foretell.   
Law was not simply the province of the elite.  It was also a weapon of the 
subordinated.  Marginalized people frequently used the lower courts to contest the 
authority of the elite and improve their lives.  What appears from appellate records to be 
law wielded hegemonically in the interests of the master class was far more messy and 
flexible on the ground.   
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Thus, turning our attention to local legal records reveals white women and 
African Americans’ intimate knowledge of the law and their potential role in shaping it, 
domestic dependents readiness to challenge their husbands and masters, judges and juries 
willingness to punish household heads for their transgressions against their dependents, 
rules articulated in statutes and appellate courts but locally negotiated and sometimes 
partially enforced, and the potential flexibility of the law as it was lived daily by ordinary 
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